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The intention of this present study is to examine Pierre Bayle 
in his context as an historian rather than a philosopher. The purpose 
of the thesis will be to analyse the influence exerted upon his idea of 
history by the arguments which he advanced in defence of toleration in 
the Dictionnaire historique et critique. I shall attempt to show that 
while his idea of history remained essentially seventeenth century in 
character, the demands of his defence of toleration led him to make certain 
departures from the traditional seventeenth century concept of history, 
and that in doing so he reached conclusions which represented the begin-
nings of a dramatic metamorphosis in French historical thought. 
The fact that until recently Bayle has been viewed primarily as 
a philosopher has tended to overshadow his abilities as an historian. 
The title of "le philosophe de Rotterdam" which has been bestowed upon 
him seems to ignore the fact that while at the "Ecole Illustre" he held 
the post of "professeur en philosophie et en histoire". Moreover, this 
pre-occupation with his capacity as a philosopher has proved an obstacle 
to a satisfactory understanding of his meaning and intentions in the 
Dictionnaire. All too often the encyclopaedic nature of this work has 
encouraged scholars to examine its various subjects in isolation without 
attempting to discern any overall relationship between them. If, however, 
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CHAPTER I  
TOLERATION, HISTORY AND THE DICTIONNAIRE  
On September 17th., 1697 Bayle answered Pierre Jurieu's 
criticisms of the Dictionnaire historique et critique1 by remarking 
"En un mot, tout ce que j'ai fait se trouve enferme dans le ressort ou 
dans la jurisdiction d'un Ecrivain, qui donne une Histoire accompagnee 
d'un Commentaire Critique." 2 This was no idle boast, for in fact the 
Dictionnaire may best be described as a monumental work of history de-
voted in its critical footnotes, to the propagation of the theme of 
universal religious toleration. What makes this work unique is that two 
elements are fused together in its footnotes: it is at one and the same 
time a work of historical scholarship and a disjointed polemical treatise. 
It will be the purpose of this study to demonstrate that through the re-
action of these two aspects of the Dictionnaire upon one another, Bayle 
1 On the whole, the abbreviated title Dictionnaire will be used through-
out the rest of this study. Quotations in the text and citations in 
the footnotes of this thesis are taken from my own copy of the 
Dictionnaire historique et critique, quatriame edition, revue, corrizee  
et augmentee avec la vie de l'auteur par Mr. Des Maizeaux. 4 vols. 
Amsterdam & Leyden, 1730. The spelling in this edition has been followed 
for all quotations. The citation of Bayle's own footnotes is made 
according to the title of the article, which is capitalized (e.g. 
BEAULIEU), and the alphabetical letter of the note (e.g. note B). 
2 "Suite des reflexions sur le pretendu judgement du public', Dictionnaire. 
IV, p.660. 
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produced an implicit philosophy of history which, although profoundly 
seventeenth century in character, included certain assumptions which 
provided a basis for the growth of the modern approach to history. 
It is not commonly agreed, even to-day, that Bayle did develop 
a philosophy of history. In 1963, H. T. Mason wrote "When a philosophy 
of history was required, Bayle had little advice to give, and Voltaire, 
like the eighteenth century in general, had painfully to elaborate and 
systematize his outlook as well as his times would permit. 	Although 
"philosophes" like Montesquieu, Diderot, d'Holbach and Voltaire did ela-
borate and systematize Bayle's ideas, they misunderstood his fundamental 
meaning and intention, for they regarded the Dictionnaire as an arsenal 
of sceptical and anti-religious arguments with which to attack the 
traditional representatives of authority in the eighteenth century: 
the Church and the Monarchy. Bayles own horizons did not extend 
as far as this. His goal was simply and solely to establish universal 
religious toleration and preserve religious peace. Nevertheless, 
whether he intended it or not, we are bound to acknowledge that Bayle's 
Dictionnaire exercised a profound influence upon the principal philo-
sophical movement of the eighteenth century, 4 which in turn has 
3 H. T. Mason, Pierre Bayle and Voltaire. London: O.U.P., 1963, p.133. 
Apart from Mason, both Ernst Cassirer and Alfred Cobban adopted this 
view. 
4 See Walter Rex, Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965, p. 201, where he remarks "It is possible 
that, historically, the main interest of Bayle's article [DAVID] lies in 
the use the I philosophee made of it in the Enlightenment; perhaps, 
indeed, from one point of view, their interpretation - whether right 
or wrong - is the important one to remember." 
*IIX'd 'S961 'TTTaleN-sqqoa :eueTpui asuodeueTPul 
Nsnag 2Tv13 jo a3ue2sTsse eq2tlA 'npdo y pimp-Fa 'ao2Tpa eq2 Aq 
•sueaT ‘suoTapeTas 'Aa5uoT20TG TeDITT23 Pue Te3T103aTH Wag eaxeu 9 
'TTTA'd 4M1 'uT2/1. 9 aaTAasTH :sTaed mePlalsme .sauemnoop aa 
sapn2g 'mepaaaaou ap eqdosoTTqd aT 	aziaTd '(pa) uoqTa viva s 
padoTaAap amilq Aym Wag 2sq2 22e; eq2 paSpaTmouve seq oqm anotios 
ATuo eq2 sT 'aeAamoq '9ssnoaqs1 aux .2xaluoo Aanaueo qauee2q2Te sTq 
usq2 aawea Aln2uao qauaeauaAas sTq uT pazeid aTAege ;o seTpnas umlea 
-aapun Tie eAmq 2aecipues .3,.x pue qsnaa 2Te13 ',Lag 1e2Tem se2eas peaTug 
eq2 uT pus gTos senboar pus assnoaqaT q2eqesua apueaa uT 'sew .a .a 
pus aeqaeg -a pueT2ua ul 'flaTTTm  pus samT2 sTq ;o 3112T1 aqa uT 
sAlom sTq guTpaaa-al Aq aTAsa snoT2TTaaaT pus TeoTadeps e lo uoTaou 
942 2oefea oa sawmos emos Jo wed aqa no lions se zscr apuTs ueaq 
seq eaeq2 NaAm eq2 jo suopenladaed luazaa qons a2Tdsaa 
912-pl1om TenaoaTTaluT Aanaue2 qaueaauenes eq2 jo suoTaspuno; eq2 
Tie pauTmaapun AT2;ap 21aqa eoTadezs sums e ATI V92 ST laom spun 
:eaTeuuoTapTa eq2 ;0 pellawmaa upidoa 'V paellaTU uaqm 596T se ATauapaa 
se pawaTm-ea sem qoTqm 421Cm sTqa lo uoTapauea U sT %alma/ shuosew 
s„.TnT nada eaTqdosouqd, 
eT 2Tad anb sagqouvaa snid suomsod set lead TnT ap le 
'snuuo0 xnaTm ‘sanesseoons gas SISAS22 V 1TOA OT ep mos; snid 
eAnoa2 110 484111393 UOS suet) aeosidea ST ap aa eaTT 01 ap neTT nv 
.seaueATns suoTasagugS sap seasTmgTod Teuesae,p 2TAaas ar—ircaT. 
aa anbTaoasTa eaTeuuoTloTa uos anb eaxeagad snos uaTaTeaToA 
ejgp aTAeg un 'enbTadeps eTAeg un aeuT2smT easTsuoo TT 
wommoo 2sa ITInb eoled aosue2 'Wag ap eq2Am un 
:e2o1ft Nasep soTAeg ;0 ALIESIOATUMS 113ST3JTJ pus paapunq oma 
042 2uT2saomemmo3 looq lo aolTpe se 'oqm uoqTa Trigg Aqdn 6S6T uT 
pawmns ATIVOTO SEA 3013; sTq/ .aTAsa ;o situTpeaa uaapom papuenTjuT 
4 
genuine philosophy of history. 7 It is in the spirit of this re-eva-
luation, therefore, that this present study will, as well as outlining 
Bayle's philosophy of history, also attempt to demonstrate that it 
reflects a mind which was undoubtedly humanist, sincerely Calvinist, 
profoundly royalist and fully steeped in both the old and new traditions 
of seventeenth century historiography. 
Of all his works, it is perhaps the Dictionnaire which 
contributed most to the classical image of Bayle, the sceptic and anti-
religious critic, and it is probably its unusual encyclopaedic form which 
is responsible for this myth. Since Bayle chose on this occasion to 
present his ideas on toleration in encyclopaedic form rather than in the 
subjective coherence of a rational treatise, his meaning was open to 
misconstruction. The "philosophes" conveniently ignored or unwittingly 
missed any coherent purpose which might have bound Bayle's ideas together. 
They could disregard his unflinching royalism, his re-affirmation of 
traditional Calvinist theology and his support for the fundamental frame-
work of seventeenth century historiography as long as they were free to 
seek in his footnotes arguments in support of scepticism, anti-religious 
criticism or almost any form of attack on traditional authority. They 
were not the only ones to bypass the essential unity of the Dictionnaire, 
7 See Elisabeth Labrousse, Pierre Bayle. 2 vols., The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1964, II, Heterodoxie et Rigorisme, particularly chap.15, 
"La philosophie de l'Histoire". pp.449-73. 
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for even the late Alfred Cobban referred to it as "monstrous and 
unclassifiable. n8  
Because of its size and nature, the Dictionnaire presents 
problems in assessing Bayle's true meaning and purpose. In four 
massive folio volumes we find an apparently random selection of 
articles dealing in the main with Individuals, sects and towns, many 
of them remarkably obscure and apparently insignificant. To most of 
these articles are appended long and diverse footnotes discussing almost 
everything from history, philosophy and theology, to errors, miracles 
and scandals. It is this diversity in the Dictionnaire which has 
provoked so much controversy amongst those who have written on Bayle. 
For example, the dispute over the manner in which Bayle resolved the 
faith-reason issue has tended to centre around half a dozen or so 
articles, particularly BEAULIEU, PYRRHON and ZENON. It has frequently 
been assumed that because Bayle exercised no apparent discrimination in 
the selection of his articles, it is impossible to discern any essential 
unity in the work. Historians have asserted that his choice of subjects 
was entirely arbitrary and one writer at least has voiced despair at the 
absence of any continuity of historical theme in the Dictionnaire. 9 
8 Alfred Cobban, In Search of Humanity: The Role of the Enlightenment  
in Modern History. London: Jonathan Cape, 1960, p. 105. 
9 P.J.S. Whitmore, "The use made of English thought and history in the 
works of Pierre Bayle, with special reference to the Dictionnaire". 
M.A. thesis, University of London, 1952, p. 30. 
6 
When scholars seek the cohesive character of a rational 
treatise in this work, they must inevitably be disappointed. 
Nevertheless, a close examination of the Dictionnaire will show that 
the apparently random selection of articles is perhaps not as random 
as appears at first sight. To begin with, Bayle's original motive for 
undertaking the work should not be ignored. Initially he set out with 
the intention of correcting the faults which he had discovered in Louis 
Moreri's Grand Dictionnaire Historique, 10 but he gradually found 
himself expanding this plan to include an encyclopaedic correction of 
the errors to be found in all dictionaries, and even more "Je me suis 
mis en tete de compiler le plus gros Recueil qu'il me sera possible des 
Fautes qui se rencontrent dans les Dictionaires & de tie me pas renfermer 
dans ces espaces, quelque vastes qu'ils soient, mais de faire aussi courses 
sur toutes sortes d'Auteurs, quand l'occasion s'en presenters. till Even 
though he expanded this plan again to include a widely dispersed treatise 
on toleration, Bayle's Dictionnaire nevertheless bore the indelible 
imprint of his original design. Of the two thousand and thirty eight 
articles included in its volumes, more than eighty percent of them corres-
pond to articles in Moreri's dictionary. 12 Whatever its final purpose, 
10 Louis Moreri, Le Grand Dictionnaire Historique, cu le Melange Curieux  
de l'Histoire Sainpe et Profitne, 1674. 
11 "Dissertation qui fut imprimie au devant de quelques Essais ou Fragmens 
de cep Ouvrage l'an MDCXCII, sous le Titre de Projet d'un Dictionaire 
Critique, A Mr. 4u Rondel, Professeur aux belles Lettres A Maestricht", 
Dictionnaire. IV, p.606, in future referred to simply as "Projet". 
r 	, , 
12 For the purpose of this comparison, the second edition of Moreri's 
dictionary (published by Parayre at Lyon, 1681, 2 vols.) was used. 
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Bayle s s work owed its encyclopaedic form to its somewhat leas illustrious 
predecessor. 
We still have to account, however, for the basis on which 
Bayle did make his selection of articles, for he by no means discussed 
all the subjects treated by Moreri. The answer to this problem, while 
not completely definitive, is quite straightforward. After all, Bayle 
originally set out to correct the errors in Moreri's work, so it is not 
unlikely that he should treat subjects where his own knowledge would 
permit him to discern errors. As a child he had studied Greek and Latin, 
his family and religious background had familiarized him with the Bible 
though he knew little Hebrew, and through his work on the Nouvelles de la  
Republique des Lettres, he was well versed in the history, philosophy and 
literature of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A 
-13 recent study by Jacques Sole confirms my own conclusion that Bayle s s 
articles correspond closely to his own knowledge and interests. Articles 
in the Dictionnaire fall into three clear categories: biblical and 
classical antiquity up to the fifth century (approximately 28% of the 
total); the Middle Ages from the sixth to the fourteenth centuries (approx-
imately 6% of the total) 14 and what for Bayle was the modern period of the 
fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (approximately 66% of the 
total). Significantly, of the one hundred and twenty four articles devoted 
13 Jacques Sole, "Religion ,et vision historiographique dans le Dictionnaire  
de Bayle", in Religion, Erudition et Critique 4 la fin du XVIIe siacle  
et au debut du XVIIIe . Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968, 
pp.122-27. 
14 Soli in fact includes the fifteenth century in the Middle Ages, making 
articles devoted to this period 11.77% of the toXel. 
to the Middle Ages, only forty fall within the range from the sixth 
to the eleventh centuries, and these include, among others, articles 
such as MAHOMET, ALPAIDE, ABDERAME, DAMASCENE, ACHNET, PAPESSE, 
PAULICIENS and EMMA which all contributed passages to his defence of 
toleration. Clearly then, Bayle's choice of articles was conditioned 
first by the range of articles which Moreri treated and secondly, within, 
that range, by those subjects for which his knowledge would allow him to 
speak with some authority. While this does not fully account for Bayle's 
obvious love of trivia, it assists in dispelling the suggestions that he 
selected his articles entirely at random. 
Although it is doubtful that Bayle can be considered a direct 
precursor of the "philosophes" of the Enlightenment, his ideas on the 
nature of history and its methods must command a significant place in 
the evolution of French historical thought, if only because his Dictionnaire  
was a work which sooner or later found its way to the shelves of all 
important eighteenth century libraries. In fact the initial publication of 
this work in two folio volumes in October 1696, 15 must surely come close to 
15 There is some confusion about the date of this first edition. Henri-F. 
Bergeron places it in November, 1697, with the first volume having been 
printed in 1695. 	(See "Le manicheisme de Bayle et Plutarque", in 
XVIIe Siècle, no.68, 1965, p.45). 	Elisabeth Labrousse places it on 
October 24th, 1969. 	(See Pierre Bayle, Oeuvres Diverses, with an intro- 
duction by Elisabeth Labrousse, 3 vols., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966, 
III, p.XV.). Most other authors claim that it was published in 1697, 
including Alexandre Cioranescu in the Bibliographie de is litterature  
francaise du dix-septieme siècle. 3 vols., Paris: Editions du Centre 
National de la recherche scientifique, 1966, I, p.309. I have 
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the focal point of that vortex of ideas which Professor Hazard has 
called "la crise de la conscience europeenne" .16  It is important to 
understand this in order to fully appreciate the contribution. which 
Pierre Bayle made to the idea of history in this work. The period 
which Hazard describes, from 1680 to 1715, was one of intense 
intellectual ferment and one which, he suggests, contains the key to 
the transition from the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries, or 
more generally from the medieval to the modern world. The nature of 
this transition, as far as history at least was concerned, was outlined 
in a challenging book published in 1932 by the American historian, 
Carl Becker. 17 According to Becker, thirteenth century theology 
represented in works like the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Acquinas, 
provided men of that time with an authentic philosophy of history based 
upon the story of man and his world viewed according to the divine plan 
of salvation. This scheme was essentially a denial of progress, and the 
very nature of medieval society confirmed that man was more interested in 
his relationship with God than with his fellow man. By the nineteenth 
accepted Mille. Labrousse's opinion, for apart from the obvious scholar- 
ship upon which it rests, Bayle himself speaks of the work being on 
sale in bookshops in December, 1696. (See "Suite des r6flexions sur le 
pretendu jugement du public", Dictionnaire, IV. p.662.). 
16 Paul Hazard, La crise de la conscience europeenne, 1680-1715. Paris: 
Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1963: 
17 Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers, 
Yale Paperbound, New Haven: Yale University press, 1961. 
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century, however, history had usurped the traditional role of theology, 
for in the process of replacing the search for divine salvation with the 
search for material progress, man had developed a concept of history which 
could be described most simply as "philosophy teaching by example". 
In the terms of Becker's thesis, Bayle's idea of history 
straddled the medieval and the modern worlds, for on the one hand he had 
a cyclical view of history which denied progress and included a considerable 
deterministic role for Providence. On the other hand, through his re-
examination of the fundamentals of biblical criticism and his re-definition 
of "truth", Bayle was able to cut the Gordian knot which had bound history 
for so long to theology. The eighteenth century may have misunderstood 
Bayle's intention in the Dictionnaire, but it fully appreciated the 
significance of his ethical criticism of the Bible and the value of his 
principles of historical criticism. 
To a considerable extent, Bayle's discussion of history in the 
Dictionnaire presumed an acceptance, in its broad framework, of the 
seventeenth century humanist philosophy of history. This philosophy, 
which had its origins in the writings of men like Paul-Emile 18 during the 
high Renaissance period of fifteenth century Italy, was an extension of 
medieval historical philosophy. History was very much a literary genre 
18 See Antoine Adam, Histoire de la litterature franqaise au XVIIe siècle: 
la fin de l'ecole classique, 1680-1715. Paris: Editions Mondiales, 
1962, pp.328-29. 
in which Providence still commanded a considerable, if not absolute, 
deterministic role, and the purpose of history was seen to be the 
provision of historical examples which would implicitly teach moral 
or political lessons. 19 The humanists selected the classical 
historians as their guides, and modelling themselves on these ancients, 
sought to produce historical works which were primarily of literary 
value. The originally high ideals of the Italian humanists, however, 
soon became distorted. Becker remarked of history in the seventeenth 
century "We find then humanists 'exploiting the past' in the interests 
of classical learning, patriots in the interests of national or royal 
prestige, Protestants in the interests of the new religion, Catholics 
in the interests of the old faith." 20 History had become a weapon of 
polemic in which the standards of historical scholarship were sacrificed 
to prejudice and self-interest. It was against this infusion of intol-
erance and prejudice into historical scholarship that Bayle reacted most 
forcefully. He witnessed humanists like Mgzeray, Saint-11ga1 and Vertot 
striving for dramatic and literary effect at the expense of factual 
accuracy, Protestant historians uncritically extolling the virtues of 
the Reformation, while Catholics such as Maimbourg, Sarrasin and Bossuet 
filled their histories with heranques against the Protestants. Not only 
19 See Cobban, In Search of Humanity, p.105. 
20 Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers, p.90. 
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had history fallen into the abysmal depths of factual inaccuracy, 
but it had also become a battleground for the passions, emotions 
and religious prejuduces of historians themselves. 
In part as a reaction to these tendencies, in the second 
half of the seventeenth century two new movements emerged which 
provided Bayle with the inspiration for some of the techniques which 
he used in arguing his defence of toleration. The first of these 
movements, the spirit of historical criticism employed by the "erudites", 
arose as a direct reaction to the declining standards of humanist 
scholarship. A group of new historians, men like Duchesne, Baluze, 
Montfaucon, Mabillon and the Benedictines of Saint-Maur, interested 
themselves in new historical techniques, delving into chronology, 
archaeology, palaeography, numismatics and diplomatics. French, 
Italian and German scholars began plunging into the study of coins, 
inscriptions, deeds, charters and other non-literary documents which had 
been ignored or neglected by the humanists. The Jesuit Hardouin made an 
extensive study of coins and inscriptions, while in England, John Horsley 
of Morpeth in Northumberland undertook a systematic collection of Roman 
inscriptions. In France the Cartesian Tillemont published a work in 
which he attempted to reconcile the varying accounts of Roman history 
presented by accepted authorities, while the Bollandists undertook a 
critical re-appraisal of the lives of the saints. This spirit of 
historical criticism was widespread and became a movement in which accuracy 
and verification soon replaced literary excellence as the motivating forces 
- 13 - 
behind historical scholarship. 
The second movement, which flourished during the decade 
1680-90, relates to the growth of a spirit of historical pyrrhonism 
closely associated with the development of biblical exegesis. It 
was not altogether separate from the previous movement, for in fact 
the conclusions of many of the "erudites" amounted to a situation of 
historical pyrrhonism, if only because of many of their efforts to 
verify historical facts had proved fruitless. Most of the "erudites" 
were reluctant to adopt the radical stand of the historical pyrrhonists, 
but among those who did were Papebroek, Mabillon, Levesque de Pouilly, 
Richard Simon and Spinoza. These men were convinced that where historical 
facts could not be proven by substantive evidence, the best situation to 
be hoped for was one of enduring doubt. While this stand had far reaching 
implications for secular history, it had perhaps its most profound effect 
on biblical scholarship. By the time the Dictionnaire was published, 
Tillemont, Simon and others had already been busy at the task of biblical 
exegesis. It seemed that the Bible, which for centuries had been 
regarded as the primary historical document, was the least capable of 
verification by substantive evidence. All the new techniques of 
historical scholarship were of little avail in proving the authenticity 
of biblical facts, and when Bayle came to approach the subject in the 
Dictionnaire the Spinozists were already denying the substance of biblical 
miracles. 21 
21 SPINOZA, note R. 
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had to seek out the very foundations upon which intolerance in 
religion was based, and it was precisely this task which he set 
about in the footnotes of the Dictionnaire. 
In the following chapters we shall examine four of the 
principal aspects of Bayles defence of toleration, each of which 
either reflected or influenced his philosophy of history. Bayles 
primary trait was the fact that he genuinely loved to argue, and 
nowhere did he better display his talent for this than in the 
Dictionnaire. There he could effectively dwell on almost any 
aspect of his defence of toleration without the inhibition of having 
to relate it to any overall subjective pattern. He could bring his 
opponents into the open by quoting extensively from their works and 
could refute their arguments more subtly than he might have done in 
a straightforward polemic. Even his readers were affected by this 
approach for they imbibed his arguments almost without thinking. 
Under ERMA, for example, they would find arguments supporting absolute 
monarchy; under ESOPE and incidental remark of the nature of history; 
or under EUCLIDE a discussion of the dangers of controversy. Wherever 
the opportunity presented itself, Bayle would add a new argument to 
support his theory. 
The first aspect of his defence of toleration, his attack on 
the revival of Huguenot theories of resistance, reflected his depend-
ence upon the humanist idea of the moral purpose of history. Convinced 
as he was that religious toleration could only be consonant with political 
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stability, Bayle saw in the revival of the Huguenot theories of 
resistance after the Revocation a direct threat to the existing 
political order in France under Louis XIV's absolute monarchy. 
He firmly believed that history, when accurately reported, would 
implicitly underline the moral validity of toleration. Using 
the French Wars of Religion as his primary illustration, he drew 
two important moral lessons from history. Against rebellious 
Huguenots and ultramontanist Catholics he argued that since wise 
sovereigns acted more generally from political rather than religious 
motives, the secular sword could not fail but to be brought down on 
the heads of subjects who expressed disloyalty to their king, even 
for religious reasons. Against sovereigns who acted, in their 
folly, on the advice of ecclesiastical advisers his argument was that 
they sacrificed political wisdom for religious zeal, and in conse-
quence had their power reduced and exposed their domains to political 
anarchy. 
The second aspect of his defence of toleration, his attack 
on arguments which excused persecution by appealing to Providential 
favour, raised the whole question of historical causation. His 
intention was not to deny Providential determinism completely. 
Instead he broadly followed the Machiavellian view which divided 
causation equally . between God and Man. The idea that Providence 
invariably protected and sanctioned the behaviour of the orthodox 
virtually absolved individuals or sects from any personal responsibility 
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in the persecution of heretics. Bayle observed that in their efforts 
to establish their orthodoxy, it was a common practice for religious 
sects to invoke Providential favour to justify their victories and 
testify to their orthodoxy while at the same time they pointed to 
the punishment of God for heresy signified in the defeat of their 
enemies. This amounted simply to a question of might justifying 
right, and provided a ready excuse for religious persecution. In an 
attempt to discredit such fallacious reasoning and to emphasise each 
man's personal culpabiblity in persecution, Bayle was obliged to go to 
the very heart of causation. His answer to the problem involved an 
examination of those theological questions upon which the whole matter 
rested: Providential determinism itself, free-will and the origin of 
evil. 
The third aspect of his defence of toleration, his condem-
nation of the principle of religious orthodoxy, turned his attention to 
the problem of biblical interpretation. It is interesting to note that 
his attack on controversy in religion bears a remarkable resemblance to 
the ideas advanced by Sebastian Castellio in his Traite des heretiques  
(1554). 23 Bayle began with the premise that doctrinal controversies 
were the fundamental origin of all religious persecutions, that the 
excessive pursuit of orthodoxy was responsible for turning Christians 
23 For a discussion of Castellio's views on toleration see Joseph Lacier, 
Toleration and the Reformation. Trans. by T. L. Westow, 2 vols., New 
York & London: Associated Press and Longmans, 1960, I, pp.336-47. 
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against one another. Dogma, the focal point of all such contro-
versies was rather the enemy of, than a statement of, the truth. 
It was not the result of inadvertent ignorance, but of a self-
perpetuating delusion of the intellect. Heresy, the antithesis 
of orthodoxy, more often than not simply represented the beliefs 
held by one's religious adversary. All sects freely accused each 
other of heresy without ever attempting to identify the fundamental 
truths of religion. When examined properly, heresy was not as easy 
thing to identify in religion. In morality it was less difficult 
for all men had a common notion of natural morality, and if one man 
stubbornly persisted in contradicting the light of moral conscience, 
he could be justifiably accused of heresy. In religion, however, 
there were few truths on which men could agree, except for the 
existence of God and the divinity of the Bible, and the only legitimate 
proof for these was moral demonstration (the doctrine of probability) 
which could not provide absolute certainty. Only faith could provide 
the absolute certainty essential for religious truths. But faith 
was a gift from God, and could not be instilled in men by force. If a 
heretic should refuse, according to the light of his conscience, to 
accept moral demonstration as a proof for the divinity of the Bible, 
then reason was on his side, and under no circumstances could he be 
forcefully coerced to embrace any particular faith. 
This whole argument had considerable importance for the 
question of biblical criticism. When he rested the proof for the 
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divinity of the Scriptures on the evidence of faith, Bayle con-
cluded that if the Holy Ghost passed explicit judgment on biblical 
accounts, then they must unquestioningly by accepted by the faithful 
as revealed truths. Where, however, no explicit judgment was made, 
it was necessary to test the accuracy of biblical accounts according 
to the principles of natural morality. In other words, Bayle advanced 
the principle of ethical criticism, 24 in cases where biblical facts were 
not clearly revealed, and in so doing allowed the critical historian a 
free hand to examine certain aspects of the Bible without the risk of 
profaning sacred theology. What in fact he did was to draw a clear 
division between the realms of history and theology, freeing history for 
the first time from its bondage to St. Augustine's De Civitate Del. 
The final aspect of Bayle's defence of toleration, his attack 
on those religious prejudices which blinded men in their pursuit to truth, 
focuses attention on his historical method. As an argument against 
persecution it follows logically from the previous point, for that same 
ignorance which caused men to identify as heresy everything which dis-
agreed with their own beliefs also impaired their ability to discover 
genuine truth. It was with increasing alarm that Bayle observed these 
24 See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. (German 
edition, Die Philosophie der Aufklirung, Tabingen; J. C. B. Mohr, 
1932). Trans. by Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove, 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951, pp.167-68. 
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very passions and prejudices at work in the historians of his own 
time, men whose religious, national or dynastic loyalties caused 
then to suppress, alter or exaggerate facts as it suited the interest 
of their cause. To remedy this he drew up a new charter of truth 
which represented the final stage in the complete separation of history 
from theology. For Bayle, truth fell into three categories: 
philosophical truth which relied upon metaphysical demonstration and 
reason, theological truth which relied upon moral demonstration and 
faith, and historical truth which relied solely upon physical demon-
stration. By distinguishing between these three areas of truth, Bayle 
was able to establish a set of principles through which the critical 
historian could continually strive to eradicate his prejudice, control 
his passions and devote himself solely to the search for objective 
historical truth. 
When it came to a philosophy of history, Bayle did in fact 
have-a great deal to offer. If he followed closely the traditional 
pattern of seventeenth century humanist concepts of history, this was 
only because Bayle himself was essentially a seventeenth century figure. 
Unlike the "philosophes" who followed him, and who so clearly mis-
interpreted his meaning, his target was not the traditional authority 
of the Church and the monarchy. He was concerned solely to condemn 
religious prejudice in all its forms, whether displayed by pastors, 
priests, kings or historians. His only goal was universal religious 
peace. Nevertheless, in seeking this goal, he reached conclusions 
which represented for history the beginnings of a dramatic metamorphosis. 
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CHAPTER II  
ABSOLUTISM AND THE MORAL PURPOSE OF  
HISTORY  
Living, as we are, in the apparent sophistication of the 
twentieth century historical world, Bayle s s idea of the purpose of 
history may seem to us somewhat naive. In an historical milieu 
which by and large no longer believes in the utilitarian and moral 
value of history, or in the ultimate attainment of absolute hist-
orical truth, the notion that history has a definite moral purpose 
and a platform of established, historical facts would seem completely 
untenable. Nevertheless, this is how Bayle saw history in the seven-
teenth century: as the objective pursuit of truth; as the sword 
wielded by the sovereign for the pronouncement of moral judgments on 
the memory of historical figures; and finally, as the means whereby 
the reading public could be made more circumspect in the use of their 
judgment. But this is merely the theory of the purpose of history. 
In the footnotes of the Dictionnaire, Bayle used history for a much 
more practical and immediate purpose: to lay the foundations for his 
defence of toleration, which serves to show how firmly his ideas on 
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c6t6 de la Science. Ce sant autant de trophees ou autant d'arcs 
de triomphe arigez l'ignorance & la foiblesse humaine. 	This 
limited purpose was soon abandoned for a wider one, which is re-
flected in the scope of the digressions in the footnotes. As his 
earlier works testify, Bayle's chief passion was toleration, and it 
was no real surprise that his new work, the Dictionnaire, should 
reflect this passion. 
In a letter which he wrote to Jacques du Rondel, Professor 
of "Belles Lettres" at Maestrict, on May 5th., 1692, Bayle put this 
question: "Les profondeurs abstraites des Mathematiques, dira-t-on, 
donnent de grandes idees de l'infinite de Dieu. Soit: mais croit-on 
qu'il ne puisse pas rasulter un grand bien moral d'un Dictionaire 
Critique V'5 In this question lies the key to his theoretiCal view of 
the purpose of history. As Paul Hazard so aptly put it, "Ii n'a 
jamais voulu perdre l'idee d'un certain bien moral A accomplir 	. 
History, as it emerges in the Dictionnaire, has a distinct utilitarian 
value; it contains its own implicit lessons. In the same letter to 
du Rondel, Bayle clarified the point: 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. Bayle's letter to du Rondel, referred to in this thesis as 
"Projet", was appended to all editions of the Dictionnaire from 
1720 on. 
6 Hazard, La crise de la conscience europfienne, p.103. 
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mais on m'avotiera, Monsieur, qu'une infinite 
de personnes peuvent profiter moralement parlant de la 
lecture d'un gros Recueil de Faussetez Historiques bien 
averees; quand ce ne seroit que pour devenir plus circon-
spects A juger de leur prochain, & plus capables d'eviter 
lea pieges que la Satire & la Flaterie tendent de toutes 
parts au pauvre Lecteur." 7 
Everywhere history provided examples of passions blinding men to 
the truth and the prudent way of life, but it was not only from 
falsehoods that moral lessons could be learned. A great deal 
could be learned from the very actions and beliefs of men: 
il est plus utile & plus important que Von 
ne pense, de representer nalvement les horreurs, & les 
abominations que lea Philosophes Paiens ont approuvees. 
Cela peut humilier & mortifier la Raison, & nous convaincre 
de la corruption infinie du coeur humain, & nous aprendre 
une virite que nous devrions jamais perdre de vue; c'est 
que l'homme a eu besoin d'une Lumiere revelee, qui suplat 
au defaut de la Lumiere Philosophique 	."8 
History, in other words, was nothing more than a catalogue of the 
errors, sins and follies of mankind, and there was nothing so trivial 
that we could not glean some moral lesson from it. Bayle saw it as 
his duty, and the duty of other historians, to present history 
accurately and objectively, and as far as possible, to remain free 
from partisanship : 9 
Thus presented, history would represent both the good and evil, 
the true and false, a necessary requirement it the correct moral lesson 
7 "Projet", Dictionnaire, IV, p.613. 
8 HIPPARCHIA, note D. 
9 The duties of an historian will be discussed in Chapter V. 
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were to be drawn: 
l'Histoire de l'esprit humain, de ses 
sottises, & de ses extravagances, & l'Histoire des 
varifitez infinies qui se trouvent dans les loix, & 
dans les usages des nations, ne sont pas des choses 
dont on doive frusterer lee Lecteurs, & dont on ne 
doive pas espirer des utilitez."1 0 
Because of the gravity of the task with which the 
historian was charged, Bayle emphasized that it should not be 
left to every individual to write history. Because there were 
moral lessons to be learned from history, its writers should 
receive their commission from the state, for just as the writing of 
ecclesiastical history required the guiding hand of God, so too, 
civil history required the guiding hand of the sovereign: 
"11 faudroit laisser ce soin A l'Histoire, & celui de 
composer l'Histoire A des personnes choisies, & autorisees 
pas ceux qui gouvernent: par ce moien lee flgtrissures, que 
l'Histoire infligeroit au nom & A la mEmoire des gens qui 
miritent l'infamie publique, procideroient de leur viritable 
source, & seroient comme une amanation de ce droit du glaive, 
dont le bras des Souverains est stale pout le chatiment des 
michans." 11 
In other words, history was the moral sword which was used to punish 
or reward the figures of the past, and it rested only with the secular 
power, or more specifically with the sovereign, to wield this sword: 
l'Histoire Civile ne fat composie que par des gene commis A 
cela par le Souverain de cheque Etat. Et alors la presomption seroit, 
.12 que l'Histoire ne difameroit pas lee gene sur de mechantes preuves 	. 
10 BLONDEL, Francois ii, note A. 
11 "Dissertation stir lee libelles diffamatoires", Dictionnaire, IV, p.581. 
12 Ibid. 
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open civil war in France, presses running hot with treatises on 
popular sovereignty and some of the most horrible examples of 
religious persecution known to man. With a certain disgust, 
Bayle asserted; "Pour l'honneur du nom Francois & du nom Chratien, 
ii seroit A souhaiter que la mamoire de toutes ces inhumanitez eat 
eta d'abord abolie, & qu'on eat jette au feu tous les Livres qui en 
parloient..17  It was a "siacle abominable", the memory of which is 
scarred with bitterness, hatred, passion and suffering. Should 
historians even consider touching upon such barbarities? It was a 
fair question, Rayle admitted, for would it not rekindle dying hatred, 
revive settling passions? Had he not been personally accused of doing 
this? As much as one might wish that the memory of those years could be 
obliterated, the fact remains that numerous history books, which still 
exist, had dealt with the subject, and "... comme toutes choses ant 
deux faces, on peut souhaiter pour de tras-bonnes raisons que la 
memoire de tous ces effroiables desordres soit conservae soigneusement.. 18  
The "tras-bonnes raisons" to which he alluded are the moral lessons to be 
drawn, which are available to everyone, but to which three types of people 
ought to pay attention, "Ceux qui gouvernent 	. 	Ceux qui conduisent 
les affaires Ecclasiastique ... [et] ces Thaologiens remuans, qui prenent 
"19 tent de plaisir A innover 	. 	It is considerable significance 
17 MACON, note C. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. The moral lessons are quoted in Chapter III, p.95, supra. 
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that these three categories correspond broadly to the three elements 
of French society in which Bayle saw the greatest threats to political 
stability and peace in France: Louis XIV, the Catholic Church, and the 
exiled Huguenot clergy. As we shall see, he made use of history, and 
in particular the events of the sixteenth century, to counter the 
political and social threats which these three elements represented, 
and in doing so, advanced a further stage towards the completion of his 
defence of toleration. 
"Ceux qui gouvernent 	." 
As we have already mentioned above, Bayle's political point 
of view rested on the premise that toleration could only exist in a 
society where there was peace and political stability, and for this 
reason he remained throughout his life a firm and unswerving supporter 
of the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV. He showed no disposition to 
alter the political order of Europe, and in fact was one of the few 
Refugees who persistently maintained the pre-1685 Huguenot political 
philosophy after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. " Prior to 
1685, the majority of Huguenots including Jean Claude and Pierre Jurieu, 
had been unflinching in their support for Louis XIV and the French 
monarchy, but after that date these men snatched up the banners of popular 
sovereignty and the rights of a people to resist tyranny with force. 
Bayle, almost alone of the Huguenots, remain a convinced monarchist, the 
result being that his ideas, which before 1685 had been thoroughly 
orthodox, afterwards became increasingly conservative and obsolete. 
20 See Rex', Pierre. Bayle and Religious Controversy, p.252. 
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He then began to assume the character of a seventeenth-century 
Protestant counterpart of the "politiques", a man who found the 
continuance of civil war in France intolerable, and one who sought 
the toleration of all religious sects for the sake of peace and 
national unity. Bayle's position was like that of Epicurus, who 
made so many sacrifices for the welfare of his homeland: "Il 
souhaitoit de bons Souverains, & se soumettoit A ceux qui gouvern-
oient mal. C'est une Maxim tres-necessaire au bien public, c'est 
le fondement de la surete de tous Les Etats."21 As P. J. S. Whitmore 
has so aptly put it, Bayle became the first and foremost "Protestant 
Jacobite" of the seventeenth century. 22 
The anarchy and persecution which existed in France during 
the sixteenth century lay heavily on Bayle's conscience; firmly etched 
in his mind were the horrors of Vassey and St. Bartholomew's Night, and 
the whole religious holocaust which accompanied them. By contrast, he 
was acutely aware of the relative peace and stability France had enjoyed 
under Louis XIV. It is not surprising, then, that he should have 
dismissed with a wave of his hand, the new democratic idealism which 
21 EPICURE, note 0. 
22 Whitmore, "The use made of English thought and history in the 
works of Pierre Bayle, with special reference to the Dictionnaire", 
p.10. 
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burst forth after 1685: 
"Qu'on fasse ce qu'on voudra, qu'on batisse des 
Syst8mes meilleurs que la Republique de Piston, que 
l'Utopie de Morus, que la Republique du Soleil de 
Campanella, &c.: toutes ces belles 'dies se trouver-
oient courtes & defecrueuses, des qu'on les voudroit 
reduire en pratique. Les passions des hommes, qui 
naissent lea unes des autres dans une variet8 prodigieuse, 
rulneroient bientat les esperances qu'on auroit conques 
de ces beaux Syseemes."23 
We can detect in this passage, the fundamental reason for Bayle's 
lack of interest in political theory as such. His concern was not 
with the chimeric idea of the perfect political state, but with the 
practical realities which would produce peace and stability in France. 
Forget your paper theorizing; the political tumult of the early part 
of the seventeenth century in France: 
ne venoit que de la diminution de l'autorite 
Roiale, & cessa das que le Cardinal de Richelieu eat abaissi 
aux pieds du thrane de Louts le Juste [Louis XIII] lea Princes 
& lea grans Seigneurs qui usurpoient une tres-considerable 
partie de la puissance souveraine."24 
Did not the stability which France had experienced since that time 
under Louis XIV testify to the value of absolute monarchy? Although 
Bayle had many criticisms to make of Hobbes and his political system, 
is it too far wide of the truth to see Bayle's awn political beliefs 
coming to the surface in this precis he gives of the Leviathan? 
23 HOBBES, note E. 
24 GUISE, Louis de, note A. 
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"Les précis de cet Ouvrage est, que sans is paix 
n'y a point de sarete dans un Etat, & que la paix ne 
peut subsister sans is commandement, ni le commandement 
sans les armes; & que lea armes ne valent rien Si elles 
ne sont muses entre lea mains d'une personne; & que la 
crainte des Armes ne peut point porter a la paix ceux qui 
sont poussez a se batre par un mal plus terrible que la 
mort, c'est-A-dire, par les dissensions sur des choses 
nicessaires au salut."25 
Bayle and Hobbes had this in common at least; they were both 
anxious to justify and encourage obedience to the absolute 
monarchies of their sovereigns. 
Bayle drew upon frequent examples from history to assert 
the value of absolute monarchy over democracy. Using the example 
of Rome at the time of Julius Caesar, he asserted that republics, 
that is to say democratic republics, could only remain truly faith-
ful to popular sovereignty if they desisted from foreign conquests 
and concentrated their popular energies within the confines of a 
small state. As soon as they embarked upon .a programme of conquest, 
the popular sovereignty of republics was usurped by a few individuals, 
such as happened with Caesar, Brutus and Cassius. 26 But it was 
indeed rare for any democracy to succeed, for republics can be com-
pared to man, who retains his innocence only in the cradle and for 
a few years after. Even a small democracy like Athens could 
boast its tyrannies, and what was more "Vous chercheriez en vain 
25 HOBBES, note F. 
26 BRUTUS, M. J., note F. 
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dans la Macedoine, qui itoit une Monarchie, autant d'exemples de 
Tyrannie, que l'Histoire Athenienne vous en presente. H27 
In his efforts to justify absolute monarchy, Bayle even 
condemned the instances of monarchies limited by parliaments. He 
remained curiously silent on the subject of England, however, con-
fining himself to a condemnation of French assemblies. His explan-
ation of this is rather unconvincing: 
"Les Anglois ont raison de dire que la tenue frequente 
des Parlemens eat nicessaire au bien du pars; mais la France 
ne peut pas dire la mane chose de ses Etats Generaux. On 
lea convoqua souvent sous le Regne des fils de Henri II, & 
jamais la France ne fut plus brouillie, ni plus disolee, qu'en-
ce tems-111; & au lieu de trouver du remede dans ces Convocations, 
elle y empiroit." 28 
Elsewhere he said: 
"L'Auteur du Testament Politique de Mr. de Louvois a bien 
mieux conu le genii de la Nation. Ii pose en fait que le 
seul & le vrai moien d'eviter en France lea guerres civiles eat 
la puissance absolue du Souverain, soutenue avec vigueur, & 
arede de toutes lea forces necessaires A la faire craindre 	. 
Ii se pourroit tromper par rapport A certains pars; mais ii n'a 
point d'aparence qu'il se trompe A l'egard de sa Nation •.. •"28 
Bayle was uncompromising in his contempt for the Estates-General, and 
once again he drew upon history to support his point of view. The 
example, as is to be expected, came from the sixteenth century, when 
French parliaments enjoyed a full liberty of rejecting the King's 
27 PERICLES, note Q. See also the comment on democracy in 
CAPPADOCE, note A. 
28 MARILLAC, Charles de, note B. 
29 LOUIS XIII, note A. 
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edicts, under the reigns of Charles IX and Henry III. Nothing 
could have been worse than the calamities which France suffered 
as a result of this privilege. "Il est aisg de prouver aussi 
que l'exercise de cette autoritg fut la principale source des 
miseres du Roiaume depuis l'an 1562 jusqu'i l e an 1594."3° 
Perhaps it was merely an oversight that in another article, Bayle 
placed the chief blame for these miseries at the feet of Francois 
de Lorraine, Duke of Guise, and his brother, the Cardinal. 31 
Nevertheless, he explained his charge fully in the article HOSPITAL: 
"Disons en gfingral que les Parlemens de France, en rgfusant 
de vgrifier les Edits de pacification, ou en les verifiant de 
mauvaise grace, & puis pas une suite naturelle, en les faisant 
par observer, ont ate' l'un des plus grans mobiles des longues 
calamitez qui ont dgsole l'Etat, & qui ont pensg renverser de 
fond en comble is Monarchie. Si Charles-Quint eat rggng en ce 
tems-1A, elle seroit enfailliblement devenue une Province de 
ses Etats, ou bien elle auroit gtg partagge en mule pieces." 32 
No possible good could come from popular assemblies in France, where 
only the most trifling causes were considered, and a great deal of 
time was wasted. 33 The French parliaments had brought nothing but 
ruin to their country, and "Personne ne doit reconottre cette veritg 
plus franchement que ceux de la Religion; car egtoit dans ces Assetblges 
que leurs ennemis prenoient de nouvelles forces. 934 
30 HOSPITAL, Michel de l', note K. 
31 GUISE, Francois de, note C. 
32 HOSPITAL, Michel de l', note K. 
33 DUAREN, note F. 
34 MARILLAC, Charles de, note B. 
Bayle was not so naive as to believe that absolute 
monarchy was perfect. It had many imperfections and weak-
nesses, and when, in MACON, he alluded to the moral lessons 
to be learned from history, it was these imperfections and 
weaknesses which he had in mind. In particular, he believed that 
Louis XIV had acted injudiciously in revoking the edict of Nantes, 
and in his anxiety to stress this fact, he lighted upon one of the 
principal weaknesses to which a monarchy was subjected. This weak-
ness was religion, and in the article ABDAS, he stressed the fact 
that religion, far from being an artifice invented by sovereigns to 
keep their subjects in obedience, was more frequently a bind on the 
sovereigns themselves. 35 He continued with the observation that if 
monarchs did not profess the religion of their subjects, they ran the 
danger of losing their crowns. Two examples from recent history 
were the case of Henry of Navarre, 36 and more immediately that of 
James II of England. As a more general rule Bayle was willing to 
concede that monarchs more frequently adhered to the principle of 
sacrificing religious interests to those of their states, and 
35 ABDAS, note B. 
36 In SAMBLANCAI, Guillaume de Beaune, Baron de, note C, Bayle remarked 
of Henry IV: "Voila un Roi bien souverain: 11 ne petit pas mgme 
obtenir que see sujets aient la bonte de lui permettre de servir Dieu 
selon lee lumieres de sa conscience; & c'est une honte au Christian- 
lame d'avoir introduit dans l'Univers un si grand renversement de 
l'ordre. C'est aux sujets A demander la libertfi de conscience 
leur Souverain; & en voici qui la lui refusent." 
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and significantly, he seems to have condoned this action as 
politic for sound government. 37 Those monarchs who failed to 
adopt this principle frequently lost all they had, or could have, 
gained. Again history provided an example in the person of Henry 
II of France who concluded a peace treaty with the Austrians, 
"N'importe; il aim mieux leur accorder tout ce qu'ils voulurent, 
que de n'avoir pas ses coudees franches pour exterminer lea Protes - 
tans de son Roiaume." 38 The strong prince was the one who considered 
politics before religion, for in EMMA we are told that ecclesiastics 
led weak princes by the nose, while strong ones frequently acted 
against the interests of religion. 39 The monarch, as a public figure, 
must consider his state above all else, a rule which prompted Bayle to 
applaud Queen Elizabeth of England for retaining her throne by carefully 
distinguishing between political and religious motives. That he condoned 
such morality as the public duty of a monarch, is evidenced by the following 
remark: 
"Henri VI, le jouet de la fortune, captif plusieurs fois, 
massacre enfin dans la prison, etoit la meilleure ante qui se pat 
voir 	. Si au lieu de tant de vertus Chretiennes Henri VI 
avoit possede lea qualitez d'un guerrier, & d'un politique, qui sait 
mettre tout en oeuvre pour se faire craindre, on ne lui eat pas 
debauche sea sujets avec la mgme facilite 	mais pour faire 
tomber un Prince scrupuleux & debonnaire, ii ne faut qua soufler 
dessus."40 
37 ELISABETH, note G. See also ARGESILAUS II, note H, ARISTIDES, note C, 
BEAUCAIRE, note F, and HENRI II, note AA. 
38 HENRI II, note D. 
39 EMMA, note A. 
40 EDOUARD IV, note F. 
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There is one further weakness to which monarchies were 
subjected, one which perhaps had considerable importance at the 
time that Bayle was writing. The subject of this weakness was 
discussed under the article BOURGOGNE, Philippe de, where Bayle 
made the observation: 
"Le Regne de Charles VI nous represente l'endroit foible 
duGouvernement Monarchique. Les autres especes de Gouverne-
ment ont chacune leur mauvais eate; mats elles ne sont point 
sujettes A l'enfance, ni a la demence, comme sont lea Rots. 
La Loi Monarchique veut dans les Roiaumes hereditaires, que 
celui qui est dans l'ordre de la succession occupe le Thrtine, 
quoi qu'il soit enfant, ou qu'A cause de sa vieillesse, ou de 
quelque maladie, il soit retombd dans l'enfance. Par 1I, 
les plus furieuses et le plus funestes dissensions s'introd-
uisent dans un pais, come la France l'fiprouva sous le Regne 
de Charles sixieme."41 
Was not Louis XIV a minor himself when he ascended the throne of 
France, and had he not already been ruling for above fifty years 
when Bayle was writing? Perhaps Bayle personally attributed France's 
troubles to the fact that Louis was in his declining years. But 
then, there is no specific evidence of this fact, only the lesson to be 
learned about this weakness in kings: rejoice if they are good kings, 
obey them if they are bad. 
"Ceux qui conduisent lea affaires Ecclfisiastiques 	." 
As part of his justification of absolute monarchy, Bayle 
turned his attention to another problem which threatened the peace 
41 BOURGOGNE, Philippe duc de ,  surnomme le bon, note A. See also 
HENRI II, note P. 
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and security of France, the insidious influence (as he saw it) 
held over Louis XIV by his Jesuit advisors. Bayle remained 
convinced that the Roman Catholic Church, as represented by the 
Jesuits, was ultimately responsible for the Revocation of the 
Edict of Nantes and the dreadful petiecutions which followed it. 
Louis XIV heti it last been prevailea upbh to use his secular sword 
in a teligious matter, at attion which Baile sincerely deplored. 
The spectre of Vassey loomed again, arid it the hope of reversing the 
trend, he s6t about clarifying duce again, the separation of the 
sovereigh'i temporal power frbm any conntiOn with spiritual power. 42 
As far as Bayle wut coh6erded, the days of King David were past history; 
the monarchy now should be not only absolute, but secular as well. 
He was intransigent with regard to those ecclesiastics who 
made use of the secular sword for the persecution of heretics. History 
was filled with examples of them, and the degradation to which they had 
brought their countries. And now, in his awn time, Bayle was confronted 
with the worst example of all. Can there be any doubt as to whom he is 
referring in this passage? 
42 It is interesting to note that at the time of the Revocation, this 
principle of the separation of powers was also coming under attack 
from Jurieu's faction in Holland. See Rex, Pierre Bayle and  
Religious Controversy, p. 215. Bayle dealt extensively with this 
subject in the Commentaire philosophique (1686). 
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... on ne sauroit s'empgcher de plaindre la destinee 
des Souverains, & leur dependance inevitable de leur Clerge. 
Divots ou non, us seront togjours obligez de le minager & de 
le craindre: c'est un veritable 'Imperium in Imperio'. Il 
eat vrai, le Regne de Jesus-Christ n'est point de ce monde: 
l'a dit lui-mgme: mais ceux qui le representent ne laissent 
pas d'gtre bien souvent lea mattres des Rois de la terre, & 
ou de donner des couronnes; & ceux qui nous parlent tant 
de l'Eglise militante ont plus de raison qu'ils ne croient."43 
Although the reference is not direct, it is almost certain that Bayle 
would have had in mind Louis XIV's dependence on his Jesuit advisors. 
They were one of the principal obstacles to the implementation of 
toleration in France, and their Church, far from being a pillar of 
society, was more frequently a source of instability: 
"La Religion, qui eat regardee par tout le monde camme 
le plus ferme apui de l'Autorite souveraine, & qui le seroit 
effectivement si elle itoit bien entendue & bien pratiquie, 
eat ordinairement ce qui &terve le plus cette mgme Autorite 	. 
Lisez bien l'Histoire de l'Eglise Romaine, vous trouverez que lea 
plus grans Princes du monde ont eu plus a craindre les passions que 
les zelateurs excitent, que lea armes des Infideles: ainsi ce qui 
devroit gtre l'affermissement de la Republique, & de la Majeste de 
l'Etat, eat bien souvent l'obstacle le plus invincible que lea 
Souverains rencontrent a l'execution le leurs ordres." 44 
Bayle's misgivings about the Jesuits had an even deeper 
significance, however, for the Society of Jesus was renowned every-
where as being Ultramontanist in sympathy. The Jesuits had incited 
monarchs to use their secular sword in matters of religion, certainly, 
but those princes who had sufficient strength to resist such pressures 
ran the risk of another problem; the argument for the Pope's right to 
depose sovereigns, the Jesuits being the most ardent preachers of this 
43 BROSSIER, note E. 
44 JUNIUS, Francois i, note B. 
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doctrine. It is little wonder that Bayle should have attacked this 
order so vigorously in the article LOYOLA, 45 an order which preached 
so many doctrines which were contrary to the interests of peace and 
stability in France, at least as he saw it. 
As recently as 1681, he noted, there was published in France 
an edition of Thomas Barlow's book, An Historical Treatise on the  
Subject of Excommunicating and Deposing Kings, in which the author 
maintained that it was still an article of the Roman faith that the 
Pope retained the right to depose sovereigns. 46 Because of this 
disclosure, the book, which was originally published during the Titus 
Oates affair in England, had aroused a great deal of national sentiment 
against the Catholics there. Bayle considered the doctrine to be 
completely untenable. If the sovereign had no right to dabble in 
religious affairs, equally, the Pope had no right to interfere in secular 
matters. The logic of this is exposed in the article GREGOIRE VII, 
where Bayle explained: 
"Qu'on supose tent qu'on voudra que Jesus-Christ a fitabli 
Vicariat dans son Eglise, le bons sens, la droit raison, ne 
laisseront pas de nous aprendre qu'il l'a etabli, non pas en 
qualite de souverain Metre, & de Createur de toutes choses 	. 
Ce Vicaire ne pourroit tout au plus que decider de la doctrine 
qui sauve, ou qui damne 	. Ainsi ceux-memes qui ont eta le 
plus fortement persuadez que le Pape eat le Vicaire de Jesus-Christ, 
ont da regarder comma un abus du Vicariat tout'ce qui sentoit la 
jurisdiction temporelle, & l'autorite de punir le corps."47 
45 LOYALA, note S. 
46 BARLOW, note B. 
47 GREGOIRE VII, note S. 
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On the subject of the separation of powers, Bayle delivered 
the moral sermons forcefully. For ecclesiastics who promoted the 
use of the secular sword for religious persecution, there was nothing 
but condemnation: 
... car il n'y a rien de plus detestable que d'emploier 
les suplices contre ceux qui ne se separent d'une Religion que 
par la crainte d'offenser Dieu, & qui dans tout le reste se 
comportent en tees-bons sujets; ii n'y a rien de plus raisonnable 
que de laisser A Dieu seul l'empire de la conscience." 48 
For those monarchs who submitted to the pressures of ecclesiastics 
there was a warning: take heed of the numerous instances in history 
where states have been brought to ruin because monarchs have indulged 
in religious persecution: 
"Cela doit aprendre aux Princes que lea Edits de persecution 
lea exposent A de grans inconveniens: cela est cause que leurs 
feux de joie affligentune partie de leurs sujets, & que lea 
victoires de leurs ennemis la remplissent de consolation. S'ils 
se plaignent d'avoir de mauvais sujets, on leur dolt repondre, c'est 
vous qui lea rendez tels; car de pretendre qu'un Parti persecute 
s'affligera des maux publics qui sont la source de son repos, & le 
fondement d'une esperance tres-plausible de prosperite, c'est 
pretendre le retour des premiers siecles du Christianisme; or ces 
tems-la ne reviennent pas deux fois." 49 
Although Bayle would not admit so openly, this last remark was obviously 
directed at Louis XIV, which becomes clear if we read on: 
"Vest ainsi que Von a vu la mane Cour laisser perdre lea 
occasions lea plus favourables de s l agrandir l'an 1684, afin de 
s'apliquer uniquement 5 la supression de l'Edit de Nantes. Ceux 
qui se laissent posseder de cet esprit n'ont qu'A renoncer au titre 
de Conquerant. c5u 
48 FRANCOIS Ier , note O. 
49 HENRI II, note D. 
50 Ibid. 
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Jurieu clamoured for a united Protestant crusade to drive Catholicism 
from France, 53 an appeal made with such passion that Eagle became 
increasingly alarmed. He was deeply concerned for the fate of those 
Huguenots still remaining in France and bearing the burden of the 
persecutions. With William of Orange on the English throne, and most 
of the European powers united in a war against Louis XIV, 54 it must 
certainly have appeared to Bayle that Jurieu's cry for a religious 
crusade against France had already been answered. He was acutely 
aware that while Louis was so hard pressed, it was highly unlikely that 
the King would lend a sympathetic ear to any appeals to his reason and 
concscience to restore religious toleration in France. On the contrary, 
it was more probable that the Huguenots would be blamed for France's 
recent reversal of fortune, and that their persecution would only be 
intensified. To make matters worse, Jurieu had put forward the claim 
that those of his religion were no longer bound by their oath of loyalty 
to their former king. 55 With many young Huguenots already serving in 
the armies of William of Orange and the German princes, Louis XIV could 
hardly be expected to have sympathy for his Protestant subjects. 
53 See Rex, Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy, p.216; Rex also 
mentions the interesting fact that Jurieu claimed to have had the 
sanction of William for his doctrines, and was used by the English 
government to co-ordinate a spy ring (p.225, n.84). 
54 England, Spain, Holland, Austria and most of the German states were 
at war with Louis XIV by November, 1688. 
55 See Rex, Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy, p.239, n.147. 
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Naturally enough, under such circumstances, Bayle felt obliged to 
itensify his appeal for toleration, and to denounce not only Jurieu 
and his followers, but their theories as well. 
Jurieu and his followers, living as they were in the Low Coun-
tries, mingled with an assortment of intellectuals, - refugees from the 
Exclusion Crisis in England, republicans, and a variety of Protestant 
clergymen. In such an intellectual environment, he could hardly 
avoid being put in touch with all the current theories of popular 
. resistance, many of which were derived from the Monarchousch doctrines 
which were revived during the English Exclusion Crisis. The criticisms 
which he levelled at Louis XIV from Holland initially covered a variety 
of subjects, but following the English Revolution, there appeared in his 
Lettres pastorales (1686-1689) an open call to his fellow subjects to 
rebel against their king. The justification for such a call to arms 
lay in his belief that there was an implicit contract in existence 
between subjects and ruler, and as in all such contracts, there were 
mutual obligations. For the monarch, there was the obligation to 
protect and safeguard the physical and spiritual liberty of his subjects. 
When he violated this obligation, his subjects were under the obligation 
to resist him. Such an obligation should be invoked, he claimed, 
especially when the monarch violated the supreme liberty of worshipping 
according to conscience. 56 Jurieu's contact with the English Whigs had 
56 See Kingsley Martin, French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth  
Century', 2nd. ed., London: Turnstile Press, 1954, p.33. 
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left its mark in his uncompromising stand on sovereignty. When 
the king exceeded the limits of his authority, he maintained, his 
subjects had a right to depose him. They alone, had no need to be 
right for their actions to be valid. 57 
This political volte-face on Jurieu's part, from supporting 
to criticising the French monarchy, in all probability provoked this 
scathing remark from Bayle's pen: "Generalement parlant c'est une 
preuve que les passions font parler ou pour ou contre le droit des 
Princes, que de voir que lee mEmes gens disent ll-dessus le out & 
le non 	mesure que lee intirats de leur cause se troUvent changez." 58 
But Bayle was not content to let the matter rest there. Once more he 
mustered his historical resources, this time for a direct attack on 
Jurieu's doctrines. If we turn to the article ELISABETH, 59 the text 
affords us with an account of the persecutions inflicted upon English 
Papists, as a consequence of their slanders and libels against the 
reputation of Queen Elizabeth and her government. It could hardly be 
a more obvious allegorical warning to Jurieu that his own diatribes 
against Louis XIV would result in more persecutions for those Huguenots 
remaining in France. If Huguenots preached the right of subjects to 
depose sovereigns, it would only provoke Louis into intensifying their 
persecution. Calm reason and not zeal was required. 
57 Ibid. 
58 KNOX, note H. See also RARCLAI, Guillaume, note E. 
59 ELISABETH, in corp. See also notes L and U. 
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His principal attack on the idea of popular resistance, 
however, is to be found in the article LOYOLA. 60 Here he mentioned 
two doctrines which were ardently supported by the Jesuits: that the 
authority of kings is inferior to that of the people; and that kings 
may be punished by the people in certain cases. The Jesuits, he 
remarked, were not the inventors of these doctrines, but they were 
responsible for putting them into the most odious practice. In the 
same breath, he condemned the notion that sovereigns were given the 
secular sword to punish heretics. The reasoning of the Jesuits on 
this subject was that if sovereigns refused to use their power to 
persecute heretics, then the people, the true sovereigns, had a 
responsibility to assume the task, and the king should be dethroned. 
It was the sovereign's duty to persecute heretics but, if because of 
some threat to the security of the state the king should be obliged 
to grant toleration, the concession should remain only while the danger 
existed, and then persecution should once again be resumed. At this 
point, Bayle noted with a certain pleasure that the Third Estate of 
France condemned all such doctrines as pernicious. Then followed 
the significant thrust at Jurieu. This French pastor, Bayle continued, 
accepted a similar line of reasoning to that of the Jesuits, viz. 
"Les Princes peuvent faire mourir lea heritiques, donc us doivent les 
faire mourir" ,61 only this time the heretics were not Protestants, but 
60 LOYALA, note S. 
61 Ibid. 
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Catholics. Although the footnote under which all of this is 
discussed was ostensibly a criticism of the Jesuits, its general 
condemnation of the ideas of popular sovereignty and resistance 
lead me to believe that it is equally an allegorical criticism of 
Jurieu's own political beliefs. That Bayle should have used 
allegory as a means of criticising Jurieu is not surprising, for 
Jurieu's political influence in Holland is an established fact. 62 
In 1693, he had already used this influence with the Walloon 
Consistory to secure Bayle's dismissal from his professorship in 
Rotterdam, the excuse being that Bayle was an enemy of William of 
Orange. 63 Any open condemnation of this zealous pastor would 
probably be interpreted by him as an act of treachery against William 
and Holland. Obviously then, prudence forbade Bayle to speak too 
openly against the political beliefs of his arch-antagonist. In fact, 
in this very article he admitted as much himself: 
62 See n.53 of this chapter. See also Rex, Pierre Bayle and Religious  
Controversy, pp.233-34. 
63 Ibid., pp.223-34, in particular p.234, n.126. In MMUS, note F 
Bayle remarked: " Dane toutes sortes de pals, il n'y a que trop de 
gens qui s'imaginent qu'on ne peut raisonner autrement qu'eux sur 
les affaires d'Etat, sans etre gagne par lea ennemis de la patrie. 
Ii y en a d'autres, qui sont beaucoup plus 6clairez: ils savent 
fort bien qu'avec un grand zele pour le bien public, on peut 
opiner d'une maniere toute contraire A la leur 	." 
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"L'opinion que lea Souverains ont regu de Dieu le glaive 
pour punir les Heretiques eat encore plus universelle que la 
precedente, & a ete reduite en pratique parmi lea Chretiens depuis 
Constantin jusques a present, dans toutes lea Communions Chretiennes 
qui ont doming sur lea autres, & A peine ose-t-on ecrire en Hollande contre une telle 0pini0n•" 64 
But this is even more significant if we consider Jurieu's call for a 
religious crusade against France. William, a Protestant prince, now 
had the power to lead such a crusade, so Jurieu was bound to regard with 
disfavour any efforts to prevent this. 
The allegory in the Dictionnaire goes even farther, however. 
In another article; Bayle allegorically highlighted the unreasonableness 
of Jurieu's position in maintaining against the Catholics the very 
arguments which the Jesuits used against the Protestants. In GELDENHAUR, 
he carefully laid bare the irony of the situation. The early Church 
fathers did not pretend: 
111 	8ter aux Princes le droit du glaive qu'ils 
tiennent de Dieu; on vouloit seulement dire que ce droit ne 
s'etend pas sur lea erreurs de la conscience, & que lea 
Souverains n'ont pas regu de Dieu la puissance de persecuter 
lea Religions ... d'oa vient qu'Erasme n'a °se lea imiter? 
Et ce qui eat bieu plus etonnant, d'oa vient que depuis quelques 
annees un Ninistre de Hollande 65 a eiche de rendre odieux lea Tole-
rang, Oar la raison qu'ils 8toient aux Souverains un des plus 
beaux droits de leur Majeste? N'est-ce pas atre plus maim n & plus 
injuste que lea Paiens ne l'etoient contra lea Peres de la primitive 
Eglise, ausquels us ne reprochoient point ce pretendu attentat sur 
les droits des Souverains, ou ce pretendu crime d'Etat? Mais pour 
montrer l'illusion de ce.Ministre, ii sufiit de lui demander pourquoi 
il ate aux Rois Catholiques le droit du - glaive par raport aux 
Protestans? Pourquoi se croit-il permis ce qu'il blame dans lea 
64 LOYOLA, note S. 
65 There can be little doubt that the minister to whom Bayle was 
referring here was Pierre Jurieu. 
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autres comme tin crime de leze-majeste? Je pane pour la 
verite, dira-t-il; mats sa pretention eat celle de tout 
le monde."26 
Bayle's attack on the rights of popular sovereignty is 
not confined to the article LOYOLA. For example in the article 
BODIN, he summarised that sixteenth century "politique" as saying 
that no matter what "meschancetez, impietez, & cruautez" a monarch 
may have committed, it did not belong to his subjects, either 
individually or generally, to make any attempt against his honour 
or life. 67 The results of such attempts have been made clear 
elsewhere. Despite the fact that Bodin later contradicted this 
opinion when he sided with the Catholic League of the Guises, Bayle 
indicated his own acceptance of the opinion when he pointed out 
that we are at liberty to presume that "la chute d'un pficheur n'emprtche 
pas que lea bonnes actions qu'il avoit faites ne soient bonnes."68 
On the subject of allegory in the Dictionnaire, Walter Rex 
has noted two further points. In his erudite and detailed analysis 
of the article DAVID, he claims that in the first edition of the 
Dictionnaire, when Bayle condemned King David for joining the Philistines 
to fight his own people, the Israelites, he really had in mind the 
contemporary problem of the Huguenots. 69 Jurieu had claimed that 
France's Protestants were no longer bound by their oath of loyalty to 
66 GELDENHAUR, note F. See also MAHOMET, note 0. 
67 BODIN, note Q. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Rex, Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy, pp.238-39. 
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Louis XIV, and were free to enlist in the foreign armieswhich were 
at that time at war with France. Since many young Huguenots had 
readily accepted this advice, Bayle's condemnation of David is quite 
rightly seen by Rex as an allegorical criticism of Jurieu and those 
who accepted his doctrines. The second point which Rex makes is 
that note G of the article DAVID can be seen as an allegorical 
treatment of the deposition of James II and the revolutionary content 
of Jurieu's Lettres pastorales. 70 
On this latter point, there is further evidence of Bayle's 
keen awareness of the importance of the 1688 Revolution to the Huguenots 
in the article ELISABETH. Dr. P. J. S. Whitmore has noted in his thesis 
the use to which Bayle has put English history and learning in the 
71 Dictionnaire, and while I consider that he rather over-inflates the 
importance of Bayle's specifically English knowledge, there can be no 
doubting the value which Bayle placed on 1688 as a piece of historical 
evidence. We learn in note I of ELISABETH, that the excuse the English 
used in 1688 to depose James II was that Elizabeth had once broken a 
promise to maintain the Catholic religion in England when she ascended 
the throne. "Ainsi lea Anglois", he continued "ont pu se persuader que 
Jaques II ne craindroit point lea mauvaises suites d'un manquement de 
pantile en metier de Religion ••• . "72 An oath once broken by a monarch 
70 Ibid., pp.239-41. 
71 Whitmore, "The use made of English thought and learning in the works 
of Pierre Bayle, with special reference to the Dictionnaire."  
72 ELISABETH, note I. 
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had made the English cautious a second time-, and-1n their eyes this 
seemed to justify the deposition of James. But in a. sense Louis XIV 
had also broken his oath to the French Huguenots by revoking the 
Edict of Nantes, and Bayle could forsee what capital Jurieu would, and 
did, make of this. Jurietes proclamation of a holy war against France, 
allied to the fact that the deposed English king was not only a close 
friend of Louis', but also enjoyed his protection, seemed to Bayle 
evidence enough that the French monarchy was in dire peril. 
Perhaps the best example of the moral use to which Bayle put 
history is to be found in the article AMYRAUT. Its tone, its length 
and the praise Bayle had for this Protestant minister, all suggest that 
the Article WEIS included for a specific purpose. In fact the footnotes 
- contain a perfect moral lesson in the very ideas on toleration and 
politics which Bayle himself held. The article and its appendages are 
almost a straight narration of the events and ideas which marked 
Amyraut's career. As a piece of historical writing, this article is 
truly "philosophy teaching by example" 73 Everywhere we find lengthy 
remarks on Amyrautts belief in passive obedience, liberty of conscience 
and absolutism. In note 0, for example, we learn that he believed 
the French Huguenots should have shown the same patience under the 
persecution of the sixteenth century as the early Christians did under 
the Roman persecutions. In 1650, following the death of Charles I of 
73 See Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers, 
Chap. /II. 
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England Amyraut published a book under the title de la Souverainete  
des Rois, in which he denounced the action of subjects in taking up 
arms against their sovereigns. 74 A little further on we learn that 
during the last minority (presumably that of Louis XIV) he constantly 
exhorted his congregation to maintain passive obedience towards the 
king, saying that "ii n'y avoit point d'autre party a prendre que de 
se tenir au gros de l'arbre", 75 a sermon to which Bayle himself would 
have lent wholehearted support. The narrative continues: 
etablit, que par lea veritables principes du 
Christianisme lea sujets ne doivent point prendre lea armes 
contre leurs Souverains. Ii se declare hautement pour ce 
qu'on nomme 'l'oberssance passive'. 	Cet Ouvrage [i.e. de la 
Souverainete des Bois] fut dedie au Roi d'Angleterre Charles 11, 76 
peu apres que ce Prince fut remonte sur le Tr8ne." 77 
Like Bayle, Amyraut made one exception to the stringent rule of obeying 
sovereigns, and that was in matters which concerned conscience. Once 
again Bayle made the point by narrating an historical example, - the 
occasion when Amyraut, like the English ambassador Stafford some seventy 
years before him, refused to hand out drapes in Paris for the feast of 
Corpus Christi. 78 As elsewhere in the article, the moral lesson cannot 
74 AMYRAUT, note Q. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Bayle deplored Cromwell's usurpation of power in England, and praised 
Charles II for his generosity to the French refugees. See P. J. S. 
Whitmore, "English Thought and Learning in the Works of Pierre Bayle", 
French Studies, VIII, 1954, p.143, n.20. 
77 AMYRAUT, note Q. 
78 Ibid. 
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associated with toleration. He was concerned entirely with the 
political and religious issues of his times in so far as they 
threatened the peace of Europe. Political peace was the pre-
requisite of religious toleration, and historical evidence was the 
best proof of this. In the following chapter, we shall see how 
Bayle s s view of historical causation evolved from his concern 
for negating the view that the will of God inspired religious 
persecution. 
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CHAPTER III  
CAUSATION IN HISTORY  
Bayle's view of causation in history is reflected primarily 
in his attack on religious orthodoxy. One of the principal argu-
ments which he pursued against the advocates of persecution in many 
of the footnotes was that orthodoxy in religion cannot be justified 
on rational grounds, since religious truth is a matter for the 
individual conscience guided by revelation. To be able to justify 
such a conclusion, he had to presume two fundamental ideas: first 
that man possesses a certain degree of liberty of action and freedom 
of will, and as a consequence, secondly that the guiding hand of 
Providence in human affairs be restricted to allow man this freedom 
of action. These ideas, however, have a further importance. The 
former was necessary if there were to be any value in his appeal for 
men to cease the cruelties of persecution and adopt the principles of 
toleration, for he must show that the responsibility for persecution 
rested with man. The latter idea was necessary to forestall the use 
of absolute Providential determinism as a justification of persecution, 
for frequently religious sects or causes would point to Providential 
favour to excuse their barbarities. In seeking to divide causation 
between man and God, Bayle naturally risked contradicting Calvin's 
teachings on Providence and predestination, and suffering the accusation 
of heresy. Consequently, not only his defence of toleration, but the 
- 56 - 
very sincerity of his religious beliefs, depended upon the manner 
in which he resolved the causal relationship between man and God. 
The question of the sincerity of Eagle's religious views 
has been the subject of considerable dispute in recent years. 
Although interpretations have varied widely they tend to fall broadly 
into two categories: those who seek to emphasize his religious 
sincerity by highlighting his seventeenth century background, in 
particular, his political and religious milieu, and those who doubt 
his religious sincerity, by indicating his advance towards scepticism 
and the use made of his ideas in the various attacks on religion 
during the eighteenth century. The dispute tends, on the whole, to 
centre around the discussion of religious and philosophical questions 
in the Dictionnaire, but rarely to any of the disputants relate such 
discussions to any underlying purpose in the work. Without such a 
guide, the task of determining Bayles religious sincerity is a 
baffling one, as the conflict of interpretations indicates. 
The belief that Bayle remained a sincere Calvinist till his 
death is not a new one, and can be traced back to Sainte Beuve's 
nineteenth century work Portraits Litteraires. 1 One of the earliest 
recent attempts to advance such a view was made by W. H. Barber in 
1 Sainte Beuve, "du Genie critique et de Bayle" in Portraits  
Litteraires, Oeuvres de Sainte Beuve. Paris: Bibliothaque 
de la Pleiade, 1949, I, pp.978-99. 
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1952. 2 In Barber's view, the negative and destructive criticisms 
which led to Bayle's double conversion did not necessarily prevent him 
from holding sincere religious beliefs, but rather destroyed his 
confidence in reason where matters of faith were at issue. More 
importantly, Barber recognized the causal relationship between many 
of Bayle's religious views and his conception of history, claiming 
that the latter was "not only profoundly Christian, but essentially 
Calvinist". Almost a decade later, in 1962, E. D. James published 
an article3 in which he took exception to the views of some of the 
contributors to the Dibon volume, Pierre Bayle, le philosophe de  
Rotterdam. James also advanced the view that Bayle was less a sceptic 
than an orthodox Calvinist, and maintained that even where Bayle's 
religious views betrayed a fideistic element, as in the question of 
free-will, he took a strongly Calvinist line. James was concerned, 
in particular, to examine Bayle's religious views beyond what he 
referred to as the usual article PYRRHON. With the exception of 
Mine Labrousse's monumental,study of Bayle 4 which will be discussed 
2 W. H. Barber, "Pierre Bayle: Faith and Reason", in The French Mind, 
ed. W. Moore et al. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952, pp.109-25. 
3 E. D. James, "Scepticism and Fideism in Bayle's Dictionnaire" in 
French Studies, xiv, Oct. 1962, no. 4, p.307. 
4 Labrousse, Pierre Bayle, 2 vols., 1963-4. 
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in later chapters, the most recent attempt to portray Bayle as an 
orthodox Calvinist was the previously mentioned study by Walter Rex, 
in 1965. 5 Closely analysing the article DAVID, Rex endeavoured to 
prove that its opinions were Calvinism of the most orthodox type, 
whereas Bayle's erstwhile friend, Pierre Jurieu, often placed consi- 
derable strain on orthodox Calvinist teachings. The real contribution 
of Rex's discussion of this single article from the Dictionnaire, 
is that he placed it in the context of Bayle's struggle with the 
over-zealous Jurieu and the Huguenot theories of resistance which 
abounded after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. It 
is of considerable significance that on the one hand Barber has made 
the association between Bayle's Calvinism and his view of history,- 
while of the other Rex has made the association between Bayles 
Calvinism and his role in the Toleration Controversy. It will be 
the purpose of this chapter to attempt to define an association between 
Bayle's view on toleration and his concept of causation as seen against 
the background of his religious faith. 
Of those who doubt Bayle's religious sincerity, two recent 
articles deserve mention. In 1963, H. T. Mason made a challenge to 
5 Rex, Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy. The 
chapter entitled: "Bayle's Article on David" originally appeared 
in two parts under the title: "Pierre Bayle: the theology and 
politics on David" in Bibliothaque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 
xxxiv, 1952, i, pp.168-89 and xxv, 1963, ii, pp.366-403. 
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Barber's thesis, 6 in which he concluded that Bayle's professed 
orthodoxy was in all probability a ruse to avoid attracting 
unwelcome criticism from his enemies, in particular one would 
presume, Pierre Jurieu. Although Mason is not completely at 
variance with Barber's views, he argues that there is ample 
reason to doubt Bayle's religious sincerity. In his book 
Pierre Bayle and Voltaire, 7  which also appeared in 1963, Mason 
goes on to assert that Bayle was in fact advocating the Manichean 
hypothesis. I find this a baffling assertion which I can only 
attribute to a misunderstanding of the meaning of the articles 
MANICHEENS, MARCIONITES, and PAULICIENS. It is interesting 
that Mason should point out that even Voltaire did not consider 
Bayle a Manichean believer, Voltaire who miscontrued the meaning 
of so many articles in the Dictionnaire. The second monograph 
to reflect doubts as to Bayle's religious sincerity was an emphatic 
challenge to E. D. James's thesis by Harry M. Bracken, 8 published in 
1964. Bracken sought to point out the deficiencies in James's 
argument, and to reassert the value of seeking out the relationship 
between Bayle's philosophical scepticism and his religious views 
6 H. T. Mason, "Pierre Bayle's religious views", in French Studies, 
XVII, 3, July 1963, pp.205-217. 
7 Mason, Pierre Bayle and Voltaire. 
8 Harry M. Bracken, "Bayle not a Sceptic?", in the Journal of the  
History of Ideas, 25, no. 2, 1964, pp.169-80. 
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in order to reveal the extent of both his scepticism and his 
fideism. Both Mason and Bracken, however, tend to draw their 
evidence from isolated theological and philosophical discussions 
in the Dictionnaire, rather than relating this evidence to some 
purpose in the work as a whole. Although, as Mason points out, 
we cannot avoid recognizing that the "philosophes" regarded Bayle 
as their precursor, it is a mistake to interpret Bayle's views in 
terms of what the eighteenth century made of them. Bayle's own 
motives for writing what he did must remain the essential key to an 
understanding of his beliefs, especially with relation to theology. 
It is here perhaps, that this present study can hope to make some 
contribution to a further understanding of Bayle, by revealing at 
least one of the primary purposes of the Dictionnaire - to defend 
toleration - and the relationship this has to his philosophy of history. 
Of the discussion of religious questions in the Dictionnaire, 
there are three that can be shown to have a direct bearing both 
on Bayle's defence of toleration and upon his view of causation. 
They are the questions of free-will, Providential determinism and 
the origin of evil. E. D. James, in his articles on Bayle's fideism, 
lists five points which he considers central to Bayle's religious 
views: the rational proofs for the existence of God; natural law; 
the immortality of the soul; free-will; and the controlling activity 
of a benevolent Providence. 9 It is significant that he should 
9 James, "Scepticism and Fideism in Bayle's Dictionnaire", p.322. 
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conclude that only Bayle's views on the proofs of the last three 
betray any element of fideism, for two of these, as I have said, 
are fundamentally concerned with his defence of toleration and 
his views of causation. Before Bayle can finally hope to resolve 
the relationship between free-will and Providential determinism, 
however, there is another important question to be consiciered - the 
origin of evil. His discussion of this question is one of the most 
original elements in the Dictionnaire and perhaps one of the most 
controversial. Apart from being used to show the impossibility 
of arriving at rational justifications of orthodoxy in religion, 
the question of the origin of evil also involves the first 
significant act of history. The respective roles of man and God 
in causation cannot be settled until the responsibility for this 
first act is determined. As Bayle set out to show, attempts to 
solve the problem rationally can only lead to the heresy of 
Manichean dualism or the inadequate 'a priori' arguments for free-
will and the Christian notion of the Devil. It is clear that 
Bayle's own solution to the problem had to be one that did not 
detract from man's responsibility in the act, or he would destroy 
the point of his defence of toleration, and one which did not 
contradict the Calvinist teaching on predestination, or he, 
himself, would fall into heresy. Although he is ultimately 
obliged to retreat behind the screen of fideism on all three of 
these questions, he nevertheless remained throughout, completely 
within the bounds of orthodox Calvinist theology. 
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Ultimately Bayle's concept of causation in history 
rests upon his view of the nature of man, a view which 
immediately reflects the influence of his Calvinist upbring-
ing, as well as his powers of historical observation. He 
began with the pessimistic assertion that man is fundamentally 
wicked and unhappy, a conclusion, as we shall see, which 
ultimately led him to a denial of progress in history. With 
almost Hobbesian gloom he pronounced: "L'homme est mechant & 
malheureux: chacun le conoit par ce qui se passe au dedans de 
lui, & par le commerce qu'il est oblige d'avoir avec son prochain."10  
Not only was man wicked and unhappy, but what was more alarming: 
“ 	y a dans le genre humain une source d'Anarchie que l'on 
ne sauroit boucher." 11 As further support for this view of the 
unfortunate state of man, Bayle went on to say: "Si l'homme 
n'etoit pas un animal indisciplinable, ne se seroit-il pas corrige 
de son orgueil, apras tant de preuves de is Maxime d'Esope 
relterees en cheque pals, & en cheque siecle?',12 Understandably 
then, with such a creature as the object of its study, history could 
hardly be described as more than "un Recueil des crimes & des 
infortunes du genre humain. 1,13 Despite this obvious excess of 
10 MAN ICHEENS, note D. 
11 ARNAULD, Antoine, fils d'Antoine Arnauld, l'Avocat, note B.B. 
12 ESCOPE, note I. 
13 MANICHEENS, note D. 
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wickedness in man's nature, Bayle showed his deference to the 
doctrine of predestination when he offered the reservation that 
history does not show every man to be entirely wicked: 
mais remarquons que ces deux maux, l'un 
moral & l'autre physique, n'occupent pas toute l'Histoire 
ni toute l'experience des particuliers: on trouve par 
tout & du bien moral & du bien physique; quelques 
examples de vertu, et quelques exemples de bonheur; & 
c'est ce qui fait la difficulte."14 
Such examples of virtue and happiness are not frequent, however, 
and Bayle maintained in several articles his conviction that evil 
exceeds virtue and misery exceeds happiness in this world. 15 
Even men like Cicero16 and La Mothe Le Vayer, 17 whose lives 
appear to have been fruitful and rewarding, would agree with him 
on this point, he believed. The latter, for example, had ex-
pressed a genuine reluctance to relive his life again, probably, 
Bayle surmised, because he was convinced his new life would be 
much the same as his present one. The miseries of this world 
are so oppressive that "ii n'y a guere de rales qui paroissent 
dignes d'etre repetez sur le th6atre du monde A un home de 
jugement. “18 Some men like Raphelengius 19 had spent the greater 
14 Ibid. 
15 LA MOTHE LE VAYER, RAPHELENGIUS, XENOPHANES for example. 
16 TUPPIUS, note A. 
17 VAYER, La Mothe Le, note F. 
18 Ibid. 
19 RAPHELENGIUS, note B. 
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part of their lives in a comfortable state of matrimony, deeply 
in love with their wives, and only a brief span suffering the 
miseries of being widowed. As a consequence, it might be 
concluded, Bayle tells us, that Raphelengius had a greater 
share of happiness than of misery. Such was not the case, 
however, for although he only spent three years as a widower, 
as against twenty-nine in happy marriage, in all probability he 
suffered more misery in those three years than he experienced in 
the previous twenty-nine. Even during his marriage there must 
have been crosses and sorrows to bear, for no marriage is purely a 
state of conjugal bliss. The conclusion in inescapable: this is 
a world filled with far more vice and misery than virtue and happiness. 
As final proof that 3ay1e's view of man accords with Calvin's 
teaching on predestination, we need only turn to the article 
XENOPHANES, where Bayle commented: 
qlotez que toutes lea choses que je viens de dire 
sont prattle-es tous les jours, & cela sans qu'on pretende 
donner atteinte A l'Empire tout-puissant du Verbe interne. 
On ne veut dire autre chose, & c'est ausai ma pens6e, sinon 
que l'homme est de sa nature si porta au mal, qu'except6 
le petit nombre 	tous les autres hommes vivent & 
meurent aux gages de l'Esprit maim, sans que lea soins 
paternels de Dieu pour lea sauver puissent guerir leur malice, 
ni lea amener A la repentance."20 
It is this Calvinist emphasis on the excess of misery 
20 XENOPHANES, note E. 
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over happiness in the world that is ultimately responsible 
for Bayle's denial of progress in history. This is yet 
another point at which we can identify him as belonging more 
precisely to the seventeenth rather than the eighteenth century, 
for although in one sense Bayle did take a tentative step along 
the path towards the eighteenth century, he very quickly drew 
back. He took this hesitant step in his attack on the 'ancients'. 
The authority of the 'ancients' was accepted traditionally because 
of the length of time through which their works and ideas had 
survived. In fact the very word 'ancient' inspired an idea of 
authority. Along with many of his contemporaries, Bayle 
maintained that the moderns were in fact more ancient than the 
' ancients ' since they had access to a far greater accumulation of 
knowledge. 21 He needed only to make the association between the 
advances in scientific knowledge of his own century and the advance-
ment of material happiness, and he would have arrived at something 
approaching the modern view of progress. Nevertheless, he made no 
such association. The key to it was at his disposal in the writings 
of Francis Bacon, 22 which presumably he had read. He even included 
21 CORCEONE, note F. 
22 Bacon's view of knowledge and its utility is discussed fully in 
chapter II of J. B. Bury's The Idea of Progress, London: Macmillan 
& Co. Ltd., 1928, pp.50-63. 
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an article on Bacon in the Dictionnaire, but apparently perceived no 
significance in the idea that accumulated knowledge could give man the 
power to improve his material well-being. Instead, he fell back upon 
the traditional seventeenth century notion of happiness. 
To begin with, he made the distinction in his notion 
of happiness between what he called its "efficient" causes and its 
"formal" state. 23 The "efficient" causes, under which heading he 
included such things as riches, science, honours, fame and virtue 
(knowledge, we may presume, would be included here) react only upon 
our senses, and are entirely external to our bodies. Such were the 
causes which the ancient philosophers identified as the true source 
of happiness. The "formal" state of happiness, however, is that 
necessary state of blessedness within us, which originates within our 
mind, and makes our soul (or "mind" - Bayle, like Montaigne, used 
the terns synonomously) truly happy. For an explanation of the cause 
of this "formal" state of happiness, Bayle revived an idea which he 
found so appealing in the philosophies of Malebranche and Descartes; 
the idea of "occasional" causes • 24 The "formal" state of happiness, 
which Bayle described as a feeling of ease, a sense of pleasure, and a 
23 EPICURE, note H. 
24 Although Brush maintains that Bayle abandoned his adherence to 
Malebranche's 'occasional' cause hypothesis during the latter's 
dispute with Arnauld in the mid-1680's, Bayle nevertheless drew 
heavily upon this idea to explain the complexities of the origin 
of evil in the Dictionnaire. In the light of Brush's research, 
however, this idea is probably more of a Cartesian legacy. 
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general satisfaction of mind, was identified accurately by Epicurus, 
under whose name the subject is discussed in the Dictionnaire. 
Epicurus, made the significant mistake of believing that a selection 
of "efficient" causes could produce this "formal" state of happiness; 
causes such as those which preserve bodily health and prevent any 
uneasiness of the mind. According to Bayle, this philosopher's 
chief mistake lay: "... en tie reconnoissant pas qu'il n'y a que 
Dieu qui puisse produire dans n8tre ame l'itat qui la rend heureuse."25 
Obviously then, to attain the "formal" state of happiness, men needed 
only to be subject to "occasional" causes, or ideas which react on 
the mind, and needed to have no reference to "efficient" causes which 
react solely on the external senses. If then, as Bayle implied, 
there is no necessary connection between sensation and ideas, what was 
the value and purpose of "efficient" causes? 
Our sensations, which are the vehicles of pleasure, only 
react on the mind to produce happiness because God, who is the author 
of the union of the soul and body, has seen fit to allow this. 26 
Working through the medium of "lee loix de l'union de l'ame et du 
corps", God has permitted the soul (mind) to refer to the senses for 
an awareness of certain pains and pleasures, such as burning or tickling, 
in order more successfully to preserve the body from harm. These very 
laws can, in fact, produce a great diversity of reactions in men. 
25 EPICURE, note H. 
26 Ibid. 
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Frequently ideas resulting from the action of external stimuli 
upon the senses can contradict ideas resulting from "occasional" 
causes. Hobbes, for example, whose courage and steadiness related 
solely to objects of the mind, showed distinct fear at the prospect 
of physical pain. Montaigne, whose sceptical turn of mind would 
seem to have placed him above physical prejudice, was unable to 
witness a pullet's throat being cut or a hare being savaged by dogs. 
Such contradictions in men Bayle attributed to what he called 
"temperament". 
Obviously God, who is unable to separate the being 
of a circle from the idea of a circle, can nevertheless separate 
body and soul, sensation and ideas: "Notre ame pourroit sentir du 
froid sans le reporter I un pied, ni A une main, tout commie elle sent 
la joie d'une bonne nouvelle & le chagrin, sans lea raporter I aucune 
des parties du corps ... . ,27 In other words, while bodily sensa-
tions are referred to the mind (soul), the mind need not refer to the 
body to experience sensations of its own. Happiness, then, emanates 
from God, either directly, or through the "occasional" cause of an 
idea for which He is ultimately responsible. We should not enquire 
too deeply into the manner in which God effects such causes in the 
distribution of happiness and misery, for what at first may appear as 
adversity, may in time, well result in prosperity. Antony Panormita 
27 Ibid. 
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was sufficiently wise to realise that the causes of happiness 
and unhappiness are hidden from our scrutiny. 28 Bayle's all too 
familiar conclusion concerning the inscrutable ways of God, is 
once again offered to us: "C'est par la Revelation que Von petit 
s'en debarasser. ”29 
Thus in making true happiness a divinely inspired state 
of mind, Bayle precluded rational knowledge as a key to happiness, 
and therefore as a means to the achievement of progress. His 
powers of historical observation left no room for a belief in the 
idea. If he needed further evidence of man's failure to progress 
through accumulated knowledge, he had only to turn to the lessons of 
history. From the time of Emma, wife of Ethelred, through the 
barbarities committed in Europe between 1345 and 1390, to the horrors 
of the French Wars of Religion and the persecutions which followed 
upon the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, it was clear that man had 
made little or no progress in dispelling the evils of superstition 
and ignorance. 30 
28 PANORMITA, note H. 
29 Ibid. 
30 P. J. S. Whitmore in his thesis "The use made of English Thought 
and History in the works of Pierre Bayle, with Special Reference 
to the Dictionlaire", p.9, claims that many of Eagle's 
criticisms were levelled at the twin evils of superstition and 
ignorance. 
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His historical observations and his denial of progress 
led Bayle to adopt a cyclical view of history, once again betraying 
his indeptedness to seventeenth century historical traditions. He 
saw the pattern of historical development as one of undulation and 
repetition: 
"Prenez l'Histoire Uhumaine) par quelque bout qu'il 
vous plaira, & suivez-en les progres depuis le commencement 
jusqu'A la fin, vous verrez 	. Le monde est un veritable 
jeu de bascule; tour A tour on y monte & on y descend. On 
doit admirer dans ce jeu-lA les profondeurs d'une sage 
Providence, & l'activite de nos passions." 31 
This was essentially a statement of the "antique-modern" view of 
history, which received its currency during the Renaissance from the 
ideas of Machiavelli, 32 and was widely accepted by French historians 
in the seventeenth century. In The Prince, Machiavelli presented a 
picture of human beings acting out their drama on the unchanging stage 
of Earth, with nature as a backdrop. Men appeared merely as different 
mixtures of the same basic ingredients, the same basic compounds. 
y a des vices qui sont de tous pals, & de 
toute Religion, & de tout Siecle 	. Notons aussie qu'il 
y a de bonnes actions, dont on trouve des exemples dans 33 cheques pas, dans cheques siecle, & dans chaque Religion..  
Consequently, the historical narrative is the same, regardless of. the 
31 ESCOPE, note I. 
32 For a discussion of this point, see H. Butterfield, The Origins  
of Modern Science. 	2nd. ed. London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd., 
1462, pp.210-18. 
33 AVERROES, note P. 
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period of history under review. In fact a panoramic view of 
history would reveal a similar picture in all ages: "Le pis est 
qu'on ne profite pas du passe: chaque generation fournit lea 
mgmes sympames, tantat plus grans, tantat plus petits. ”34 In 
excluding the possibility of progress in history, Bayle did not 
wish to present a picture of a world growing steadily more wicked 
and degenerate. The repetitive view of history is a denial of both 
progress and regress in the absolute sense. It is in fact a 
completely static view of history: 
"C'est une erreur que de croire que le monde va to8jours 
de mal en pis; car il eat certain que le Siecle oil nous 
vivons ne nous fait pas voir dans l'Occident une suite d'enormitez 
en peu d'annees semblable a celle que l'on y trouve depuis l'an 
1345 jusqu s en 1390."35 
While Bayle s s acceptance of the cyclical view of history 
places him in the mainstream of seventeenth century historical 
thought, his point of departure lies in his rejection of the traditional 
explanation of causation generally associated with the theory. Its 
most usual exponents were the ecclesiastical historians, who ascribed 
a considerable, if not absolute, deterministic role to Providence as an 
34 AMYRAUT, note F. 
35 NAPLES, Jeanne I de, note 0. 
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explanation of causatiod. Bayle, as we have seen, held firmly to 
his opinion that both God and man must be considered equally as 
causal factors. On the one hand, when discussing the Reformation, 
he remarked: "Ii faut admirer dams cette conduite le doigt de Dieu. 
Vest le pere commun de tous lea Peuples, il donne dams un Siecle A 
une Nation les benadictions temporelles, 	lui Ste dans un.autre- 
Siecle." 36 while on the other hand, he made pointed reference to 
man's unruly passions as a factor in causation: "Ii y a peu de grandes 
affaires, qui me reassissent pour le mains autant par lea fautes de 
l'un des partis, que par la prudence de.l'autre."37 In dividing 
causation thus, between man and God, Bayle was then pressed to provide 
some explanation of the respective roles of each. The solution he 
proposed was, to say the least, something less than exact. 
We find part of his answer in note B.B to the article 
LUTHER, where he remarked: "Sans recourir aux constellations, l'asyle 
ordinaire de l'ignorance, on eat pu trouver sur la terre lea causes 
secondes dont Dieu se servit pour le changement qui arrive en Allemagne 
au XVI Siecle."38 Clearly Bayle saw God as the prime mover, working 
His mysterious ways denugh general laws: "Dieu sur la terre, entant 
que dispensateur des evenements, & distributeur des bons succAs & des 
malheurs, n'a pas moms sounds aux Lois generales la vertu & l'innocence, 
que la sante et lea richesses. ”39 
36 NAPLES, Alphonse Ier de, note A. 
37 AUTRICHE, note F. 
38 LUTHER, note B.B. 
39 BRUTUS, M. J., note D. 
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while man and his environment were to have freedom within the 
framework of these general laws to act as second causes. By 
this means, he sought to extricate himself from the difficulty 
of having Providence direct everything down to the minutest detail 
of our lives. This solution was not an original one, however, 
for almost the same explanation of causation can be found in the 
XXVth. chapter of The Prince: "... I think that it may be true 
that fortune is the ruler of half our actions, but that she allows 
the other half or thereabouts to be governed by us." 40 This lack of 
clarity which Bayle exhibited in defining the respective causal roles 
of God and man beyond "general laws" and%econd causes" was not 
without it purpose, but to fully appreciate this, we must have 
recourse once again to his arguments in defence of toleration, in 
particular those concerned with Providence, free-will and the origin 
of evil. 
In his attack on religious orthodoxy, Bayle's intention 
was not so much to deny Providential determinism absolutely, as to 
deny the ability of man's reason to comprehend it. By this means 
he hoped to weaken the position of the rationalist theologians in 
their attempts to define religious orthodoxy. If the attainment of 
orthodoxy were placed beyond reason, all religious sects would then be 
40 Nicola Machiavelli, The Prince and Other Pieces, taken from the 
English translation of 1674. London: George Routledge & Sons, 
1883, p.153. 
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obliged to respect each other's opinions, as well as the opinions 
of the individual conscience. The claim of religious orthodoxy 
was one of the principal justificationsof persecution. Frequently, 
religious sects had interpreted their success as a sign of Providential 
favour, and had argued their orthodoxy, and their right to persecute 
heretics, from this: "Us se flatent 	que le ciel se dficlarera 
pour eux „41 The ignorance and superstition of some men had 
easily enabled them to give ready credence to explanations of adversity 
and good fortune which point to the guiding hand of God: "... ceux 
qui condamnent une practique, ont accoutume de suposer que les prodiges 
celestes se dficlarent en leur faveur. Us persuadent cela aisement, & 
us tienent ainsi lea esprits dens la servitude. "42 It is absurd, 
we are told elsewhere, for Christians to reason in such a manner, 
especially when texts from the Bible are used as a basis for such 
arguments, because in the New Testament, in particular 1 and 2 Timothy, 
we find only contradictory teachings: 
"Qu'il me soit permis de dire un mot sur l'inconstance des 
raisonnemens de l'homme, A l'egard de l'adversite & de la - 
prosperite. On a 11-dessus des Maximes toutes opposees. On 
vous dira, & que ceux qui veulent vivre selon la piete soufriront 
persecution, & que la pieta a lei promesses de la vie presente 
& de celle qui eat a venir."43 
41 BRUTUS, M. J., note D. 
42 NAGGEORGUS, note C. 
43 MAHOMET II, note D. 
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Regardless of the obvious contradictions of such biblical 
texts, there is no doubt that Christians used the favour of 
Providence as a justification of persecution: 
"Ne voit-on pas qu'aussitat que les Chritiens 
furent en etat de persficuter, us reprocherent A 
l'erreur les maims choses que le Paganisme leur avoit 
attributees, c'est-A-dire, d'gtre is cause qu'on ne 
faisoit pas de bonnes recoltes, & qu'on voioit tin 
renversement de saisons ,n44 
Although he remained a sincere Calvinist, Bayle's faith in the 
ability of reason to resolve theological questions had been 
destroyed early in his life. It is not surprising, then, that 
the only answer he could find against such rational arguments for 
persecution lay in the adoption of some degree of fideism; he had 
to show the inability of man's reason to comprehend the divine workings 
of Providence. At this point, we can now press on to an anlysis of 
that subject which caused such a furore when the Dictionnaire was first 
45 published in 1696 - the origin of evil. 
Bayle's excuse for including a discussion of this subject 
in several of the articles has not as yet, in my opinion, been 
satisfactorily explained. As Craig B. Brush has observed, it is one 
of the truly original aspects of the Dictionnaire. 46 Bayle had 
hinted at it in some Of his earlier works, but it was not until 1696 
44 VERGERIUS, note C. 
45 In Brush, Montaigne and Bayle, p.250 the date of this first 
edition is shown as 1679, but this is obviously a misprint. 
46 Ibid., p.303. 
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thnt:he published a full discussion of the subject. W. H. Barber 
has commented upon the fact that there was a revival of interest 
in the origin of evil around the year 1690, about the time when 
Boyle commenced work on the Dictionnaire. 47 Barber makes reference 
to Bossuet's Histoire des variations des Eglises protestantes (1688) 
and Basnage's Histoire de la religion des Eglises riformees (1690), 
as well as the reviews of both Basnage's book and Bishop Stillingfleet's 
Origine Sacrae in the Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants for 1690. He 
also mentions De Origine Mali (1702), a book by William King, later 
Archbishop of Dublin, concerned exclusively with the origin of evil. 
King's book, however, postdated the first edition of the Dictionnaire  
by some six years, and can have had no influence on Bayle's original 
ideas. While the other works may well have drawn his attention to the 
subject of evil, it seems to me hardly likely that a rigorous scholar 
like Boyle would have been drawn to expend so much time and energy on a 
mere theological digression. 
The answer is not to be found, either, in the opinion of 
those who contend like H. T. Mason, that Boyle was confessing his own 
belief in the Manichean heresy. Undoubtedly the force with which Boyle 
47 Barber, Leibniz in France, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955, pp. 70-72. 
-77- 
presented the Manichean position was sufficient excuse for a 
number of his contemporaries to accuse him of a belief in 
this heresey. 48 In 1699, Leclerc answered Bayle's explanation 
of Manicheanism with his Parrhasiana, in which he posited the 
views of Origen as a satisfactory explanation of the origin of 
evil. A further attack was launched in 1705 by Jaquelot, and 
of course in 1710 there appeared Leibniz's famous Theodicy. 
Nevertheless, a rigid analysis of Bayle's treatment of the problem 
of evil leaves no room for acceptance of current opinions like those 
of Mason. 
If, however, we consider Bayle's discussion of this subject 
in the light of his defence of toleration, its inclusion in the 
Dictionnaire assumes a new importance. In the first place, both the 
problems of the workings of Providence and of free-will were indis-
solubly linked to the origin of evil. If the responsibility for 
the first sin is attributed to man alone, does this not ascribe to 
him the divine attribute of real and absolute freedom? If the 
responsibility was God's, does this not have the effect of denying His 
supreme goodness? Morover, is it not then still possible to argue that if 
God is the source of both good and evil, that victory will be the reward 
of the virtuous and defeat the just punishment of the wicked? And from 
this, is it not then valid to argue the right to persecute the weak and 
48 Barber makes this point, but also denies that Bayle was a Manichean 
believer, ibid., p.71. 
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accorded most readily with reason and experience. The free-
will argument for which Origen, the third century theologian was 
the most ardent advocate, and the Christian idea of the Devil 
could not withstand the rational objections of the dualists. 
By a subtle use of pyrrhonism, Bayle reduced all rational 
explanations of the origin of evil, with the exception of the 
dualist heresy, to impotence, and the dualist explanation he 
opposed with fideistic arguments inspired by Calvin's teachings. 
In PERICLES note K, Bayle acquaints us with the source 
of the Manichean idea of the two principles, the separate and 
eternal, good and evil Gods: 
"C'est donc ainsi que l'esprit de l'homme, trop 
borne pour comprendre clairement que lea miseres & lea 
crimes, dont la terre est toute couverte, puissent 
compatir avec l'etre infiniment bon, s'est precipite darts 
l'Hypothese des deux principes." 49 
In the article MANICHEENS itself, Bayle displayed the considerable 
potency of the dualist heresy. The real strength of the dualist 
sects, and of the pagan philosophers for that matter, lay in not 
using 'a priori' but 'a posteriori' reasoning. Had these people 
used the deductive process, the early Church Fathers might easily 
have routed them, for we know by this technique that our understanding 
of orders teaches us that God, the eternal Being, must be "unique, infini, 
tout-puissant, & doue de toutes sortes de perfections. 	This makes 
an absurdity of a system based upon two independent principles, the 
49 PERICLES, note K. 
50 MANICHEENS, note D. 
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one infinitely good, the other infinitely evil. If 'a priori' 
reasoning were alone used, neither the Manicheans nor the pagan 
philosophers would have an answer to this. Inductive reasoning, 
however, requires two things of every philosophical system to make 
it satisfactory, "... l'une que lea idies en soient distinctes, 
l'autre qu'il puisse donner raison des experiences."51  When the 
Manicheans endeavoured to prove from all the physical opposites in the 
world, for example heat-cold, white-black, light-darkness, that our 
experience contradicts the idea of a single God, they were on weak 
ground: 
"On donne raison de toutes ces choses, ou par lea 
diverses facultez que Dieu a donnees aux corps, ou par 
lea loix du mouvement qu'il a fitablies, ou par le concours 
des causes occasionelles intelligentes, sur lesquelles ii lui a plu de se regler."52 
The Cartesian theory of "occasional" causes was entirely adequate to 
explain the opposites in physical bodies. Everything, with the 
exception of man himself, declared for the glory and unity of God: 
"l'homme seul, dis-je, fournit de tris-grandes Objections contre 
l'unite de Dieu."53 It was the mixture of vice and virtue, happiness 
and unhappiness in man which afforded the strongest evidence for the 
theory of the two principles. 
To underline the impossibility of overturning the dualist theory 
by reason, Bayle invented a dialogue between two pagan philosophers, 
51 Ibid. 
52 MANICHEENS, note D. 
53 Ibid. 
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Melissus, who held to one principle, and Zoroaster, who held to two. 54 
At every turn, Melissus was thwarted in his arguments by Zoroaster 
according to the principles of 'a posteriori' reasoning, for Zoroaster's 
theory was not only rationally sound, but it also accorded with what 
experience teaches us about the existence of good and evil in the world. 
Melissus might have raised a thousand objections, but Zoroaster would 
have answered them all without ever being converted to the idea of the 
unity of God. There was an answer, however, which the Church Fathers 
might have posed to the Manicheans, who admitted the divine inspiration 
of the new Testament. The Manicheans might have been convinced of the 
divine inspiration of the Old Testament with little difficulty, and there 
one can find ample evidence for the unity of God and His infinite 
perfections: 
"Qu'on nous vienne dire avec un grand apareil de 
raisonnemens, 	n'est pas possible que le mal moral 
s'introduise dans le monde, par l'ouvrage d'un Principe 
infiniment bon & saint, nous repondrons que cela s'est 
pourtant fait, & par consequent que cela est tres-possible. 
Ii n'y a rien de plus insense que de raisonner contra des 
faits."55 
Leaving aside for the moment the question of 'probabilism' which is 
raised by Brush, 56 if we are prepared to accept the first of Popin's 
54 Ibid. 
55 MANICHEENS, note D. 
56 Brush claims that Bayle's position of grace (or revelation) is that 
while grace is totally reliable, it cannot be positively identified. 
This, according to Brush, is at best a 'probabilist' position, which 
mades Bayle technically not a fideist, but a seml-fideist. Cf. opp. 
cit., pp.299-301. I will discuss this more fully in a later chapter. 
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first, as being comfortable, or pain as being uncomfortable, 
before experiencing the other. It cannot even validly be 
maintained that pain becomes bearable after a sustained period of 
pleasure. Although custom blunts the edges of our sensations 
and reduces the degree of the stimulus, if that degree is sustained 
our comfort or discomfort will remain at the same level. All of 
this reasoning is confirmed by Christian theology which tells us 
of the eternal suffering of damnation and the eternal pleasures of 
Paradise. There is little that our reason can do against the 
a posteriori' arguments of the dualists. Theirs is a fortress 
impregnable to all but the weapon of revelation: 
"Qui n'admirera & qui ne deplorera la destinee de 
notre Raison? Von& les Manicheens qui, avec une Hypothese 
tout-A-fait absurde & contradictoire, expliquent lea 
experiences cent fois mieux que ne font lea Orthodoxes, 
avec la suposition si juste, si necessaire, Si uniquement 
veritable d'un premier principe infiniment bon & tout-
puissant. "60 
St. Basil fared no better with his hypothesis. He 
endeavoured to vindicate God by claiming that sin had its origin 
in the soul of man. But if man was the creation of an infinitely 
holy and infinitely powerful Being, should he not also be good? 
Did it still not reflect on God that a creature of His own creation 
should be the source of evil? The advice Bayle had for St. Basil 
60 PAULICIENS, note E. 
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was that: 
devoit se retirer dans son fort, c'est-A-
dire quill devoit prouver par la Parole de Dieu que l'auteur 
de toutes choses eat unique & infini en bonte & en toutes 
sortes de perfections •.."61 
As long as one's adversary can be persuaded of the divine 
inspiration of the Old Testament, he can have no answers to 
your objections. The Manicheans, indeed all the heretical 
Christian dualist sects, could be completely refuted on this 
level (only the pagan philosophers Zoroaster, Plato or Plutarch 
would be more difficult to convince). In the Old Testament, 
Isaiah, chapter iv, verse 8, we are told that the ways of God 
are not our ways. This surely should be enough to silence any 
quarrels over the origin of evil. 62 
Those like Origen, the third century theologian, who 
posed man's free-will as the source of evil would also be easily 
refuted by the Manicheans. Origen's hypothesis rested on three 
fundamental propositions: 
"I. 'Dieu nous a fait libres, pour donner lieu A 
is Vertu, & au Vice, au blame & A is louange, & A is 
recompense & aux peines'. II. Ii 'ne damne personne 
simplement pour avoir peche, mais pour ne s'etre pas 
repenti'. III. 'Les maux physiques & moraux' du genre 
humain sont d'une duree si courte en compariason de 
l'eternite, qu'ils ne peuvent pas empecher que Dieu ne 
passe 'pour bienfaisant & pour anti de la vertu'." 63 
61 Ibid. 
62 Bayle made his position clear on revelation being the answer to 
the dualists in PAULICIENS, note E where he said: "Tenez -vous -en 
donc 1A; c'est un Texte de l'Ecriture, & ne venez plus raisonner." 
63 ORIGENE, note E. 
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The last proposition is the most significant, for in it 
Origen supposed that the damnation in Hell, after several ages, 
would cease and the damned would be rendered eternally happy 
by God, which would accord with His infinite mercy, for several 
centuries of suffering would be nothing compared with eternal 
Paradise. To illustrate the weakness of this hypothesis, Bayle 
answered it as he supposed a Manichean would have done. 
In the first place, our idea of goodness only extends 
to perfect goodness, especially when considered in relation to the 
infinite goodness of God. It is inconceivable that God in His 
infinite benevolence, would give man the gift of free-will in the 
knowledge that man would use it to his awn ruin and the eternal 
damnation of the greatest part of his posterity. It is not even 
conceivable that God could do this in the knowledge that man would be 
redeemed after several centuries. Rather, if God had granted man 
complete freewill, His infinite love for virtue would have prompted 
Him to hinder the evil tendencies of this free-will. As for the idea 
that free-will exists to make room for virtue and vice, praise and 
reproach, reward and punishment, Origen would have to admit that 
virtue, praise and reward could exist without their contraries since 
he admitted that eventually all creatures shall live in a state of 
felicity. 
Secondly, since impenitence merely results from the bad 
use of free-will, there is little difference between saying that 
God punishes men for impenitence or for having sinned. 
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As for the third and last premise, the Manichean has no 
difficulty in answering this. Apart from the fact that an 
Originist would be reluctant to measure the exact duration of Hell's 
torments, it matter little how long they are. A minute, a hundred 
years, a million years or eternity, such torments would still be a 
denial of the infinite goodness of God: 
"Vous ne pouvea done parvenir A la supreme boned 
de Dieu, qu'en suprimant jusqu'l la derniere minute lea 
suplices des enfers. Car ce que Dieu peut gtre un moment, 
il le peut gtre deux heures, & deux siecles, & dans toute 
l'eternite; male ce qui seroit incompatible avec sa nature 
dans l'eterniti, rest aussi dans cheque instant de la 
duree des choses."64 
There was no resolving the difficulty by reason for the Manicheans 
were firmly entrenched with their 'a posteriori' objections, and 
Origen would have been well advised to accept this. 
The third and final hypothesis advanced for the origin 
of evil was the traditional Christian notion that the Devil is 
the first principle of evil. Christian theology tells us that: 
... le Diable eat l'auteur de toutes lea fausses 
Religions; que c'est lui qui pousse lea Herfitiques A 
dogmatiser, que c'est lui qui inspire lea erreurs, les 
superstitions, les schismes, l'impudicite, l'avarice, 
l'intempgrance, en un mot tous lea crimes qui se commettent 
parmi lea homes; que c'est lui qui fit perdre A Eve & A son 
marl l'etat d'innocence: d'oa s'ensuit qu'il eat la source 
du mal moral, & la cause de tous lea malheurs de l'homme. 
Ii eat donc le premier principe du mal  
Satan himself, however, was once an angel of God, and consequently 
64 Ibid. 
65 PAULICIENS, note H. 
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soumission A l'autorite de Dieu. Ne pas croire ce 
qu i on volt, dolt etre souvent as devise aussi bien 
que croire ce qu'on ne voit pas. Voile dens le fond 
le sans du Passage de Calvin qua lion vient de lire. 
Malanchthon, & Lout autre Theologian fauteur de is 
liberte, auroit d'autant plus mauvaise grace de ne pas 
aquiescer A cette Reponse, quills sont constraints de 
recourier A un semblable denogment; car des qu i lls out 
tent soit peu de bonne foi, us reconnoissent que is 
maniere dont la providence de Dieu, & sa prescience, 
sont liees avec la liberte de la creature, leur eat 
incomprehensible. On lee pousse donc dans lee mgmes 
precipices oil us ont pousse lea autres, us se sauvent A 
leur tour dans l'asyle de l'incomprehensibilite de la 
nature de Dieu, A l i egard de la foiblesse de notre petite 
Raison. "68 
We can confirm the accuracy of this paraphrase by turning to Calvin's 
Treatise of Predestination, where we will find the following passage: 
"The faithful indeed make these two things agree with one 
another; that the state of man was so constituted at his 
creation that in stumbling and falling of his own will he was 
the cause of his own ruin; and that nevertheless he was thus 
determined by the admirable wisdon of God, to the end that the 
voluntary ruin of Adam should be a reason for humility to all 
his race. For although God knew that this was expedient, it 
does not follow that man was not ruined by his own fault, who 
had otherwise been endowed with a good nature and formed in the 
image of God. I say once again, that I know well enough what 
an appearance of absurdity and contradiction this presents to 
profane people and those who despise God." 69 
Calvin did not deny that God must be owned the first principle of 
evil, but emphasised that the responsibility for original sin was 
man's, stemming from his misuse of free-will. As to why God should 
have given man the gift of free--will, in the knowledge that man would 
use it to evil ends, we can only affirm that it "is hidden in His 
closest counsel, and it is our duty to know nothing but in moderation." 
68 SYNERGISTES, note B. 
69 Quoted in Francois Wendel, Calvin. London: Collins (Fontana), 
1956, pp.186-7. 
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The article SYNERGISTES to fruitful in another respect, 
for it serves to show the close relationship between Bayle's plea 
for toleration and his fideistic stand on the theological problems 
of free-will, the origin of evil and the controlling influence of a 
benevolent Providence. Throughout note B, Bayle emphasized his 
admiration for Melanchthon's moderation and tolerant spirit in his 
dispute with Calvin. He was always ready to do justice to Calvin's 
opinions, and never allowed their differences to loosen the bonds of 
fraternity between them. He was such a modest and humble disputant, 
that Bayle was moved to assert: "Voila ce que tout le monde devroit 
imiter." It was his tolerant spirit of Melanchthon's which served 
as an excuse for Bayle to include the following comment on the need 
for toleration: 
"Cheque Secte impute A l'autre d'enseigner des impietez 
& des blasphemes horribles, & pousse l'animosite jusques aux 
dernieres bornes: & neamoins c'est sur de telles doctrines 
que l'on devroit pratiquer le plus promptement une tolerance 
mutuelle. On pardonneroit l'intolerance I un Patti qui 
prouveroit clairement sea opinions, & qui repondroit aux 
dificultez nettement, categoriquement, & d'une maniere 
convaincante; mais que des gens gut sont obligez de dire 
quills n'ont point de meilleure solution A.donner que des 
secrets imp6n5trables A l i esprit humain, & cachez dans lea 
thresors infinis de l'immensite incomprehensible de Dieu; 
que de telles gens, dis-je, fassent lea fiers, lancent la 
foudfe de lianatheme, bannissent, pendent, c'est ce qui parort 
inexcusable Melanchthon etoit plus humain. Ii ne croioit 
pas que ceux qui nient la liberte fussent indignes de l'eloge 
de bons serviteurs de Dieu, il lea excusoit sur l'obscurite 
de la matiere, & sur la bonte de leur motifs." 70 
Bayle took great pains and considerable space to show that there was 
70 SYNERGISTES, note B. 
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no satisfactory rational explanation of the divine workings 
of Providence. God's ways are generally inscrutable, and any 
knowledge which man has of such questions as frff:a-w1.11, the 
origin of evil and Providential determinism must emanate from 
revelation. Therefore all men should admit the impenitrability 
of these mysteries to human reason, and abandon all claims to 
orthodoxy, from which basis so many were inclined to argue their 
right to persecute. 
To this point we have seen how the reasoning behind 
Bayle's defence of toleration has determined his general view of 
causation, one in which both man and God are allotted separate, 
though ill-defined roles. But what does Bayle have to say of the 
more specific issues of causation when he discussed the various 
wars, revolutions, political and religious unheavals of history? 
Just as he would not allow that God specifically determines the 
life of every man, neither would he allow that the life of every man 
has a significant influence an history. It is not the ordinary man, 
but the 'great' man, who plays the most influential role in history. 
Bayle was still prepared to admit that Providence, in 
a general way, can have a significant influence on 'great' men and, 
consequently, on the course of history. For example, in the article 
FRANCOIS ter he admitted that God played a considerable part in 
establishing the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century: 
"Comme il est plus conforms aux principes de la Religion 
fit de la pifite, de reconottre le doigt de Dieu, je veux dire une 
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influence particuliere de la Providence dans l'atablissement 
de la Rgforme, j'aprouve ceux qui en jugent ainsi 	• "71 
Nevertheless, as we learn elsewhere: 
"Sans recourir aux constellations, l'asyle ordinaire 
de l'ignorance, on eat pu trouver sur la terre lea causes 
secondes dont Dieu se servit pour le changement qui arrive 
en Allemagne au XVI siecle."72 
The 'second causes' of which Bayle speaks are none other than 
human passions, those important psychological factors which can 
obscure reason, and upon which he placed so much emphasis: 
"L'un des principaux moiens dont Dieu s'est servi 
pour l'itablissement du Protestantisme, & dont il se sert 
encore pour la faire prosparer, eat la jalousie naturelle 
de la France & de la Mhison d'Autiche. Tour a tour chacune 
de ces deux Puissances a mieux aim travailler A l'avantage 
des Protestans, afin de nuire A sa rivale,'que de souffrir 
l'agrandissement de sa rivale sur lea runes des Protes-
tans."73 
This natural rivalry between Charles V and Francis I was more than 
sufficient to establish the Reformation, since by turns they each 
showed favour towards Luther's sect, thus allowing it to become 
firmly established on German soil, and once established, to send 
supplies and aid to the French Calvinists: 14 As Bayle remarked 
on another occasion, it was not uncommon for "lea grandes Wevolutions 
d'Etat" to proceed from "une fantaisie, ou 	on sot caprice de 
quelques particuliers. 11175 However, because Bayle was prepared to 
71 FRANCOIS Ier , note P. 
72 LUTHER, note B.B. 
73 ELISABETH, note G. 
74 FRANCOIS Ier , note P. 
75 DRUSUS, Marc Livius, note D. 
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admit that the workings of Providence lay behind the Reformation, 
he was careful to preclude the possibility of any direct action by 
God to favour one cause or another. Human passions are equivocal 
and one should not deduce from a 'great man's' actions the favour 
or otherwise of Providence. Despite what the gospel teaches us, 
that the blindness, rashness and folly of men are frequently the 
effect of a particular providence, and that equally prudence, wisdom, 
resolution and understanding are inspired by Providence, this need not 
be necessarily so: 	d'un c6t6 l'on nomme malheur ce qui 
quelquefois est une suite de l'imprudence, on donne de l'autre le nom 
de bonheur A ce qui eat quelquefois un effet de la prudence. ”76 
In other words, a man who appears to be acting rashly may in fact be 
basing his actions upon considerable strategy and policy. 
On the other hand, a prince may be lured into rash action 
by intemperate counsellors. Such was the fate of Amphiarus, who 
allowed himself to be drawn into a disastrous war by his foolish 
counsellor Tideus. 77 However, secular counsellors are not always 
the most dangerous: 'L'Auteur d'un Dictionaire Historique auroit 
mine & mille occasions de remarquer, qu'il n'y a point de plus grans 
flateurs des Puissances, que les germ ' ”78 In ENEA, BaYIe 
cautioned the rulers of his own day with regard both the secular and 
ecclesiastical counselling: 
76 TIMOLEON, note K. 
77 AMPHIARUS, note L. 
78 ALPAIDE, note C. 
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"Ii est certain que ceux qui sont stir le thr6ne 
out plus de besoiu que lea autres du secours du temper- 
ament pour devenir saints. S'ils n'ont point resu de la 
nature un esprit simple, doux, benin, humble, us 
consoivent des passions qui les engagent A une conduite 
peu conforme A la perfection Chretienne; male avec lea 
qualitez que J'ai marquees, ils se laissent conduire 
come des moutons A leurs directeurs spirituels, & ce sont 
de grandes avances pour obtenir un Jour A la Cour de 
Rome la beatification, & ce qui s'ensuit."79 
If the terrible events of the sixteenth century were not enough 
to underline this lesson, Bayle's own times furnished him with 
sufficient examples to make him particularly cautious of clerical 
advisers. On the one hand, he believed that Louis XIV's Jesuit 
advisers were responsible for the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 
while of the other he sensed the danger of fanatical Huguenot ministers 
like Pierre Jurieu gaining the ear of William of Orange to engage his 
assistance in a religious war against Catholic France. Uwe require 
conclusive proof of the relationship between Bayle's plea for 
toleration and his view of causation, we need only turn to the article 
MACON where he drew important lessons from the religious wars of the 
sixteenth century. 80  The history of these wars, he tells us, should 
be a continual lesson to three types of people: those who govern; 
those who conduct ecclesiastical affairs; and those turbulent divines 
who take so much pleasure in innovations. To the first group he 
addressed this remark: 
79 EMMA, note A. 
80 See chap. II, pp.29-45. 
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"'Ne tourmentez personne sur see opinions de 
Religion, & n'etendez pas le droit du glaive sur la 
conscience. Voiez ce que Charles IX & son Successeur 
y gagnerent; c'est un vrai miracle que la Monarchie 
Francoise n'ait point pen i pour leur Catholicite. Ii 
n'arrivera pas tous lea jours de tels miracles, ne vous 
y fiez point. On ne voulut pas laisser en repos 1'Z:tit 
de Janvier, & ii falut epees plus de trente ans de 
desolation, apres mule & mine torrens de sang repandus, 
mille & mule perfidies & incendies, en accorder un plus 
favorable. ' 1'81 
and to the second group he said: 
"'Vous ne voulez pas ... que cette Secte prie Dieu 
A sa mode, ni qu'elle prAche see sentimens; mais prenez 
garde, si l'on en vient aux epees Urges, qu'au lieu de 
parler & d'ecrire contre vos dogmes, elle ne renverse 
vos Temples, & ne mette vos propres personnes en danger. 
Que gagnAtes-vous en Prance & en Hollande en conseillant 
la persecution? Me vous fiez point A votre grand nombre. 
Vous Souverains out des voisins, & par consequent vos Sect-
aires ne manqueront, ni de protecteurs, ni d'assistance, 
fussent-ils Turcs. '1182 
To the third group, Bayle offered the warning that although their 
intemperance would not produce the horrors of persecution which 
had arisen from the disputes between Catholics and Protestants, 
the mischief it would cause was sufficient to make it detestable. 
As far as the human element in causation is concerned, 
Bayle goes beyond his generalizations about 'great' men, to 
analyse the motivation of the individual. He is interesting for 
his deep concern with the human mind, and indentified human 
passions and the psychological intricacies of "temperament" as the 
greatest spurs to action, and the most usual causes of intolerance 
in all men, be they generals, clerics or princes: "Le temperament 
81 MACON, note C. 
82 Ibid. 
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eat presque toGjours le prfimier & le principal mobile dans 
lea personnes mimes qui font ici bas l'oeuvre de Dieu."83 
While a meek, gentle and humble monarch may be easily led by 
his spiritual dictators, a strong prince will frequently act 
against his own interests because of some secret passion. For 
this reason, princes themselves are not entirely blameless of 
persecution. Thus: "... le Rol d'Espagne, tout grand politique 
qu'il fitoit, aimoit mieux perdre le Pats-Bas, que de ne point satis-
faire lea jalousies & autres passions cachfies qui lui rongeioent 
Verne." 84 Louis XI of France was another example of a king: 
si aveugle qu i ll laissa fichaper cette 
occasion, la plus glorieuse & la plus avantageute que le 
Ciel lui pGt ofrir 	. Cele montre que lea Monarques 
ne tournent pas touj ours leurs passions selon le vent 
de leur intfirit 	ont tout come lea pakticuliers 
certaines passions secretes, ou certaines antipathies, 
qui en quelques rencontres ne leur permettent pas de se 
gouverner autrement que selon l'instinct de cette dis-
position •.. ." 85 
Louis had allowed his deep hatred for the Duke of Burgundy to 
prevent a marriage between the Duke's daughter, the princess 
Miry, and the Dauphin, which would have united all the estates 
of the House of Burgundy to the Crown. In succumbing to such 
passions, monarchs can also be led to the fatal step of playing 
with religions, a step which brings with it terrible consequences: 
83 FAREL, note C. 
84 AUTRICHE, note F. 
85 LOUIS XI, note R. 
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"C'est ainsi que de tout tens lea Souverains se 
sont joUez de la Religion: ils joUent I ce jeu-la 
encore aujourd'hui, ils persecutent chez eux ce 
font triompher en d'autres pals autant qu'il leur eat 
possible. N'allez pas dire sous ce pretexte qu'ils n'ont 
point de Religion. Cela n'est pas vrai: ils en ant 
souvent jusqu'a la bigoterie: qu'est-ce done? ils ont encore 
plus A coeur le bien temporel de leur Etat, que le Regne de 
Jesus-Christ. Je n'en excepte point le Pape & je pease qu'il 
ne fut guere plus content que Frangois I des progras le 
l'Empereur contre la Ligue des Protestans." 86 
Throughout, Bayle's message is clear and explicit: whatever reason 
it is that prompts princes to persecute religions, - simplicity of 
soul, whim, passion, - they can and should resist such impulses. 
Even where such matters as wars and revolutions are 
concerned, human passions are once again the prime source of 
motivation. In the article DRUSUS, Marc Livius, we are told: 
"L'emulation de ces deux Romaine [Drusus et Cepion), 
qui causa tant de desordres, & qui pensa perdre la Republique, 
etoit venued'une bagatelle ... . Et voila qui confirme ce 
bien des gene remarquent, qua les grandes Revolutions d'Etat 
n'ont la plapart de tems pour principe qu'une.fantaisie, ou 
qu'un sot caprice de quelques particuliers." 87 
and in MUCIE: "Voila presque toejours la chalne des plus grandes 
Revolutions. Faites-en l'analyse, vous les reduirez I tin 
adultere."88 Even Erasmus, Bayle informs us, perceived that wars 
most commonly stemmed from the wickedness and folly of some particular 
89 person. 
It was also Bayle's belief that if we look closely there 
is a clear chain of causation to be seen in the numerous revolutions 
86 FRANCO/S Ier , note P. 
87 DRUSUS, Marc Livius, note D. 
88 MUCIE, note D. 
89 ERASME, note U. 
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of history. 	In the first instance, reports, which are 
sometimes contrived but on other occasions true and in the 
public interest, are circulated from street to street, from 
90 town to town. 	These reports create great speculation until 
at last they fall into the hands of what Bayle calls "des gens 
graves", that is tribunes, demagogues or great lords: "Car 
voila lea principes, & les ressorts des Revolutions. .91 Once 
again it is the 'great' men who are singled out in causation. 
The common mass of people will generally remain passive without 
the leadership of such men: "II ressemble aux eaux de la mer 
ordinairement tranquilles, pourvu que lea vents ne souflent pas. ”92 
Even when the masses to rise in rebellion of their own accord, and 
without the leadership of 'great men', their efforts are like a 
blaze of straw. 93 
Although Bayle emphasized the influence of 'great' men 
in the chain of causation, he did not forget the general and 
guiding hand of Providence. The causal chain of revolutions is 
an excellent clarification of the respective roles of man and God. 
'Great' men inspire and lead revolutions in a specific sense, while 
God, in a general sense, can control the number of revolutions 
either by regulating: "... la stfirilite de gens capables de 
90 GARDIE, note C. 
91 EDOUARD, note O. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
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soutenir une intrigue de cette nature, ou par la vigueur 
superieure de ceux qui regnent. 
The roles of God and man apart, what did Bayle have 
to say of chance in causation? In the following remark from 
the article TIMOLEON, he clarified this issue: 
"Je soutiens avec tout cela qua l'elevation & que 
la chute des Grans ne sont pas pour l'ordinaire le pur 
ouvrage de la prudence & de l'imprudence. Le hazard, le 
cas fortuit, la fortune, y ont bonne part. Des occurrences 
que Von n'a ni peeper -6es ni prevues ouvrent le chemin, y 
font marcher A grans pas. Un caprice, tine jalousie, qu'on 
n'a pu prevoir, vous arritent tout d'un coup & vous jettent 
mane entierement hors des voies."95 
A.xident, luck, fortune, whatever name it went by, Bayle ascribed 
to it a definite role in causation. This was particularly so in 
military affairs, where generals such as Timoleon, Alexander, 
Caesar, Sylla and other ancients had acknowledged its effect: 
"Notez qu'il y a cent cas fortuits aussi impossibles A prevoir 
que 	& aussi capables de faire echoUer lea entreprises 
de guerre les mieux concertees. ”96 A reversal of season, disease 
and other such misfortunes could foil the best laid military plans. 
It was incorrect to claim that fortune merely depended upon whether 
we can or cannot see the chain of natural causes and effects. 
Fortune is completely independent of either prudence or imprudence. 
What then is this fortune which favours some and blights other with 
such an apparent lack of discrimination? Bayle's answer to this 
94 Ibid. 
95 TIMOLEON, note K. 
96 Ibid. 
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question is interesting for two reasons: in the first place 
it emphasizes once again his belief in only a general 
Providential influence in history, and secondly it reflects his 
anxiety concerning those who rationalize specific favours from 
acts of Providence. 
Bayle began by answering that it was to no avail to 
have recourse to God as an answer to this question: 
... car en avoilant qu'il est la cause ginfirale 
de toute choses, on vous demandera s'il menage immfidiate-
ment, & par des actes particuliers de sa volonte, ces 
occurrences imprevues qui font ritissir lea desseins d'un 
homme, & echoiler les entreprises d'un autre. Si vous 
ripondez par l'affirmative, vous aurez 5 dos tous lea 
Philosophes, & en particulier les Cartesiens, qui vous 
soutiendront que la conduite que vous attribuez A l'itre 
suprgme ne convient pas a un Agent infini."97 
The Cartesian philosophes would only answer that God ought to 
establish a few general laws to produce an infinity of events 
and not be distracted by producing every minor event by miracles. 
The answer which Bayle himself offered as the only 
satisfactory explanation of fortune once again drew upon 
Malebranche's theory of 'occasional' causes, and we find Bayle 
stating quite emphatically: 
"Quoi qu'il en soit, ii. n'y a point de fortune sans is 
direction de quelque cause intelligente, & je no saurois 
assez m'etonner qu'un savant homme ait ose dire, que la 
Fortune n'etoit ni Dieu, ni la Nature, ni un Etendement, ni 




- 101 - 
It was characteristic of Bayle that he should draw upon this 
occasional' cause hypothesis to explain fortune, for it 
afforded him the opportunity once again of emphasizing the 
inscrutability of the ways of God. The idea of there being 
intelligences behind such 'occasional' causes (the gospel tells 
us that they are the good and evil angels) 99 in no way contradicts 
the immutability of God's general laws. We find a clarification 
of this hypothesis in the article PLOTIN, where Bayle remarked: 
me semble que t6t ou tard on sera 
constraint d'abandonner les principes mechaniques, 
si on ne leur *ssocie lea volontez de quelques 
Intelligences; & franchement il n'y a point 
d'Hypothese plus capable de donner raison des 
fivenemens, que celle qui admet une telle association. 
Je pane sun tout des avgnemens qu'on apelle casuels, 
fortune, bonheur, malheur; toutes choses qui ont sans 
doute leurs causes reglees & dftermiaes, par lea Loix 
Onerales que nous connoissons pas, maisqui assez 
vraisemblablement ne sont que des causes occasionelles, sem-
blables 5 celles qui font agir notre ame sur notre corps. 21100 
In the article RORARIUS, Bayle affirmed his conviction that the 
hypothesis of 'occasional' causes does not in any way involve God 
acting miraculously. 101 Unless God acts contrary to His general 
laws, nothing that He does can be termed a miracle, and since 
'occasional' causes do not contradict general laws, they cannot be 
termed miraculous. 
Ultimately then, Bayle's view of causation was designed to 
establish the essential validity of his defence of toleration. 
99 ibid. 
100 PLOTIN, note G. 
101 Rorarius, note L. 
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He drew upon the historical traditions of the seventeenth 
century as well as the principles of his awn religion to form 
the basis of this view which in summary might be stated as 
follows: man, through the use of his free-will, his passions 
and his 'temperament' has been responsible for much of the 
religious and civil strife in history; Providence on the other 
hand, can only be said to influence history in the most general 
way, and should not be used as an excuse for rationalizing a 
Justification of persecution. In the following two chapters, we 
shall pass on to an examination of Bayle's discussion of absolute 
truth and the influence this had on his historical methods. 
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CHAPTER IV  
TOLERATION, RELIGIOUS ORTHODOXY AND THE SECULARIZATION  
OF HISTORY  
One of the principal restraints which was placed upon 
the development of a completely secular approach to history in 
the seventeenth century was the homage which historians were 
obliged to pay to the "sacredness" of sacred history. The Bible, 
which was an inviolable document containing the revealed word of 
God and Which provided the basic source for ecclesiastical history, 
was placed beyond the scope of historical criticism, and the 
sacrosanct nature of this document inevitably placed historians 
in bondage to theology. 
The final solution to the problem did not emerge until 
the publication of Bayle's Dictionnaire. It was in this work 
that he was able, for the first time, to effectively separate the 
whole sphere of historical scholarship from the inhibiting influence 
of sacred theology. Unlike Bodin and Lenain de Tillemont before 
him, Bayle did not set out with the specific intention of drawing 
this distinction. His solution to the problem comes almost as a 
corollary to his discussion of an issue concerned him much more 
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deeply: the Contest of Orthodoxy. It was his passionate con-
demnation of religious controversy which finally enabled him to 
arrive at the first clearly secular definition of history. 
The time at which Bayle wrote the Dictionnaire was the 
climax to an age of impassioned and excessive religious contro-
versy. The dispute about orthodoxy and the debate over "the 
way of examination and the way of authority" threatened the stab-
ility and religious peace of Europe, and seemed about to plunge 
the Continent, and France especially, into another phase of reli-
gious turmoil on the scale of the religious wars of the sixteenth 
century. During the seventeenth century the Catholic Counter-
Reformation became more intransigent, and the French Catholics, 
from the sanctuary of infallible Church authority, cited Christ's 
invitation "contrains-d'entrer" as a sanction for the physical 
persecution of heretics. In reply the zealous Huguenots in exile, 
led by Pierre Jurieu, turned to scriptual authority to sanction 
a Protestant crusade against Louis XIV and the Catholic Church. 
Faced with this situation, Bayle hoped to provide an 
invincible argument for toleration by demonstrating the obscurity 
of religious controversies in general, and the contest of ortho-
doxy in particular. In doing so he ran the gauntlet between both 
factions. He summarized his dilemma in the following passage: 
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"Sort deplorable de l'homme, vanite manifeste de la raison 
philosophique. Elle nous fait regarder la tranquillite de 
l'ame, & le calme des passions come le but de tous nos travaux, 
& le fruit le plus precieux de nos plus penibles meditations: 
& cependent l i experience fait voir, que selon le monde il n'est 
point de condition plus disgracifie que celle des amis qui ne 
veulent point s'abandonner aux flots des factions, ni de 
condition mains incommode que celle des hommes qui heurlent avec 
les loups, & qui suivent le torrent des passions lee plus agitees. 
Ils out entre autres advantages celui de ne pas conottre qu i lls 
out tort; car il n'y a point de gens plus incapables de conottre 
lee defauts de leur faction, & le bien qui se peut trouver dans 
l'autre Parti, que ceux qui sont transportez d'un ale ardent & 
d i une vive colere, & sous lee liens d'une forte preoccupation. 
'Beati pacifici i , dit l'Ecriture, bienheureux lee pacifiques. 
Cela est tres-vrai quant a l'autre monde; mais dans celui-ci 
ils sont miserables: us tie veulent point atre marteau, & cela i 
fait que continuellement us sont enclune A droite & A gauche." 
The contest of orthodoxy had its origins in Luther's 
initial break with the established dogma of the Roman Catholic Church, 
centred in the interpretation of doctrine, particularly the inter-
pretation of the revealed dogma of Scripture. The Catholics supported 
the method of authority, which sanctioned the orthodoxy of the Roman 
Church and made it the infallible interpreter of biblical revelation. 
The Protestants supported the orthodoxy of their position by insisting 
that scriptural interpretation should be undertaken by individual 
examination on the basis of conscience. Both churches denied 
each other's criterion as a means of establishing absolute religious 
certitude by demonstrating on rational grounds that it would eventually 
1 EPPENDORP, note C. 
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lead to complete religious scepticism. This was the point which Bayle 
seized upon to expose the obscurity of danger of religious controversy 
as a prelude to proposing complete liberty of conscience for the 
individual. 
"[La Dispute] eat un instrument dont on peut tirer de bons 
usages contre le mensonge: mats ii n'en demeure point-la; 
car apris avoir detruit l'erreur, ii attague la verite: ii 
ressemble A ces poudres corrosives, qui apres avoir mange lea 
chairs baveuses d'une plaie rongeroient aussi la chair vive, & 
carieroient les os, si on lea laissoit faire."2 
Bayle took the theses upon which both churches rested their claims to 
orthodoxy, tested them, and rejected their validity. He did not, 
however, reject the doctrines which were embodied in scriptural 
revelation: he rejected only the criteria which were normally applied 
to prove the absolute certainty of these doctrines. 
• 	 The contest of orthodoxy in seventeenth century France was 
revived in 1671 when the Jansenist, Pierre Nicole, published his 
Prejugez legitimes contre le calvinisme, a defence of the authority 
of the Catholic Church against the Calvinist position of individual 
examination. He was answered in 1673 by Jean Claude in La defense  
de la reformation. Then, in 1678, the contest momentarily left the 
arena of pamphlet war for the more sedate setting of the salon. 
In that year Claude came face to face with the formidable Gallican 
theologian Bossuet to engage in a debate for the soul of Mae de 
Duras, niece of Marshall Turenne. In the debate, which took place 
2 EUCLIDE, note E. 
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in a rather theatrical setting, the Catholic way of authority wrestled 
with the Calvinist way of examination. 
As might have been expected, Bossuet began by advancing a 
reasoned proof for the infallibility of his church and defined the 
nature of its authority. In his turn, Claude defended the Calvinist 
belief in individual examination of the Bible, submitting his own 
rational proofs for this belief. And the result? Deadlock! 
The only tangible achievement was the conversion of Mme de Duras 
to Catholicism, and this seems to have been a foregone conclusion 
before the debate commenced. Nothing was resolved between Bossuet 
and Claude. All the reason and logic at their command could not 
convince their opponent, but the debate did confirm Eagle's opinion 
about two things: that truth is beyond attainment when reason is 
blinded by prejudice, and more importantly, that reason is totally 
inadequate as a means of resolving disputes about religion. 
In the years after the debate, the Catholic Counter-
Reformation in France was strengthened, and the Huguenots were faced 
with mounting persecution. The climax came on Sunday, October 21st, 
1685 when Bossuet mounted the pulpit to preach his sermon "contrains-
d'entrer" to Louis XIV and his entire court. Then, four days after 
the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 3 and in the royal presence, 
3 The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes was declared on October 17th. 
1685, but it was not confirmed by the Parlement until October 22nd. 
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Bossuet demanded that Catholics should use force against the 
Protestants. Momentarily the Huguenots were routed. Those 
who could do so fled to the relative safety of Holland, "la 
grande arche des fugutifs". 4 
But the contest had not ended. Even before Bossuet's 
sermon, Claude's and Nicole's books had been republished in 
Holland, in 1682 and 1683 respectively. These new editions 
brought the debate into the open once more, and in 1684 Nicole 
continued his case in Les pritendus reformes convaincus de schisme. 
From their sanctuary in Holland, the Huguenots of the Refuge flung 
themselves back into the contest with renewed vigour. Jurieu took 
up Nicole's challenge in his Le vrai systeme de l'Eglise of 1686 and, 
in the same year, Paul Pellisson, a former Huguenot who had adjured 
his religion for Catholicism, came to Nicole's support with his two 
volume work R6f1exions sur lea diffgrends en matiere de religion  
etc. ... • 	In 1687 Nicole replied to Jurieu with his De l'unitfi de  
l'Eglise and in both 1687 and 1689 Pellisson expanded and republished 
his book, the latest edition bearing the title Les chimires de  
M. Jurieu etc. ... . So fierce was the contest, that it even divided 
the Protestant camp. After his dispute with Bayle over toleration, 
Jurieu became involved in a further controversy over examination with 
the pastor from Utrecht, Elie Saurin. 
4 KUCHLIN, Jean, in corp. 
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The historical reasons for the prominence which Bayle 
gave to the contest of orthodoxy in the Dictionnaire are obvious 
enough, but there were personal reasons as well. As a young man 
he had undergone a religious crisis involving the very issues 
being debated in the contest. While a twenty-one year old student 
of philosophy at Puylaurens, his faith in Calvinism had been shaken 
by a Catholic pamphlet which showed that the Reformed Church had no 
authoritative body on earth to establish dogma. He discarded Reform 
for the traditional church, but eighteenth months later he returned to 
his original faith, unable to accept the authority of the Roman Church 
on the doctrine of Transubstantiation. Then in November 1685 his 
brother Jacob died, a victim of Catholic persecution in France. This 
was an event for which Bayle felt a deep sense of personal responsibility. 
Bossuet's sermon, which followed so quickly upon his brother's arrest 
must have struck deeply at Bayle's sensitivity over religious intolerance, 
and the bitter invective of Jurieu's initial Lettres pastorales and his 
Le vrai sxsteme de l'Eglise published during the first two months of 
1686, would have done nothing to calm him. Not surprisingly then, 
almost a year to the day after Bossuet's sermon, Bayle published the 
first two parts of the Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de  
J.C. contrains-les d'entrer, a forthtLght defence of the rights of 
individual conscience and an appeal for religious toleration. Four 
years later, the appearance of the Avis important aux refugiez prompted 
Jurieu to accuse Bayle of its authorship. He engaged him for more than 
three years in a bitter debate over religious toleration, and it was the 
enmity aroused by this dispute that prompted Jurieu to secure 
Bayle's dismissal from his post at the Ecole Illustre, Amsterdam, 
in October, 1693. In the midst of this crisis the Dutch publishers 
Reiniers Leers issued the Projet et fragmens d'un Dictionaire critique  
in May, 1692, so it is not unreasonable to expect that Bayle should 
have wished to revive in this new work the spirit of the Commentaire  
philosophique by seizing the opportunity to re-assert his defence of 
toleration and condemn the intransigence of religious apologists. 
The first lesson which Bayle drew from the religious 
controversies he had seen and experienced was that when apologists 
had exhausted the powers of reason they "... ne souffroient plus 
la contradiction, us vouloient que l'on se soumit A leurs iclairc-
issemens ...", and must resort to persuasion by physical force. 
The controversy between Cain and Abel, for example, was essentially 
a religious one since Cain denied the goodness of God in the belief 
that he had been forsaken by Providence. ”1 	attendu," dit-il 
A son Frere, hue mon oblation n'a pas Ate' acceptee, & que la viitre 
l'a eta." In reply, Abel merely substituted the affirmative for the 
negative. "La dispute s'etant echauffee, Can se Jetta sur Abel & 
le tua. Ce fut un mauvais commencement des Disputes de Religion, & 
un facheux presage des desordres ipouvantables qu'elles devoient 
causer dans le Monde." 6 Cain illustrated the fact that men are 
5 RUFIN, note C. 
6 ABEL, note E. 
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qui en eat le distributeur agisse en pere cammun de toutes lea 
Sectes, c'est-a-dire qu'il ne veuille point soufrir qu'une Secte 
puisse pleinement triompher des autres, & lea &Amer sans resource." 1° 
In other words, God revealed His truths not to a particular church, 
but to the individual conscience of every man. Therefore to force 
a man to act against the dictates of his conscience is to oblige him 
to sin against the will of God, to act the part of a hypocrite. 
"Monstre de doctrine, qui renverse toute la Morale, & en comparaison 
11 duquel le Probabilism le plus outré eat un sentiment innocent." 	If 
a man who opposes the dictates of his conscience is a sinner in God's 
eyes, then a man who forces the conscience of another must also be 
a sinner. In view of the religious persecution which accompanied 
the contrast of orthodoxy it is little wonder that Bayle should have 
remarked that it would have benefitted both churches not to have 
stirred that question. 12 But stir it they did. 
Since the contest of orthodoxy had brought into question the 
doctrine of infallible Church authority which Pierre Nicole had 
originally sought to defend in 1671, Bayle set out to systematically 
and thoroughly discredit it, although he admitted "On pourroit 
peut-gtre dire du premier Ouvrage qui a paru sur ces matieres, ce que 
lea Anciens disoient du premier navir, Plat, A dieu que l'arbre qui 
servit I construire fat encore debout!" 13 Bayle was emphatic that 
10 RORAR/US, note G. 
11 AILLI, note L. 
12 PELLISSON, note D. 
13 NICOLLE, note C. 
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neither Nicole, nor Pellisson who followed him, was able to 
refute conclusively the Protestant challenge that the way of 
authority was the high road to scepticism. After all, he argued, 
even if it were possible to establish the infallible authority of 
the Catholic Church, how does one decide where this authority resides? 
To the usual reply that this authority derives from the infallibility 
of tradition, the Pope and the Councils, Bayle objected that "On ne 
peut point soutenir l'infaillibilite de l'Eglise a regard des faits; 
& I mains que de l'admettre, on s'expose A mule inconveniens." 14  
Tradition is, for example, at very best a doubtful mark of infallibility. 
Even the Catholic theologians disagree on certain traditions, especially 
those concerning the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption of the 
Virgin Mary. 15 They agree no better on the relative authority of the 
Pope and his Councils. The Pope's authority was "... inferieure aux 
Conciles selon quelques-uns, superieure selon quelques autres."16 Moreover, 
14 ARNAULD, Antoine, fils d'Antoine Arnauld l'Avocat, note 0. 
15 Reference to the differences of opinion between the Thomists 
and the Scotists over the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption 
of the Virgin Mary comes from Bayle's earlier works: see Brush, 
Montaigne and Bayle, p.223. In the Dictionnaire Bayle made a 
general reference to these disputes in EUCLIDE, note C and the 
"Eclaircissement sur lea pyrrhoniens", Dictionnaire, IV, p.633. 
16 NICOLLE, note C. 
- 114 - 
how is each new successor to Saint Peter's title to be distinguished? 
Not by Councils if they are inferior to Popes. If the Pope is 
infallible, then only the Pope can be certain of his right to the 
office, since he is confirmed in it by no other authority than God. 
For every difficulty raised about authority, the answer seemed to 
Bayle to be what is called "Petit io principii". 17 
Even if these difficulties could be answered and the 
infallibility of the Church could be proven, how is a heretic to be 
persuaded that the Roman Church is the infallible one? "On ne peut 
conottre oU raside l'Autorite, qu'en examinant quelles sont les marques 
de l'Eglise qui la possede. .18 Consequently Catholics are faced with 
the very criterion which they deny to Protestants: the way of examination. 
"Ii faut savoir si ceux qui en comptent cent sont plus raisonnables que 
ceux qui en comptent quinze, ou douze, ou dix, ou six, ou seulment quatre. 
Quand on aura fixe le nombre des marques, il faudra examiner si alias 
conviennent a l'Eglise Romaine, plutSt qu'A Eglise Greque.. 19  Difficulty 
upon difficulty! How is the heretic to determine either the number or the 
nature of these marks? To accept the authority of the Church on the matter 
is simply begging the question again. Neither Nicole nor Pellisson were 
able to resolve these difficulties. Nicole was especially careful to 
17 i.e. "Begging the question". In MALDONAT, S.J:, note L Bayle called 
"Petitio principii" a sophism, "..• defaut enormi, & qui doit Stre 
bani d'une Controverse, come un obstacle essentiel au dessein qu'on 
a d'eclaircir une verite." 
18 PELL/SSON, note D. 
19 Ibid. 
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avoid contesting the marks of the Church's authority with Jurieu, but 
one Catholic apologist was not so cautious. In the early seventeenth 
century, Cardinal Bellarmine expo7Inded his awn proofs for the divinity 
of the Roman Church and Bayle took up the challenge, finding an opportunity 
somewhere in the Dictionnaire to discredit every single one. 
Bellarmine's proofs for the divinity of the Catholic Church 
are listed in MAHOMET II, note D: "... le nom de Catholique; l'Anti-
quite; une longue durfie non interrompue; l'etendue; la succession 
des Ev6ques; lea miracles; l'austerite des moeurs; le temoignage des 
„20 Adversaires; & telles autres marques ... . 	He was even so imprudent 
as to put: ” ... la prosperite entre les marques de la vraie Eglise. ,21 
If these were the marks of the true church, and the Roman Church could claim 
that title, then none of them should have been discernible in any other 
church. But, Bayle argued, these are the same marks "... que lea 
Sectateurs de Mahomet alleguent A l'avantage de leur Religion."22 How 
then can Catholics be so conceited as to advance them as proofs for the 
authority and orthodoxy of their church? 
In the article LAUNOI, for example ? Bayle asserted that the 
argument of antiquity and a long uninterrupted duration was as true 
for the Mahometan religion as it was for the Christian. There was little 
value to be gained by Catholics maintaining that sooner or later false 
religions would be destroyed by the wrath of God and inferring the divinity 
of their own religion from its long duration. Exactly what duration is 
20 MAHOMET II, note E. 
21 MAHOMET, note P. 
22 MAHOMET II, note E. 
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necessary to distinguish truth from error? One hundred, five hundred, 
a thousand years? 
"Si mule ans sufisent, toute opinion qui a dix siecles 
sur la ate eat veritable; mais si vous ne vous fixez A aucun 
terme, c'est en vain que vous concluez que puis qu'un dogme a 
dure quatre mule ans, ii doit passer pour certain: VOUS 
ignorez l'avenir; vous ne savez pas si le cinquieme millenaire 
viendre 5 bout de ce qui a resiste aux priadens."23 
Equally unsatisfactory was the argument of extent originally 
adopted by the early patriarchs to show that Christianity had fulfilled 
scriptual prophecies. The Old Testament prophecied that "... la 
connoissance & le service du vrai Dieu sous le Messie ne seroient point 
rafermez comme auparavant dans un petit coin de la Palestine, mais 
qu'alors toutes lea Nations seroient le Peuple de Dieu."24. In the light 
of the remarkable and universal spread of Christianity, the argument of 
extent appeared initially to be a very cogent argument, particularly 
against the Jews whose own religion remained constricted. By the 
seventeenth century, however,.Bayle was able to assert that the Islamic 
faith was of considerably greater extent that the Christian, "car elle 
la surpasse de la 30 . partie du Monde conu", 25 and since the time of 
Mahomet, Catholics ought to have forsaken extent as a mark of the true 
church "... Ouis qu'5 ne considerer que l'etendue, la Religion de ce 
faux Prophete se pouvoit attribuer les anciens Oracles, tout de mem que 
" le Christianisme se lea etoit attribuez.26 
23 LAUNOI, Jean de, note Q. 
24 MAHOMET, note P. 
25 MAHOMET, note A. 
26 MAHOMET, note P. 
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Bellarmine, moreover, actually went so far as to place 
prosperity among the marks of the true church. Christ's promise: 
"de maintenir son Eglise contre lee portes de l'Enfer", 27 was deemed 
to be a sanction for the temporal successes of the church. This was 
reasonable, Bayle replied, while Christianity was "benigne, douce, 
eatiente, qui recommandoit aux sujets de soumettre a leurs Souverains, 
& n'aspiroit pas A s'elever sur lee thranes par la voie des rebellions 
"28 
. . . • One must admire the prosperity of a church in which 
"L'Evangile prEche par des gens sans nom, sans etude, sans elogquence, 
cruellement persecutez & destituez de tous lea apuis humains, ne laissa 
pas de s'etablir en peu de tens par toute la terre." 29 But in Bayle's 
time Christianity had become "... une Religion sanguinaire, meurtriere, 
accoutumee au carnage depuis cinq ou six-cens ans." 30  Christians, 
furthermore: 
ft 	avoit contracte une tres-longue habitude de se main- 
tenir & de s'agrandir, en faissant passer au fil de l'epee tout 
ce qui lui resistoit. Les Buchers, lee Bourreaux, le Tribunal 
effroiable de l'Inquisition, lea Croisades, lee Bulles qui excitoient 
lea sujets A se rebeller, lee Predicateurs seditieux, lea Conspire-
tions, lea Assassinats des Princes etoient lee moiens ordinaires 
qu'elle emploioit contre ceux qui ne se soumettoient pas A see ordres."31 
Apart from introducing "le grand secret de Vert militaire" into 
religion, is this not "... decider que pourve que l'Orthodoxie 
27 NESTORIUS, note E. 
28 JAPON, note E. 
29 MAHOMET, note O. 
30 JAPON, note E. 
31 Ibid. 
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triomphe, ii n'importe par au ni comment?"32 
The example of Islam served to explode this myth completely. 
If temporal success were to be used as a mark of the divinity of the 
Roman Church, how could theologians explain the overwhelming successes 
won by the Infidels? Bayle was emphatic, "en matiere de triomphes 
l'etoile du Mahometisme a prevalu sur l'etoile du Christianism ..." 33 
Moreover "... s'il faloit juger de la bona de ces Religions par la 
gloire des bons succas temporels, la Mahomgtane passeroit pour la meill-
eure. .34 To answer this difficulty, Catholic theologians had been 
obliged to wear their principles as they to their clots,"... lea uns 
pour l'ate, & lea autres pour l'hiver .35  . 	When the cause of Christianity 
succeeded, they pointed to its success as a mark of Providential approval. 
When the Infidels prospered, their excuse was that for the just punishment 
of man, God frequently permitted success to the wicked. "Y a-t-ii rien 
de plus commode que cela?' ,36 	Et de la vient que lea memes Communions 
changent d'esprit & de maximes, a measure qu'elles aquierent ou qu'elles 
perdent la supfiriorita."37 
If prosperity is not a mark of divinity, neither is adversity 
a mark of heresy. When Father Maimbourg maintained that the capture of 
Constantinople and the destruction of the Byzantine Empire were the just 
punishment of God on the Greek Church for refusing to submit to Rome, 
32 CHARRON, note I. 




37 VERGERIUS, P.P. ii, note C. 
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he was begging the question, for, Bayle asked, what of Rome itself? 
Did not Charles V treat Rome as severely in 1527 as the Turks did 
18 Constantinople in 1492? - 	Should the Pope have submitted to the 
Patriarch? Did not the sack of Rome by the Goths give the pagans a 
right to turn this adversity against the divinity of the Christian 
Church? 39 No. The argument that adversity is a mark of heresy is 
an argument born of passion And false zeal for religion, and was used 
by Catholics against Lutherans in the same way that pagans reproached 
the early Christians, and indeed all Protestants might reproach 
Catholics. 40 Mainbourg would have done greater service to his cause 
if he had avoided such arguments. 
Bellarmine, too, had done a disservice to his cause. By citing 
miracles as a proof for the divinity of the Roman Church, he had not only 
failed to prove his point, he had also encouraged the excessive multi-
plication of miracles in all religions. This practice, fervently pursued 
by the Roman Church, could rationally undermine a belief in the divinity 
of the Scriptures. Superstitious phenomena such as miracles prophecies 
and holy relics were the offspring of ignorance, just as religious 
prejudices were the offspring of passion and emotion, and the ignorance 
which gave rise to a belief in superstitions nourished na/ve credulity 
which in turn encouraged the excessive multiplication of miracles. The 
danger was that "... la credulite est la source de la multiplication, 
& qu'il n'y a point de meilleure pepiniere que celle-11; mais, enf in, ou 
38 MAHOMET II, note O. 
39 Ibid. 
40 VERGERIUS, P.P. ii, note 0; see also MILLETIERE, note G. 
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en abuse avec taut d'exces, qu'on guerit tous ceux qui ne sont pas 
incurables." 44 In other words to carry religion to the point of 
superstition means "on y coule le moucheron, on y engloutit le chameau.. 42  
To people who use their reason, the excessive multiplication of 
superstitious phenomena will soon replace neve credulity with total 
disbelief. The greater part of mankind will then believe in no 
miracles at all. Although he did not explicitly draw the conclusion, 
it is obvious that Bayle was inferring that a total disbelief in miracles 
would include a disbelief in the miracles of the Gospel, an opinion 
held by the Spinozists, and this would subvert the very basis of Christian 
teaching. 
How, in any event, are miracles to be verified? We cannot 
accept the authority of the Church on the matter, since miracles are 
supposed to be a mark of that authority. Reason cannot identify them, 
since by their very nature they are a contradiction of rational phenomena. 
Bayle's answer to this question, in note B of JONAS, was that a belief 
in miracles, with the exception of biblical miracles which must be 
accepted on faith, depended in general on passions, religious prejudice 
and ignorance. The pagans, for example, had fed the superstitious minds 
of their people for centuries with a host of miraculous prodigies, but 
when Christian miracles were presented to them, they ridiculed the 
credulity of Christians and the impossibility of their miracles. Christians 
41 ACHILLEA, note H. 
42 ALTING, Henri, note G. 
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themselves behaved no better. If the Greek Church proposed miracles 
to show that the schism of Nestorius offended God, the Nestorians 
denied them; but a miracle which attested to the injustice of the Greek 
Church was applauded by the Nestorians. 43 Pagan or Christian, Greek 
or Roman Catholic, Calvinist or Lutheran, every religion either affirmed 
or denied miracles according to the interests of its cause. 
Even austerity of manners or morality was an unsatisfactory proof 
for the divinity of the Roman Church. It was dangerous for the 
Christians to try the divinity of their church on the grounds of morality, 
for in a contest with the Infidels they would gain little advantage. Only 
on the foundation of wit, learning and military prowess would Christians 
have the advantage. But "Bel avantage que d'entendre beaucoup mieux 
qu'eux Vert de tuer, de bombarder, & d'exterminer le genre humainr 44 
Although Bayle admitted that Christians were neither more nor less moral 
than the Infidels, 45 he did nothing to dispel the suggestion that Christ-
ians had strayed from the path of righteousness. He could even assert 
that atheists were neither more nor less moral than Christians. 46 In 
other words, morality does not depend upon religion. Not even the strict 
moral code advocated by Calvin could be cited as testimony for the 
divinity of his church. 
43 JONAS, le prophite, note B. 
44 HAHOMET, note P. 
45 Ibid. 
46 SPINOZA, note I; "Eclaircissement sur lea ethees", Dictionnaire,  
IV, passim. 
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Bayle's attack on the traditional marks of authority in the 
Roman Catholic Church was thorough. He suggested finally that 
... la vole de l'Autorite conduit necessairement lea particuliers 
A Etre Mahometans en Turquie, Paiens dans la Chine, & togjours de la 
Religion Nationale." 47 A significant fact for the contest of orthodoxy, 
moreover, was that the way of authority "..• demande un long travail, 
& une suite penible de discussions: desorte qu'aiant voulu eviter is 
voie de l'Examen, on s'y retrouve neamoins necessairement.. 48  Further-
more "... la voie de l'Autorite, par oil les Catholiques Romaines sont 
profession de se conduire, eat le grand chemin du Pyrrhonisme. .49 
Essentially this was a traditionally Calvinist stand against the authority 
of the Catholic Church, but it remains to be seen whether Bayle considered 
the way of examination as any more sure a path to religious certitude and 
orthodoxy. 
A fact which only becomes clear in the light of his defence of 
toleration in the Dictionnaire is that Bayle discussed the way of exam-
ation according to three different levels of meaning. First he remarked 
on the way of examination which was based upon prepossessions rather than 
natural reason, a method which he considered was practised by both the 
parties to the contest of orthodoxy. It resolved nothing because the 
disputants commenced with the prepossession that they were right and 
because of their passions and prejudices they could not be persuaded 
otherwise. Secondly, he remarked upon what we might call Cartesian or 
47 PUCCIUS, note B. 
48 PELLISSON, note D. 
49 NICOLLE, note C. 
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philosophical examination, a full examination conducted by natural 
reason as opposed to partial examination based upon prepossessions. 
He dismissed this also because ultimately it destroyed the basis of 
Christianity and led to absolute religious scepticism. Thirdly, he 
remarked upon the orthodox Calvinist doctrine of examination of the 
Bible based upon conscience. This was the way of examination by which 
men, relying on moral demonstration and grace, could inquire into the 
Bible to discover (but not to understand) the certitude of God's 
revealed word. It was this final method of examination which he 
personally accepted. Each of these three levels of meaning was an 
indispensible part of his defence of toleration, for they exposed the 
ability of prejudice to obscure truth in religious disputes, and 
established the primacy of faith over reason as the criterion for 
religious certitude. It was from this primacy that Bayle justified 
the complete liberty of the individual and erring conscience. 
Bayle discussed the first of these methods of examination, 
that based upon prepossessions and prejudices, in note D of the article 
PELLISSON. His point was that because of their passions, prepossessions 
and religious zeal, neither of the two adversaries in a dispute was able 
to understand himself or his opponent, since theological problems were 
not examined on the basis of clear and natural reason.. What they 
believed to be an examination of reason was actually no more than 
rationalization of their awn passions and prejudices. Instead of 
reading the works of the contrary party, they learned of their adversaries' 
arguments from fragments included in the works of their own writers. 
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Nothing said by the opposite party was granted validity, and not even 
the judgements of a superior tribunal could alter this prejudice. 
"D'od vient cela? N'est-ce pas de ce qu'ils examinent tout avec une 
sorte prgvention d'avoir la justice de leur ate?" 50 Neither 
Pellissons not Nicoles, Claudes nor Jurieus, neither Catholic nor 
Protestant apologists in Bayle's opinion were concerned to discover 
the legitimate criterion for religious certitude. 	si vous 
n'avez pas dessein de les Lies Loix du combat] observer, il vaut mieux 
n'entrer point en lice, & dire tout court, il faut croire cela sans 
raisonner: Dieu l'a dit, cela doit suffire. ,51 The adversaries began 
with the prepossession that they were orthodox, and not even the most 
incontrovertible arguments could dissuade them from this opinion. The 
contest of orthodoxy, therefore, could serve little purpose other than to 
inflame passions and stir the fires of persecution in both camps. 
What if prepossessions could be laid aside? What if partial 
examination could be replaced by full examination? Could clear and 
unfettered reason establish complete religious certitude and resolve 
the question of orthodoxy? Bayle could not leave such questions 
unanswered without exposing a serious flaw in his defence of toleration; 
but to deny the validity of examination was to deny one of the fundamental 
doctrines of Calvinism. To resolve this difficulty, he drew the further 
distinction between examination through reason and examination through 
conscience. 
50 PELLISSON, note D. 
51 RUFIN, note C. 
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Bayle introduced the first principle of Cartesian or 
philosophical examination in note D of the article PELLISSON: "La 
premiere chose qu'il faudroit faire, si Von vouloit bien examiner, 
seroit de douter de sa Religion ... . .52 For example, in attempting 
to prove the existence of God, one should behave as Maldonat did, and 
examine the two propositions "ii y a un Dieu" and "il n'y a point de 
52 PELLISSON, note D. I cannot agree with H. T. Mason that this 
quotation, along with another from MALDONAT, S. J., note L: "Ii 
faudra examiner tout, come si nous etions une table rase", sum 
up Bayle's dilemma of being a religious sceptic who made an outward 
profession of Calvinism in order to preserve what little tranquillity 
remained to him in exile: see Mason, Bayle's Religious Views, p.215. 
Bayle had already shown his preparedness to surrender his tranquillity 
in defence of the principles of liberty of conscience and toler-
ation, although he did exhibit more caution in the Dictionnaire than 
in his earlier works. Mason makes the error of assuming that the 
sceptical precipice to which Bayle pushed rational examination was in 
fact representative of his own sceptical attitude to religion. This 
error becomes apparent if we read these quotations in their proper 
context of Bayle's attack on orthodoxy. If he was a sceptic in 
anything, it was in matters of philosophy where his mistrust of 
reason was apparent. His avowed fideism makes his religious 
position not like that of Melanchthon, but more in accord with the 
sentiments expressed in this passage from SPINOZA, note M: "... ii 
y a aussi des gene qui ont la Religion dans le coeur, & non pas dans 
l'esprit. us la perdent de vue des qu'ils la cherchent pas les 
voies du raisonnement humain: 	mais des qu'ils ne dispurent 
plus, & qu'ils ne font qu'icouter lea preuves de sentiment, lea 
instinctsde la conscience, le poids de l'iducation, &c., ii sont 
persuadez d'une Religion, & ils y conforment leur vie autant que 
l'infirmite humain le permet." 
- 126 - 
Dieu." 53 This is essential, Bayle explained, to ensure that all 
prepossessions will be set aside. If, however, this position 
of doubting is not to persist, it is essential to show that it is 
possible to recognize truth by certain characteristics, which Bayle 
called "Criterium veritatus". 54 Furthermore, it must be shown 
that such criteria or "l'evidence" possesses a certain character of 
truth, "... car si l'avidence n'etoit pas ce caractere, rien ne 
le seroit."55 Where, in Bayle s s opinion, examination is based 
upon reason, the only valid criterion for truth is self-evidence 
("l'avidence"); that is to say, propositions which according to 
our reason cannot possibly be otherwise than true. Self-evidence, 
however, belongs properly to philosophy, and to introduce it into 
religion will lead directly to scepticism, for the dogmas of the 
Christian religion are clear contradictions of certain self-evident 
propositions of philosophy. 
To illustrate this point, Bayle invented a dialogue 
between two Catholic priests, the abbe "philosophe" and the abbe 
"theologien". 56 The abbe "philosophe" began by citing four dogmas 
of the Church which contradicted four self-evident principles of 
philosophy. 	(These examples, it should be mentioned, formed the 
core of the dispute between the Catholics and the Protestants in the 
contentiof orthodoxy). The abbe's first self-evident principle was 
53 HALDONAT, S. J., note L. 
54 PYRRHON, note B. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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"lee choses qui ne sont pas differentes d'une troisieme, ne 
different point entre elles ...", which explicitly contradicted 
the revealed mystery of the Trinity. The second was "que pour 
faire un homme qui soit reellement & parfaitement une personne, ii 
suffit d'unir ensemble un corps humain & une ame raisonnable", 
which denied the mystery of the Incarnation. The third principle 
"qu'un corps hunain ne peut pas etre en plusiers lieux tout A la 
fois, & que sa tete ne peut pas etre penetree avec toutes sea autres 
parties sous on point indivisible. ...", contradicted the mystery 
of the Eucharist. Finally the principle "que lea modes d'une 
substance ne peuvent point subsister sans la substance qu'elles 
modifient....", denied the mystery of Transubstantiation. Since 
reason tells us that the four philosophical principles are irrefutably 
true, we can only assume one of two possibilities about the mysteries 
of religion which they contradict: they are false, or that 
reason itself is an unsatisfactory criterion upon which to base 
religious certitude. 
If Bayle's intention had been to subvert the principles 
of Christian theology, or if his faith in reason had been surer, 
he would undoubtedly have chosen the first possibility. Instead, 
he concluded his comments on this footnote with this remark: "C'est 
donc une heureuse disposition A la Foi, que de conortre les 4:Watts 
de la Raison ... •"57 His point had been made in terms of the 
57 PYRRHON, note C. 
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contest of orthodoxy: since reason was an unsatisfactory 
criterion in disputes about religion, the contest or orthodoxy 
could produce little more than the dogmatism of religious 
prejudice or complete religious scepticism. Some other criterion 
was needed for religious disputes: "Si un homme s'est convaincu 
qu'il n'a rien de bon A se promettre de sea Discussions Philosophiques, 
il se sentira plus dispose A prier Dieu, pour lui demander is 
persuasion des veritez qu l'on dolt croire, que s'il se flatte d'un 
bon succia en raisonnant, & en disputant."58  To confirm that in 
discrediting reason as the criterion for arriving at religious 
certitude, Bayle's intention was to put an end to the contest of 
orthodoxy, we need only to cite this passage from the article NICOLLE: 
"Mais comme lea chases ont deux faces, il y a quelque sujet 
d'esperer que lea esprits bien tournez profiteront d'une Controverse 
si f6cheuse. Xis aprendront A renfermer dans ses'bornes is Maxime 
de Mk. Des Cartes, touchant la suspension de nos jugemens. Xis 
aprendront A se defier des lumieres naturelles, & A recourier A la conduite de l'Esprit de Dieu, puis que notre Raison eat si 
imparfaite. Xis aprendront combien il eat necessaire de s'attacher 
A la doctrine de la grace, & combien notre humiliti plait A Dieu, 
puis qu'il a voulu nous mortifier jusques dans is possession de 
sea veritez; n'aiant pas penis que nous lea discernassions par 
lea voles d'un Examen philosophique, par lesquelles nous parvenons 
A la science de certaines choses."59 
The criterion which Bayle selected for religious certitude 
under his third definition of examination was faith: "... 11 faloit 
avant toutes choses leur Des Pyrrhoniensj faire sentir l'infirmite de 
la Raison, afin que ce sentiment lea porte A recourir A un meilleur guide 
qui est la Fat " 60. • This assertion, which is echoed throughout the 
58 Ibid. 
59 NICOLLE, note C. 
60 PYRRHON, note B. 
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Dictionnaire, has provided grounds for the opinion that Bayle was a 
complete, or at least a semi-fideist, an opinion which we have already 
remarked upon. 61 But how did Bayle define faith? His definition, 
like Calvin 's,62 was something short of clear: Or cette Foi qu'il 
exigeoit ne s'aqueroit point par une suite de discussions Philosophiques, 
& par de grans raisonnemens: c'etoit un don de Dieu, c'etoit une pure 
grace du saint Esprit, & qui ne tomboit pour l'ordinaire que sur des 
personnesignorantes. .63 It was a gift which produces certainty but 
nor clarity: "cette Foi produit une certitude achevee, mais son objet 
demeure toajours ingvident: la Science au contraire produit tout 
ensemble l'gvidence de l'objet, & la pleine certitude de la persuasion. . 
The form of examination which Bayle accepted, and which was 
designed to complement rather than contradict faith, was based upon 
rational evidence but lacked the certitude of philosophical proof. It 
was an examination which produced moral demonstration based upon the 
doctrine of probability. It was not treated cohesively as a subject 
in the Dictionnaire, but Bayle discussed it sufficiently for us to glean 
61 See Chapter III, pp.57-61, 81-88. 
62 See Wendel, Calvin, pp.253-63. 
63 "Eclaircissement sur lee Menicheens", Dictionnaire, /V, p.621. 
In SPINOZA, note 4, Belle defined Christian belief as preferring 
"deffirer aux preuves de sentiment, & aux impressions de la 
conscience, en lin Mot a 14 4role de Dieu ... ." 
64 "Eclair6isisement. sur leg MAnichgens", Dictionnaire, IV, p.621. 
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his meaning. He argued that while faith alone could establish 
the certitude of the revealed mysteries in the Bible, and that 
comprehension of them was impossible, there was an area in which 
rational examination of the Scriptures was valid: 
"C'est un avantage que de pouvoir concilier les principes 
des Philosophes, c'est un bien qu'on ne dolt point negliger, & 
que l'on dolt faire profiter autant que l'on peut; mais ii faut 
Etre toajours tres-resigne A la perdre sans regret, lore qu'on 
ne peut pas l'etendre jusqu'aux doctrines, cra ii ne sauroit 
atteindre, & qui par l'essence du mystere sont au-dessus de la 
portee de notre Raison."65 
Although comprehension and certainty of revealed mysteries were beyond 
reason, it was at least possible to morally demonstrate the divinity of 
the Holy Scriptures, and to clarify obscurities and inconsistencies in 
the text of the Bible by rational examination. 
The substance of this argument was discussed in the article 
BEAULIEU, where Bayle was remarking upon a dispute between Saurin and 
Jurieu over the principle of faith. In the final analysis, both of 
these minister, according to Bayle, agreed in principle that the divine 
inspiration of the Scriptures was beyond absolute, geometrical certainty 
and could only be proved by moral demonstration, although when the dispute 
commenced Jurieu was somewhat less than clear as to what moral demon7 
stration was. Bayle clarified the situation by remarking that. "Une 
demonstration morale ne consiste pas comma lea demonstrations 
geometriques dans un point indivisible: elle souffre 10 plus. &. 
moms, & se promene depuis une grande probabilite, jusques1 unetds-
grande pro1abilite. "66 In other words, the divinity of the Bible 
65 PERROT, Nicholas, note L. 
66 BEAULIEU, note F. 
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rests upon the most satisfactory proofs available: the fact that 
it is more probable, according to ogr reason, that God did inspire 
the Scripture than that He did not. This degree of probability 
should be sufficient to convince many rational men who do not possess 
the divine gift of faith. However, Bayle cautioned, if a man should 
refuse to accept any other criteria than the proof of self-evident 
principles, he should not be persecuted. Reason justified his stand, 
which,without faith, is entirely logical unless it can be proven to 
him that the mysteries of the Bible are self-evident. Since this is 
impossible "Tout ce donc que la raison & la charite exigent de vous, 
c'est de prier Dieu pour lui, & de faire en sorte par les voies d'une 
instruction moderee, qu'il trouve moins de probabilite dans sea opinions 
que dans lea v8tres. ”67  
When he denied that reason could establish religious certitude 
either through authority or Cartesian examination, Bpyle showed that 
there is no dogma in any church which is a matter of incontrovertible 
certainty. On the contrary, the only satisfactory criterloo for 
religious certitude is faith, and since faith is a gift from God, only 
God can infallibly know who possesses it. Furthermore, since faith 
can produce only the certainty, but not the understanding of revealed 
mysteries, there is no way of proving that what any man believes is not 
67 NICOLLE, note C. In VORSTIUS, Conrad, note N, Bayle commented 
"Ii n'y a rien qui indispose davantage contre l'Orthodoxie, que 
d'an etre persecute." 
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in fact revealed dogma. They only sure guide in religious matters 
is conscience. Because it can be shown that no church is infallibly 
in possession of revealed dogma, it must be a sin for a church to 
force an heretical conscience, since none but God can know whether the 
beliefs upheld by this conscience have not in fact been revealed 
though the gift of grace. We must even tolerate the conscience of 
a man like Grotius who believed in the fundamental doctrines of 
Christianity, but refused to accept the communion of any one church on 
the grounds that it is a sign that one damns other Christian sects, 68 
for "... tons lea sermens par oft l'on s'engage A l'Eglise sont 
conditionels; mais l'engagement aux lumieres de la conscience eat 
nature', essential, & absolu." 69 
Bayle applied the principle not only be believing Christians 
but to non-believers as well. Since no church can prove its orthodoxy, 
it can have only voluntary subjects whose oaths of allegiance respect 
the dictates of their conscience. If the erroneous conscience of a 
Jew or a pagan is not illuminated by the light of grace, no church has 
the right to force an oath of allegiance from him if it contradicts 
the light of his conscience. None but God has the right to judge a 
man's conscience since only He can be sure when grace has been received, 
68 GROTIUS, Hugo, note L. 
69 GREGOIRE Ier , note E. In ALTING, Henri, note E. Bayle commented: 
"Si l'on avoit A se halr & A se persecuter pour la Religion, on 
devroit attendre que l'on fat comme lea peuples d'Egypte, lea uns 
au service d'un Dieu, & lea autres au service d'un tout autre 
Dieu." 
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To force the conscience of a heretic, therefore, is to force him to 
sin against the will of God, whether the heretic be pagan, Jew or 
atheist, for "c'est 	que ceux que l i on convertit de cette sorte 
retournent A leur vomissement quand ils le peuvent." 70  The 
conscience of an atheist is just as inviolable. If he should choose 
to regulate his conscience according to reason, the Christian can hope 
to do little but persuade him by moral demonstration of the divinity 
of the Bible. If, however, he will accept no other criteria than self-
evident principles, then nothing but the grace of God can correct his 
erroneous conscience. The Christian has no right to violate the 
conscience of other be they pagan, Jew or atheist, because even the 
certitude of his own convictions is based entirely upon the grace of 
God. 
Although Bayle argued his defence of toleration from the 
only true religious principle, the inviolability of conscience, he 
allowed one exception to its universal application. He denied religious 
toleration to Catholics, since of all Christian sects, they alone posed 
a continuing threat to the political stability of society. Whenever 
they rose to a position of strength, they invoked the maxim "compel them 
to come in", and pursued a policy of forceful conversion even to the 
point of overthrowing legitimate government. The toleration of the 
Jesuit missionaries in Japan was a mistake, Bayle argued, which the 
Emperor of Japan had learned to his cost. 71  The Chinese also, he 
70 GREGOIRE 1e r , note E. 
71 JAPON, note E; see also MILTON, note O. 
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believed"... peut-gtre se verront-ils obligez plut8t qu'on ne 
pease resister A des seditious dangereuses, excitees par lea 
Sectateurs de la nouvelle Religion, & A egorger s'ils ne veulent 
"72 gtre egorgez. 	It was essentially the same argument which Bayle 
used to undermine Jurieu's proposed holy crusade against Louis 
73 XIV. 	If the peace and stability of a state were threatened by 
any of its subjects, the monarch was politically justified in 
persecuting them, and "... come le Papism est de tem immemorial 
le Parti qui persecute le plus, & qu'il ne cease de tourmenter le corps 
& l'ame des autres Chretiens par tout o0 il le pant faire, c'est 
principalment son expulsion que concluent les tolerans lea plus 
"74 outrez. 
The arguments which produced this defence of toleration had 
considerable effect upon Bayle's approach to biblical criticism in 
the Dictionnaire. From an ecclesiastical point of view at least, the 
Old Testament had been up to that time the one document for which 
absolute historical certainty could be claimed. This claim was founded 
upon the sactity of the Bible as a source of revelation. Bayle made 
no move to destroy this sanctity. He emphatically upheld the divinity 
of the Scriptures, asserting that it could be satisfactorily proved on 
the basis of moral demonstration. What is more important, he under-
lined their sanctity by placing the revealed mysteries of Scripture 
72 MILTON, note 0. 
73 See Chapter II. 
74 MILTON, note O. 
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beyond the scope of critical reason. By denying a role in religion 
to philosophical examination, and by placing the certitude of 
scriptural revelation in the hands of faith, Bayle effectively 
separated the realms of philosophy and theology. 
Not all that was recounted in the Old Testament was explicitly 
qualified by Scripture, and to this extent Bayle sanctioned a rational 
criticism of the Bible. 	There were certain unqualified actions, 
fallacies, obscurities and inconsistencies in its text which, he 
maintained, were fair game for the critical historian. Some of the 
difficulties could be clarified by applying the ordinary criteria of 
historical evidence; others could be clarified on the basis of moral 
demonstration, while the remainder must be considered beyond clarification 
altogether. He made his meaning quite clear: 
il eat trAs-permis A de petits particuliers comme 
moi, de juger des faits contenus dans l'Ecriture, lots 	pe 
sont pas expressement qualifiez par le Saint Esprit. Si 
l'Ecriture en raportant une action la bate ou la loue, ii n'est 
plus permis A personne d'apeller de ce jugement; chacun dolt 75 regler son aprobation ou son blame sur le modele de l'Ecriture. u  
Moreover, most of the criticisms which Bayle made of the Old Testament 
had direct bearing on his defence of toleration. Just as he had 
separated the realms of theology from that of philosophy, so too he 
separated it from the realm of history. Whatever was explicitly 
revealed or qualified by the Holy Ghost in Scripture was sacred, invio-
lable and must be accepted on faith. Where facts or actions were not so 
qualified, the historian was at liberty to apply to principles of 
75 DAVID, (original article), note I. 
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criticism in order to clarify them. 
Bayle identified an important source of error, obscurity 
and inconsistency in the numerous copies, glosses and translations of 
the Bible which had been produced down through the centuries. For 
example, in note A of ARIBA, he commented upon the inconsistencies 
which occured in the two basic translations, the Hebrew (Masoretic) 
and the Greek (Septuagint) texts, in recording the ages of various 
biblical figures. In ADAM, note I, he dealt with the difficulties 
encountered in determining the exact location of Adam's sepulchre,. 
since the various texts gave such widely differing accounts. Beyond 
the Hebrew and Greek texts, however, there were numerous other trans-
lations: the Vulgate of St. Jerome, the French, the Genevan, the 
Dutch, the Spanish and the official English version of King James. 
There was the instance of a remark by Lamech taken from Genesis, 
chapter iv, which was translated in the future tense by the Genevan 
version, in the past tense by the Vulgate and in the conditional tense 
by certain Hebrew scholars. 76 On this point Bayle confessed 
j'avoue ingenament qua cela me passe." 77 
A further difficulty was that all translations perpetuated 
the chronological inconsistencies of the original manuscripts. For 
example there was the difficulty over Ishmael's age. When, Abraham 
sent Sarah away with her son, Bayle calculated that Ishmael must have 
76 LAMECH, note C. 
77 /bid., in corp. 
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"Qui auroit jamais deving que cela serviroit un Jour 
d'apologie A ceux qui persecutent les sectes? Cependent 
l'esprit fecond & imaginatif de St. Augustin y a trouvfi ce 
secret. Ii a soutenu par la conduite de Sara envers Agar, 
que la vraie Eglise peut infliger des chgtimens A la fausse, 
1"exiler, la tourmenter, & ce qui s'ensuit."80 
In spite of the tone of ridicule which Bayle expressed towards 
St. Augustine's inventiveness, he took a much more serious view 
of the lessons which Jurieu derived from the moral conduct of the 
Old Testament prophets. 
The subject of Bayle s s closest scrutiny was King David 
who had long been a central figure in Calvinist theology and who 
supplied Jurieu with numerous precedents for calling the Huguenots 
to arms against Louis XIV. We have already taken note of the 
interpretation which Walter Rex offered for the article DAVID. 81 
His view, that Bayle endeavoured to re-affirm the traditions of 
the past against the threat of change represented by Jurieu's 
theological innovations and his call to arms against Louis, 
accords with the whole nature of Bayless defence of toleration. 
It was Bayle s s opinion that since Scripture gave no clear qualification 
of David's behaviour, it must be interpreted in the light of natural 
morality: 
80 AGAR, note D. 
81 See Chapter II, passim. 
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These last two references are to the Dominican friar James Clement who 
assassinated Henry III of France on August 1st., 1589, and Francois 
Ravaillac who assassinated Henry IV in 1610. Both of these murders 
were justified by the Jesuits on the basis of Judith's conduct. 
Bayle's disapproval of the Old Testament prophets encompassed 
not only their moral conduct, but their prophecies as well, for these 
furnished self-styled Protestant prophets like Jurieu, Allix, Gurtler and 
Joseph Mede with an excuse for predicting the downfall of the Apocalyptical 
Babylon (the Papacy) on various dates during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. 84 'Bayle objected that "c'est vouloir introduire le carnage 
& le massacre par tout, que de parler d'accomplir les Propheties. o85 
84 BRAUNBOM, note C. In this note, written in 1702, Bayle launched a 
bitter attack on the prophecies of Mede, Allix, Gurtler and in 
particular Pierre Jurieu. Jurieu drew his inspiration from Mede, 
predicting the fall of the Catholic Church between 1710-14, following 
a break between France and the Pope after 1690. He claimed from 
the example of James II and the English, that Providence would direct 
the French to submit to d,Protestant prince. Bayle's reply was: 
"Que voilA un home heureux A conjecturer! Il ne savoit pas, 
qu'au bout de deux ans, l'Angleterre chasseroit son Rol Papiste, 
ce qui seroit une preuve que la Providence ne vouloit pas accoutumer 
les Peuples A se soumettre A un Prince qui ne fat pas de leur 
Religion; mats plutat disposer la Nation Francoise par un exemple 
tout frais & voisin A desobilr A son Rol, en cas qu'il changer de 
Religion. Notez que cet Ecrivain a compta plusiers miracles parmi, 
les causes qui ont renvers6 du Throne Jaques II." 
85 BRAUNBOM, note C. 
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He continued: 
ft 	ne servent qu i a inviter son Ennemi, qui n'est 
déjà que trop en colere, & a lui fournir cette excuse de sea 
persecutions, que pour prevenir sa ruine, il est oblige de 
travailler a celle des Protestans, qui ne cessent de predire qu i ll 
sera extermine bientat par l i epee des manes Princes qui ont 
autrefois adore la Bete."86 
Little wonder that Bayle should have spent soma Lime discrediting 
apocrophal stories about Elijah and Elisha, 87 especially the prediction 
that Elijah "jugeroit Israel par le feu & par l i epee..88  It agreed, 
he remarked, with Elijah's vengeful spirit in destroying the priests of 
Baal, but 
"Les Docteurs de l i intolerance ne sont pas bien aises qu'on 
lea avertisse que Jesus-Christ a aboli cet esprit ... . Je ne 
m i etonne point qu i lls soient fgchez qu'on lea empgche de 
s'autoriser d'un tel example; car que peut-on voir de plus fort 
en favour des massacreurs par zgle de Religion que la conduite 
d'Elie?"89 
Bayle also turned his attention to criticizing the 
superstitions of rabbinical tradition which were fostered by the incomp-
rehensibility of biblical revelation. In all religions, superstition 
provided a convenient explanation for the unnatural, and the Jewish 
religion was no exception. For example, there were numerous Jewish 
fables concerning Agar's origin, none of which were credible. It was. 
Bayle's opinion that: 
86 Ibid. 
87 See ELIE, note B; ELISEE, note B. 
88 ELIE, in corp. 
89 Ibid, note B. 
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"Ce sont des mysteres, dont il ne faut point'etre 
curieux: ii faut suposer qu'ils se passent sous lee 
voiles de la nuit, ou derriere le rideau, & lee laisser 
dans leurs tenebres naturelles. Les Juifs, toujours 
guindez sur lee miracles, attribuent la conversion d'Agar 
aux prodiges qui se firent chez Pharao, A cause du rapt 
de Sara."90 
The fable that Adam was originally created of both 
sexes, one side male and the other female, both parts being joined 
at the shoulder, was equally ridiculous. Although the Jewish rabbis 
had maintained that God separated the two parts to create Eve, Bayle 
pointed out that "Il ne faut que savoir lire l'Ecriture, pour refuter 
pleinement toutes ces visions."91 Other fables such as the story of 
the bone called Luz, 92 Elijah's resignation of his office to Elisha, 93 
and the miracles associated with Ezekiel's tomb, all testified to the 
same point. Scriptural history had been embellished with super- 
stitious explanations of obscure textual passages, many of which required 
only the natural light of reason to explain them, others of which were 
beyond explanation altogether. Jewish supersitions, however, were no 
worse than similar ones upheld by Mahometans, Catholics and Protestants. 
In every religion, man "soared up to the marvellous" to explain 
unnatural phenomena. 
90 AGAR, note A. 
91 ADAM, le pare tout le genre humain, note F. 
92 BARCOCHEBAS, note K. 
93 ELISEE, note B. 
- 143 - 
This conclusion underlined Bayle's treatment of miracles, 
for he spent a great deal of time in the Dictionnaire showing how 
unwise it was to explain all unnatural phenomena in terms of the 
miraculous. Once again he was motivated in this course by his 
defence of toleration, for Jurieu had been urging the Protestant 
princes to march against France on the grounds that the Protestant 
cause was protected by the divine intervention of Providence. 94 
Bayle's attitude to miracles was unequivocal: "Se suis persuade 
autant que jamais, qu'afin qu'une action soft miraculeuse i1faut 
que Dieu la produise comae une exception aux loix generales: & 
que toutes lea choses, dont il est immediatement l'auteur selon ces 
95 1oix-1A, sont distinctes d'un miracle proprement dit 	."Biblical 
miracles were safe within this definition, for where they were explicitly 
designated as miracles, they had simply to be accepted as revelation 
on faith. Even the story of Jonah's incarceration in the whale must 
be accepted as a miracle, for as St. Augustine asserted: "Ou ii faut 
nier 	tous lea miracles de Dieu, ou reconetre qu'on n'a nul 
sujet de rejetter celui-ci."96  The divinity of the Scripture testified 
to the truth of biblical miracles, but proof for non-biblical miracles 
was not so readily available. 
94 See BRAUNBOM, note B. Also Rex, Pierre Bayle and Religious  
Controversy, pp.218-221, especially p.218, n.58. 
95 RORARIUS, note L. 
96 JONAS, le prophAte, note B. 
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The criterion upon which Bayle dismissed um-biblical miracles 
was, as we have seen, the fact that they ultimately depended upon 
religious prejudices. In the article CONSTANCE, he remarked "Or 
comae ii n'y a nulle aparence que Dieu dfiroge aux loix genfirales 
de la nature, que dans lea cas o0 le salut de sea enfans le demande, 
ii tie faut point prendre pour des Miracles ce qui arrive egalement 
parmi lea infideles, & parmi lea fideles." 97 In other words, on 
the basis of moral demonstration, divine miraculous protection will 
only be given to the orthodox. Since none can prove their orthodoxy, 
however, no one is justified in claiming as a miracle a fortuitous 
event which favoured his cause. Nevertheless, "Ii y a des Ministres, 
a qui tout paroit Miracle dans lea fivenemens qui concernent leur 
Parti."98 The target for this remark was Jurieu. 99 He was marvellously 
free in identifying Protestant miracles to win support for his holy 
crusade. Furthermore, his attitude to miracles threatened a dangerous 
heresy. For example, instead of rejecting the story of John Damascen's 
100 hand as a "conte monachal", 	Jurieu denied this Catholic miracle on 
97 CONSTANCE, note B. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Bayle openly condemned Jurieu's publication of so-called Protestant 
miracles in ESECHIEL, note C where he remarked "Combien y a-t-il de 
choses dans la pratique des Protestans d'aujourd'hui, qu'ils 
n'eussent pas aprouvies Il y a cent ans? Je suis assare que 
l'Auteur des Pastorales Purieui a publie plus de faux miracles 
qu'il ne devoit 	." 
100 DAMASCENE, note D. This miracle concerned John Damascen who, 
after having his hand severed by order of Leo Isauricus, prayed to 
the Virgin Mary and as a consequence was reputed to have recovered 
it. 
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the grounds that the Damascus Saracens failed to renounce 
Mahometanism and accept Christianity. Did it not follow then 
that all the miracles, performed by Moses and Christ were false because 
they did not immediately convert the multitudes? 
ne se peut rien dire de plus impie ... car c'est 
declarer hautement A la face du ciel & de la terre, qu'il 
eat persuade que tous lea miracles de Molse de Jesus-Christ, 
& de sea Apatres, sont des fables, & par consequent que 
l'Ecriture de Vieux & Nouveau Testament n'est qu'un Raman & 
tine Legende. 11 ,101 
(This quotation originally came from Declaration de Mr. Bayle touchant  
un petit Ecrit Qui vient de paroitre sous le titre de Courte Revue  
des Maximes de Morale, which according to Bayle was published in 
1691, but according to Dodge was published in 1690). In the face 
of Jurieu's theological innovations and the threat they represented 
for religious toleration, it is understandable that Bayle should have 
devoted so much time to discrediting the miraculous nonsence of Jewish 
biblical traditions as he did to discrediting the baseless superstition 
of Mahometaftism and Christianity. 
The principles of criticism which Bayle applied to the Bible 
were a part of the general historical method which he bequeathed to 
the study of history. This.method, which is the subject of the next 
chapter, had its foundations in his defence of toleration. What we 
have seen so far is the groundwork upon which he based the universal 
application of these critical principles, but this groundwork forms no 
101 DAMASCENE, note D. 
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part of his claim to originality. As a field of endeavour, 
biblical exegesis had been flourishing for many years before 
Bayle published his Dictionnaire. 	In fact many of the points 
on which he criticized the Bible had been suggested to him through 
his reading of the works of earlier and contemporary critics. 
Bayle himself was not a biblical scholar, and it is certain that in 
this field he was overshadowed by his contemporary, the Jesuit 
Richard Simon. 102 From a purely historical point of view, however, 
Bayle's truly original contribution was the clear division which he 
effected between the sacred theological content and the profane secular 
content of the Bible. In his enthusiasm to defend toleration, he 
effectively removed the last remaining obstacle to a completely secular 
approach to history. It only , remains now to examine the criteria 
and nature of the critical method which he applied to history. 
102 See Hazard, La crise de la Conscience euroOenne,  deuxiame 
partie, chap. III, for an interesting account of Simon'a 
work in the field of biblical exegesis. 
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CHAPTER V  
TOLERATION, TRUTH AND HISTORICAL CRITICISM  
The framework of ideas upon which Bayle based his use of 
the critical method in history developed more from expediency than 
Anything else: the expediency of providing an unassailable defence 
of toleration. Like the principles of the method itself, these ideas 
lie scattered and generally unrelated throughout the Dictionnaire.  
Wherever Bayle saw an opportunity to attack intolerance, he did so, 
constructing arguments which were tentalizing in their implications. 
This was the case during his many encounters with the word "truth", 
and more especially with the term "historical truth". For Bayle, 
the final definition which he offered for "historical truth" was 
the essence of the historical endeavour: "la varite tant l'ame de 
l'Histoire, il est de l'essence d'une Composition Historique que le 
1 mensonge n'y entre pas ,.. •" 	This definition, as we shall see, 
was a distillation from several arguments which he used against 
intolerance and persecution. 
Ultimately, in Bayles view, the, cord of truth had three 
strands: one physical, one metaphysical ancl,the other moral. There •••:. • 
is no single, all inclusivedefinition of the three to be found in the 
Dictionnaire, although a collective discussion of them appears in at 
1 REMOND, note D. 
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least one article. 2 To each of the three Bayle ascribed a distinctive 
set of criteria, which clearly separated each one from the other two, 
but these distinctions were drawn as the result of separate arguments. 
In Chapter III we observed that through his efforts to 
counter persecution based upon the idea of Providential determinism, 
Bayle was obliged to draw a very firm line between the criteria for 
proving religious and philosophical truths. It becomes apparent from 
what he said elsewhere in the Dictionnaire, that the terms "religious" 
and "philosophical" can be respectively equated with the more broadly 
based terms "moral" and "physical". Moral or religious truths, Bayle 
argued, require only demonstration of faith as proof, whereas meta- 
physical or philosophical truths must stand up to the rigorous tests of 
reason. 3 Through these definitions he was able to show that there was 
no necessary relationship between the two varieties of truth. In fact: 
111 	bien loin qua ce soit le propre de ces Veritez de s'accorder 
avec la Philosophie, il eat au contraire de leur essence de ne Sc pas 
adjuster avec sea Regles. n4  From this distinction Bayle was able to 
indicate the futility of attempting to justify persecution on the 
2 BEAULIEU, note F. For alternative discussions of Bayle's definition 
of the term "truth", see James, "Scepticism and Fideism in Bayle's 
Dictionnaire", p.323, n.3 and Labrousse, Pierre Bayle, II, chap.3, 
passim. 
3 BEAULIEU, note F. 	See alsoTrojet", Dictionnaire, IV, p.613. 
4 "Eclaircissement sur lea Manicheens", Dictionnaire, IV, p.620. 
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A few lines later he remarked of the existence of a Roman republic 
that "Ii y a lA pour le going une demonstration physique II clearly 
indicating that historical truth was to be placed on the same level 
as physical truth. 
Later in the Dictionnaire Bayle drew a clear distinction 
between historical and metaphysical truths. In the following quotation 
he spoke of the metaphysical certainty associated with geometry: 
"On me dira, peut-Stre, que ce qui semble le plus abstrait 
& le plus instructueux dans les Mathematiques aporte du moms cet 
avantage, qu'il nous conduit a des veritez dont on tie sauroit 
douter; au lieu que lee Discussions Historique, & lee Recherches 
des Faits humains, nous laissent toujour dans lee tenebres, & 
toujousquelques semences de nouvelles contestations. Mats qu'il 
y a peu de prudence A toucher A cette corder 9 
Between physical and metaphysical, or more precisely between historical . 
and geometrical truths. there exists quite a different level of certain-
ty, and on the basis of this fact he asserted that "les Veritez 
Historiques peuvent atre poussees A un degre de certitude plus 
indubitable, que ne Vest la degre de certitude A quoi l'oh fait par- 
”10 venir les Veritez Geometriques 	. 	In contrast to the indivis- 
ible rational proofs required for geometrical truth, historical facts 
needed only their apparent existence to be proved for them to be able 
to attain the highest degree of certainty possible. 
Although the distinction he drew between religious and 
8 BEAULIEU, note F. 
9 "Projet". Dictionnaire, IV, p.613. 
10 Ibid. 
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philosophical truths can be clearly shown to have been a vital stage 
in his defence of toleration, why should Bayle have bothered about 
such an exact definition of historical truth? He did not make his 
reasons for doing so entirely explicit, but he offered a clue in the 
article REMOND when he said: 
"Je conclus de la qu'afin d'etre propre a composer une 
bonne Histoire, ii faut avoir la conscience si ennemie du men-
songe, qu'elle ne vous permette pas de mentir non pas m8me 
l'avantage de votre Religion & de vos plus tendres ands, ni au 
desavantage d'une Secte impie, & de vys plus implacables 
persecuteurs."11 
Throughout the Dictionnaire, Bayle repeatedly emphasized that religious 
prejudice was one of the principal bulwarks of intolerance and perse-
cution, and at the time the work was being written, the humanists had 
turned history into a battlefield for religious controversy. When 
historians themselves so consistently 4isplaye4 their religious prejud-
ices, Bayle remonstrated "Comment done se siera-t-on a un Historiographe 
A qui le zele de Religion fait prendre eternellement 	epees l'autre 
le caractere d'Applogiste, & celut d'Accusateur, & qui proPrement con-
vertit l'Histoire en un ouvrage de Controverse dlune nouvelle methode? .12  
Elsewhere he informs us: 
"Dana les Disputes de Religion chacun eat jugs & partie: 
car on n'examine point lea raisons de son Adversaire apras s'etre 
revgtu d'un eeprit sceptique & pyrrhonien: on croiroit commettre 
un crime, Si l'on se mettoit en cet etat; on examine done etant 
bien persuade, que la Religion que l'on professe eat la seule 
veritable. "13 
11  REMOND• note D. 
12 BRENZIUS, note B. 
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In other words, Bayle's sensitivities were aroused by the danger of 
intolerance displayed in historical writing when the humanists showed 
more concern for a moral truth than for the accuracy of historical 
facts. He was obliged to make this distinction between historical 
and religious truths quite rigid before he could set about attacking 
prejudice and intolerance in historians. 
The unique definitions which Bayle ascribed to physical and 
moral truths provided him with a basis from which to use the principles 
of criticism to attack prejudice and intolerance in historians. On the 
one hand, physical or historical truths were capable of being proven to 
the absolute degree of certainty peculiar to them. In other words, they 
were unitary, identifiable and capable of absolute physical proof. 
Moral or religious truths, on the other hand, were not unitary, ident-
ifiable or capelle of absolute proof since their evidence depended upon 
human faith. It was impossible to identify them with certainty. Conse-
quently Bayle was able to argue that all religious beliefs should be toler-
ated, since none could be proven or disproven with an absolute degree 
of certainty. By differentiating between historical and religious truth, 
Boyle drew a final and irrevocable distinction between history and 
theology, thus providing himself with a logical foundation upon which 
to base his use of the principles of criticism to attack intolerance 
in the religious prejudices displayed by historians. 
The concept of a "triple" truth also had considerable bearing 
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framework in which to place Bayle's critical method in history, 
they in fact ignore seventeenth century characteristics which 
were equally, if not more, influential in the realm of historiography. 
In emphasizing these particular developments, present day critics may 
well be attributing the secular motives of the twentieth century 
historian to his seventeenth century counterpart. One factor, for 
example, which such critics frequently understate, but nevertheless 
implicitly accept, is the connection between religion and history in 
the seventeenth century. Religious disputes were still among the most 
important problems for the historian of the 1690's, and reli3ious 
persecution was an even more pressing problem for a Huvenot historian 
in voluntary exile in Holland. 
While the attention of current historianshas tended to be 
absorbed by the reaction of some seventeenth century historians to 
the pitiful standards accepted by the humanists, virtually nothing is 
said of the fact that most of the humanists were, if not clerics, at 
least noteworthy for their unmistakable religious bias. Paul Hazard, 
for example, writing in the early 1930's, placed his stress upon the 
fact that in his old age Varillas repeatedly dictated his histories 
without bothering to check a single fact. 14 He remarked further that 
Vertot, having just completed his history of the siege of Malta, answer-
ed a colleague who referred him to the discovery of new documents 
"J'en suis fEche, mais mon siege eat fait." Even the priest Father 
Daniel, whom Voltaire had described as "instruit exact, sage et 
14 Hazard, La crise de la conscience europeenne, p.29. 
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vrai", 15 is noted by Hazard for having abandoned his labours after 
spending only one hour in the archives of the royal library because 
they proved more pain than profit. A more recent critic, E. H. Brumfitt, 
writing in the early 1950's, indicted Saint-Real and Vertot for their 
pre-occupation with psychological and dramatic effect in history at 
the expense of accuracy. 16 Even Mezerai and Daniel whom he praised 
for trying "to maintain the best tradition of humanist historiography" ,17 
displayed a decided moral and artistic pre-occupation. Neither Hazard 
nor Brumfitt has paid particular attention to the deference which 
such historians gave to the power of the French monarchy. 
It was only recently, in 1956, that the Frenchman Antoine 
Adam focused attention for the first time on the tail side of the 
coin, the side upon which Bayle's attention was focused. Adam comments 
that "la plus lourde des servitudes etait sans aucune doute, pour 
l'histoire, celle que faisait peser le pouvoir royal. ,18 Seventeenth 
century France was a state still based upon an absolute monarchy and 
a privileged church, and because its historians were shackled to the 
royal power, so too were they restained by the cords of religion. 
Their very names betrayed their Catholic prejudices: Father Bouffier, 
Father Daniel, Father Maimbourg, Bossuet, Mezerai, Moreri, Saint-Real, 




18 Adam, Histoire de la litterature francaise au XV/I e siècle. V, 
p.329. 
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Varillas, Vertot. Not all of them were deliberately inaccurate or 
careless scholars, but few tried to conceal their religious sympathies, 
or stem the tide of religious controversy which was inundating history. 
For a man so passionately opposed to prejudice in any form, it is hardly 
surprising that Bayle should have attributed many of the faults in 
humanist historians to their partisanship and religious prejudice. 
While a new wave of criticism might be enough to inspire a 
modern scholar to re-examine the tools of his profession, it is not 
enough to attribute the same motives to his seventeenth century counter-
part. The new wave of erudite historical scholarship which was born 
during the seventeenth century undoubtedly influenced Bayle, and at the 
very least we know that he was acquainted with many of the works of the 
new critical scholars from the time he spent editing the Nouvelles de  
la Republique des lettres. He confessed his awareness of the movement 
when he remarked in the Dictionnaire: 
"Pour un chercheur d'Experiences Physiques, pour un 
Mathematicien, vous trouvex cent personnes qui etudient a fond 
l'Histoire avec toutes sea dependences; & jamais la Science de 
l'Antiquariat, je veux dire l'etude des Medailles, des Inscrip-
tions, des Bas-reliefs, &c., n'avoit ete cultivfie come elle Vest 
presentement."19 
But the growth of this critical spirit in the seventeenth century 
scarcely inspired the majority of humanist historians to adopt a more 
exacting and critical approach to history. To be sure we know that 
Daniel was influenced by the new erudition, but he was the exception 
rather than the rule. Thus the question remains: why did Bayle, among 
all the humanist, develop such a deep enthusiasm for the principles 
19 "Projet", Dictionnaire, IV, p.612. 
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of criticism in history? 
In the first place, he had a distinct natural advantage over 
the majority of other humanist historians: he was not a member of the 
established Catholic Church in France. Under other circumstances, this 
might not have been such a particular advantage, since he was a self-
confessed member of the equally intransigent Reformed Church. His 
double conversion, however, had taught him to mistrust all form of 
orthodoxy, a necessary step in the development of his tolerant attitude 
to religion. Of greater importance was the fact that being beyond the 
pale of the Catholic Church, he was also beyond the direct influence of 
the royal power in France, a situation underlined by his exile in Holland. 
His idea of history was freed from the traditional biases which over-
whelmed his contemporaries living in France, and this allowed him to 
break more easily with the traditions of seventeenth century hist-
oriography. 
Secondly, when present day critics endeavour to trace a 
continuity of tradition in the history of ideas, they imply too great a 
continuity of motives. It is in the field of biblical exegesis that we 
can most clearly see the dangers of reading twentieth century motives 
into a seventeenth century situation. Although Bayle was interested in 
biblical exegesis, this does not mean that his motives were necessarily 
the same as other interested in the field. As we have already observed 
in the previous chapter, Bayle's interest in the field centred primar-
ily around his attack on religious orthodoxy, which he viewed as one of 
the principal causes of persecution. It was this essentially non- 
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scholastic motive which enabled him to achieve more than most in the 
field of biblical criticism. 
A general interest in this field can be traced back at least 
to Jean Bodin who in his Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem of 
1566 endeavoured to free secular history from the control of scriptural 
and patristic authority by insisting on the division of history into 
three natural parts: human, natural and divine. Lenain de Tillemont 
eventually came to the sane conclusion, although he insisted on a strong 
relationship between sacred and profane history, one being incompre-
hensible without the other. Both Bodin and Tillemont sought the same end: 
a clear division between theology and history, but they were unable to 
formulate a satisfactory basis upon which to make such a division. 
Richard Simon, writing at about the same time as Bayle, undertook a 
critical examination of the Old Testament in his Histoire critique du  
Vieux Testament (1678) to determine its textual accuracy and authenticity. 
Others had followed the same path, among them Samuel Bochart, Louis 
Capelle and Spinoza. It is misleading, however, to say of this spirit 
of criticism as Paul Hazard has done "tel itait l'esprit du temps", 20 
for as I have previously remarked, this implies too great a continuity 
of motive. To Bayle at least, such an assertion cannot apply. Although 
his methods and conclusions may bear a resemblance to those of other 
biblical critics, his primary object in criticising the Old Testament 
was an entirely individual one. 
20 Hazard, La crise de la conscience europfienne, p.167. 
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Bayle made a thorough examination of the causes of distortion, 
exaggeration or suppression of truth in history, but inevitably we must 
be prepared to search from AARON to XENOPHANES to find them. The 
Dictionnaire is remarkable for the way in which the principle of 
criticism are inculcated into the reader's mind. Bayle gave no clear 
exposition of these principles, largely because the nature of his dict- 
ionary did not permit this. The rules are scattered throughout scores of 
incidental remarks, but frequently they appear so unexpectedly that the 
reader imbibes them aluost without thinking, through what Elisabeth 
Labrousse calls a "homeopathic treatment". 21 For the sake of clarity, 
we shall try to impose some order on Bayle's incidental remarks, and 
present the principles of his critical method in a more ordered format 
then they appear in the Dictionnaire. 
Since the critical approach is concerned primarily with 
establishing historical truth, it is essential to understand the various 
ways in which this truth has been or can be distorted, exaggerated, 
suppressed or altered. Elisabeth Labrousse, who has published the most 
erudite study of Bayle's critical method to date, 22 divides these causes 
into two categories, which she labels "involuntary" and 'voluntary" 
causes. The former are the product of laziness, ignorance or carelessness 
21 Elisabeth Labrousse, "La methode critique chez Pierre Bayle et 
l'histoire", Revue internationale de philosophie, xi, (1957), 
pp.450-66. 
22 Ibid. See also her book Pierre Bayle, tome 2, chap. I. 
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or what Bayle called "dimness or smallness of mind", while the latter 
proceed from passion, private interest and prejudice, summarized by 
Bayle as the products of "bad faith". Bayle discovered this bad faith 
not only in the historian's witnesses, but in the historian himself, and 
even if they did not refer to it by name, he and his contemporaries were 
at least aware of the mechanisms of a complete subconscious psychology 
in man. 23 But let us begin our discussion of Bayle's critical method 
by examining the less pericious, "involuntary" sources of falsification 
in history. 
Perhaps the most obvious source of such falsifications, and one 
which confronts us every day, is the unreliability of memory. In 
ALEXANDER ab ALEXANDRO, we find that Bayle remarked "la memoire eat un 
24 moule oil les objets changent de forme tres-ais 	” 6ment. 	It is a weak 
and unreliable faculty which very quickly distorts and blurs the true 
facts: 
eat certain Oneralement parlant que lea objets de 
le memoire sont d'une nature tees -differente de celle des objets de 
la vue. Ceux-ci diminuent A proportion de leur distance, & ceux-
lA pour l'ordinaire grossissent A mesure qu'on eat eloigne de leur 
tents & de leur lieu."25 
When someone witnesses an event or listens to a story, he will generally 
only retain the essential facts because the details will present too 
great a burden for his attention and memory. Consequently when he is 
called upon the repeat these details some days or weeks later, he will 
allow his imagination free scope to fill in the missing details, thus 
allowing errors and misconceptions to creep into his account. These 
23 Ibid., P.458. 
24 ALEXANDER ab ALEXANDRO, note E. 
25 GREGOIRE Ier , in corp. 
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exaggerations and distortions will in turn find their way into the 
historian's hands, and where there is more than one witness to be found 
the errors will be multiplied accordingly: 
"Les Lecteurs retiennent mieux le gros & le fond d'un fait, 
que lea circonstances: us veulent donc le reporter, ils supleent 
le mieux qu'ils peuvent ce qu'ils en ont oublie; & comae lea gofits 
sont differens, il arrive que lea uns supleent une chose, lea autres 
tine autre."26 
Elsewhere Bayle asserted that "On falisifie encore plus ce 
que l'on a oul dire, que ce qu'on a lu", 27 which raises the particular 
question of the evidence based upon hearsay reports. Testimony trans-
mitted by word of mouth through several witnesses must be rendered 
suspect, if only because each witness will forget certain essentials 
and freely embellish others out of his imagination. As an illustration 
of the unreliability of hearsay testimony, we can take Bayle's discussion 
of a report from Mr. Labrune's book Journey into Switzerland in which the 
author asserted that Fabio Chigi, who subsequently became Pope Alexander 
VII, had considered becoming a convert of the Protestant faith. Bayle 
remarked of this report "La chose ne sauroit manquer d'apartenir I ce 
Dictionaire. 	Est-elle veritable? us s'en faitit entant qu'historique: 
est-elle fausse? ii s'en saisit entant que critique. "28 Labrune's 
evidence was based upon a conversation alleged to have taken place 
between the Duke of Longueville and Mr. Amyraut senior. Amyraut's 
son, however, had personally assured Bayle that he knew nothing of any 
26 ANAXAGORUS, note M. 
27 Ibid. 
28 CHIGI, Fabio, note G. 
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such conversation, so there was considerable doubt as to whether it ever 
actually took place. Bayle concluded his footnote with the following 
remark: 
... nous avons ici un exemple qui nous avertit, combien 
ii faut de defier des Contes qui ne sont fondez que sun l'oul -dire. 
A l'heure qu'il eat, je tiens l'Auteur de ce Voiage de Suisse pour 
pleinement persuade, qu'on doit etre soigneusement sur sea gardes 
contre ces sortes de traditions."29 
Whether the evidence of a witness is based upon hearsay or simply relies 
upon memory, the historian should always be on his guard, and believe 
very little of what he reads of is told. Instead he should ask "... si 
lea faits qu'on conte out ate mis par ecrit au tems de leur nouveaute; 
& at on lui dit que non, mats que la memoire s'en eat conservfie de pere 
en fils & de vive voix, 11 sait bien que le Pyrrhonisme eat le parti 
de la sagesse..30  
Although an historian is at liberty to mention hearsays, he 
should never assert them as true, unless he can furnish adequate critical 
proofs of them. In the article BEZE Bayle castigated Mezerai for main- 
taining as true a report that Beza was guilty of sodomy. As he explained: 
"S'il s'etoit contente de dire qu'on lisoit dans plusieurs 
Ecrits imprimez, que Theodore de Beze fut accuse de cette abomi-
ation, ii. ne faudroit pas le trouver etrange; car il n'avanceroit 
rien qui ne soit tras-vrai. On pourroit citer peut-etre deux cens 
Auteurs, qui, se copiant lea uns lea autres, out pane de ce Procas, 
Mezerai va beaucop plus loin: il soutient la chose, il s'en rend caution, & 11 n'en sauroit produire nulle preuve; c'est ce qu'on 
peut apeller la conduite d'un Historian etourdi." 31 
29 Ibid. 
30 ES1PE, note B. 
31 BEZE, note U. 
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Even Father Maimbourg, who compouneed Mezerai's offence, could only cite 
historians like Bolsec, Spondanus, Florimond de Remond and Claudius de 
Xaintes, none of whom had furnished any clear proof of Beza's guilt. 
Such an unsubstantiated accusation could only be the result of the most 
violent religious hatred. These historians should have been amply 
equipped to discover the evidence, especially as it was in their interest 
to do so. But no evidence was forthcoming, in which case it must be 
deduced that noneexisted. If this were so, then it is an inescapable 
conclusion that the accusation was false and chimerical. Mezerai and the 
others ought perhaps to have followed the example of the historian 
Naudaeus, who came across several stories concerning the amorous follies 
of Augustin Niphus, but since: 
n'etoit pas assar6 qu'ils fussent aussi v6ritab1es 
que vraisemblables, ii ne crut pas qu'il fut de la eharit6 ni de 
l'equit6 de lea publier. Je cite sea paroles, avec d'autant plus de 
plaisir qu'elles donnent un exemple de ce qu'il faut faire par 
raport aux Contes qui n'ont pour apui qua l'ouT-dire." 32 
As Elisabeth Labrousse has pointed out, these observations 
introduced an important implication for the historical critic, that of 
the relative value of testimonies. It is obvious that the value of 
evidence diminishes in proportion to the distance in time and space 
which separates an author from what he is reporting. When more than one 
witness intervenes between the event and its final reporter, their test-
imony loses all value. Nothing should deter the critic from assuring 
himself that his witnesses have put their recollections down in writing 
without delay. Testimony is not to be valued by the number of witnesses 
32 NIPHUS, Augustin, note F. 
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but by their reliability in reporting what they claim to have heard or 
seen. 
Essentially it is the duty of every critic to lay aside 
credelity, and to adopt the habit of methodical doubt. Craig B. Brush 
is correct in asserting that what Bayle practices is not historical 
pyrrhonism, but rather "la doute mfithodique"," for Bayle himself 
assures us that "L'extrgme credulitfi A quelques egards, & lextrgme 
incrfidulitg A quelques autres, s'accordent si bien ensemble dans un mgme 
home qu'elles naissent rune de l'nutre. The critic must guard as 
Much against extreme incredulity as extreme credulity. The purpose and 
value of his work resides in being able to salvage from amongst all the 
lies, falsehoods and misrepresentations of history some element of hist-
orical truth. 
Even when the critic has satisfied himself that his evidence 
is valid, he still faces the fundamental problems involved in the repro-
duction of documents. What of all the unconscious errors of printers, 
copyists, abridgers, commentators, compilers and translators? Misquoting, 
mis-spelling of names, misprinting of dates, careless translations, these 
are hazards which a work of history must encounter before it reaches the 
public. Simple printing mistakes, for example, have produced many unnec-
essary errors such as occurred in a mathematical tract written by 
Blancanus, where the printers inserted "Neronis" for "Heronis". Bayle 
remarked of this: 
33 Brush, Montaigne and Bayle, p.253. 
34 PAPESSE, note G. 
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“ ... voila comment lea Imprimeurs multiplient lea Bcrivains. 
II y a des Compilateurs, qui pour montrer qu'ils enchfirissent sur 
ceux qui lea ont prficfidez, donneront peut -etre comme une rare 
dficouverte qu'il y avoit anciennement un habile Mathfimaticien nomme 
Neron, dont on a encore quelques Ouvrages." 35 
Moreover there was the error of those historians who maintained on the 
basis of a document in which the printers had inadvertently changed the 
word "Theriacarum" to read "Theoricsrum", that Andromachus was the first 
to write concerning the theory of the planets • 36 And what of those trans- 
cribers who "confondent un fait avec leurs propres conjectures, ou avec 
lea consequences qu'ils en tirent", 37 and then insert those conjectures 
into the body of the narrative as though thooriginal author had maintained 
them? How many quotations have been carelessly translated or wrongly 
transcribed? How many glosses have been confused with the original text? 
Examples of such carelessness are everywhere to be found, waiting to 
mialead the unwary historian who fails to subject his evidence and sources 
to a rigorous process of criticism. 
These observations alone should be enough to shake the 
critic's faith in his text, but there is also another category of factors, 
considerably more pernicious, which are responsible for falsifications in 
history. They are the "voluntary" or conscious causes, and reflect the 
workings of passion and emotion in the historian. These are the factors 
which allow us to trace more precisely the relationship between Bayle's 
appeal for toleration, his historical milieu and his critical method. 
35 COMMANDIN, note B. 
36 ANDROMAQUE, note A. 
37 PEAKS, note A; also VIRGILE, Polydore, note A. 
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As we observed earlier in the chapter, one of the most obvious 
characteristics of seventeenth century French historiography, and one 
frequently understated by present day historians, was the close relation-
ship between historians, most of whom were Catholic, the Church and the 
Monarchy. Many historians wrote in the service of the state or depended 
on its favour, while many of the remainder were members of the clergy. 
The last twenty-five years of the century were also a period of intense 
religious controversy. By the early 1680's, the great Catholic historian 
Bossuet had been drawn into open debate with the Protestant controversialist 
Jurieu over such questions as absolute monarchy and popular sovereignty. 
Others like Varillas and Saint-Real merely sniped from a distance. 
Very fn117 historians endeavoured to conceal their religious prejudice, and 
fewer still paid much heed to objectivity in their writings. Historical 
scholarship became increasingly coloured by emotion, and by the intense 
religious prejudices of its writers. For Bayle, who had already identif-
ied passion and prejudice as the primary causes of intolerance and 
persecution, the discovery of these emotions in historical writing was 
particularly significant. 
It is hardly surprising that much of the time which Bayle 
spent in elaborating the principles of criticism in the Dictionnaire  
was devoted to unmasking the passions and emotions of historians. As he 
remarked to his readers: "Une des plus grandes utilitez qu'on puisse 
tirer de la lecture est d'aprendre lea foiblesses du coeur humain, & lea 
mauvais effets des prajuggs de Religion.. 38  The historian's emotions 
will persistently intrude into his writings, and even good faith and 
38 BERTELIER, note G. 
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sincerity are not sufficient to ensure that truth will always prevail. 
At this point we can appreciate one of the impliaations of Bayle's 
definition of a "triple" truth. For example a partisan bias can produce 
falsifications in history which are the result of complete sincerity and 
the best of faith. An historian can falsify an account to the advantage 
of his religion, and do so in the belief that it is a service rendered 
for truth. According to Bayle's definition, however, the service is 
rendered for moral and not historical truth. Many historians will 
falsify the truth "... lors que l'intergt de Parti aura plus de part A 
ce qu'on dire, que lea idees de l'ordre, que lea idees de l'honnate, que 
l'amour de la verite en general. 09 The qualification "en general" is 
important, for as Bayle continued: "Je dis 'en generar; & ce sont deux 
choses hien differentes, qu'aimer la verite en elle-meme. & qu'aimer le 
Parti que l'on a une Lois pris pour le veritable, & que l'on eat bien 
u40 resolu de ue prendre jamais pour faux. 	Simple religious faith, while 
it is to be accepted and tolerated as a moral truth, will always blind the 
historian to the ultimate truth of history. Obviously Bayle's definition 
of a "triple" truth was necessary, if his attack on the instincts of rel-
igious zeal in the historian was to be unimpeded. 
Historical scholarship in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
provided Bayle with more than enough examples of passion and prejudice at 
work in the historian. In reading the history of these two centuries 
the critic very quickly learns that: "... l'interat de Patti, & le 
ale pour sa propre Cause, & plus encore la haine pour l'autre Religion, 
39 BLONDEL, David, note I. 
40 Ibid. 
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engagent un Ecrivain A exaggfirer, ou I suprimer, ou extfinuer, ou A 
dfiguiser lee choses selon qu'elles peuvent servir ou nuire A l'honneur 
de son Parti.. 41  Florimond de Remond WAS just such an historian. 
A zealous Catholic, he was completely unable to suppress his zeal when 
writing history. As Bayle remarked, Remand was the unfittest man in 
the world to undertake the writing of l'Histoire de la naissance, 
progrez, & dgcadence de l'Hgrgsie de ce Si4cle. Apart from what he 
might have lacked in learning, judgement, wit and style: "... quand 
ii n'auroit point eu d'autres dfifauts que ceux que son zgle pour 
le Catholicisme, & sa haine pour le Protestantisme, produisoient en lui, 
auroit da reconoitre qu'il s'engageoit A tin Ouvrage qui passoit sea 
forces."42 As an historian, Remand should have first examined his 
conscience and sounded his prejudices before he presumed himself equipped 
to write about such a subject. Instead he accused the Protestants of 
injustice, extolled the wisdom and innocence of the Catholics, used 
injurious epithets and outrageous phrases, and utilized insignificant 
quotations. 	In truth: 
"Le meilleur conseil, qu'on eat pu donner A FlorimOhd de 
Remand, eat fite qu'il continugt a faire des Livres de Controverse, oa la passion est permise, & qu'il ne se melt point digtre 
Historien, - emploi qui n'fitoit pas convenable A un aussi bon 
Catholique que lui & qu*il faloit laisser A des tiedes, & g des 
indiffirens."43 
Moreover the example of Florimond de Remond was not an isolated one. 
Could Bossuet or Maimbourg be considered lukewarm or indifferent men? 
Was the Histoire du calvinisme anything more than a passionate 
41 REMOND, note D. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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triade against the Protestant faith? Nor was the weight of passion all 
on the side of the Catholics. Bayle typically reflected his awn efforts 
at non-partisanship by adding the following remark concerning Protestant 
historians: 
"Je croi aussi que l'on feroit bien de conseiller I un zgle 
Huguenot de n'entreprendre jamais ni l'Histoire du Calvinisme, ni 
celle du Lutheranisme, ni celle de l'Edit de Nantes, ni aucune 
autre de cette nature. Vous avez le coeur ularg, lui devroit-on 
dire vous avez congu de la haine pour lea persficuteurs, vous gtes 
rong6 d'un zgle ardent pour votre Cause, vous nous donneriez, non 
pas une Histoire, mai:3 des 6critures d'Avocat, vous de feriez que 
blamer le Parti contraire, & que loUer, ou justifier votre Parti: 
cela ne se pourroit faire sans quelques petits pechez d'amission & de commission."44 
Truth is the soul of history, and passion the enemy of truth. In a 
Europe still shuddering from the convulsions of religious persecution, no 
historian, Catholic or Protestant, could avoid the taint of prejudice 
or hope to write an impartial history of his times. 
Beyond this general condemnation of the bias of historians, 
Bayle used the critical method of highlight the mechanics of prejudice 
in historical scholarship. He firmly believed that nothing teaches better 
than the discipline of a critic, and indeed nothing could have been 
better suited to teaching the hazards and futility of intolerance than 
the principles of criticism. He focused the critic's attention on 
textual criticism, for it was here that the mechanics of prejudice 
could most readily be exposed. He believed that textual criticism applied 
as much to historical writing as to any other, but since history was 
primarily concerned with describing and recounting actual situations and 
events, the need for accuracy was paramount. 
44 Ibid. 
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To emphasize this point, Bayle alluded to the responsibility 
which historians had to succeeding generations, that of preserving 
historical truth. He remarked, when discussing a dispute between 
the Jesuit Campion and the Englishmen Whitaker, that the more deeply 
we examine the controversy which centred around Campion 'a allegation 
that Luther had called St. James's Epistle a work of straw, the more 
difficult it is to determine the truth. 45 Even the historians Daille 
and Rivet, working less than a century later, could not accurately 
unravel the course of the dispute. If the mists of only one century 
could obscure the truth, how will succeeding generations ever succeed in 
unravelling the facts of history? "Plus on examine ces choses, plus on 
sent que c'est un travail d'Hercule que d'entreprendre de demaler la 
verite au milieu de tent de deguisemens & de taut de supercheries." 46 
Faults which mislead the greatest number of readers are the most dangerous. 
Consequently historians should forbear writing, rather than fill their 
histories with lies "car il importe au public que tout ce pie l'on 
imprime soit bien certain. "47 The danger is that lies get into print 
&, des la, on seme un mensonge, dont is graine ne se 
perd jamais, 	. Le premier qui le publie n'est pas long-tems le 
seul qui Veit publie: on ne chomme pas a le faire passer de Livre 
en Livre, comme un grand motif de ale, ou comme un objet de 
reflexions."48 
Lies and errors should not be written down or at the very least committed 
to print, for: 
45 LUTHER, note N. 
46 Ibid., note 0. 
47 BASTA, George, note B. 
48 ALCIAT, Jean Paul, note D. 
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” 	l'impression lea eternise, & lea fait servir de 
fondement aux historiens: ce qui rfipand sur l'Histoire un 
cihos impfinfitrable d'incertitude, qui dfirobe aux siecles suivans 
la connoissance de la vfiritfi  
One of the most evident examples of the presence of prejudice 
in historical writing was the intrusion into history of satire and 
flattery. "Les deux pestes de l'Histoire", Bayle called them, "deux 
sources qui empoisonnent lea relations des fivfinemens humains". 50 They 
were common enough as literary techniques among those seventeenth 
century historians who cared more for artistic effect than scholarly 
objectivity. History abounded with satires and panegyrics of kings, 
prelates and statesmen, all of which included some facts which historians 
did not scruple to publish and excluded other which they dared not 
publish. 5/ 
When ranking satire and flattery in order of iniquity, however, 
Bayle remarked "on peut dire que la contagion d'une plume madisante, 
& dirigfie par la haine & par le ressentiment, eat plus pernicieuse A 
l'Histoire que la contagion des Panfigyristes. “52 The satirist, whose 
labour confounds truth with every stroke of his pen, not only suppresses 
but also distorts and grossly exaggerates the essential facts of history. 
Of Timaeus, the Greek historian and satirist, who had been banished from 
Sicily by Agathocles during the CXXIII Olympiad, Bayle remarked: 
49 "Dissertation sur lea libelles diffamatoires”, Dictionnaire, /V, 
p.582, note B. 
50 MARILLAC, Louis de, note A- 
51 REMOND, note D. 
52 MARILLAC, Louis de, note A. 
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"Sa passion la plus favorite etoit d'imprimer un caractere 
de medisance sur sea Discours: 11 aimoit naturellement A critiquer 
& A censurer. Vest pourquoi une Histoire de as fagon n'eat jamais 
pu etre bonne, quand mime il eat possede lea autres talens qui sont 
necessaires aux Historiens."53 
While Agathocles lived, Timaeus suppressed his resentment, but after the 
king's death, he discharged a torrent of rage against him, describing not 
only his crimes and ill qualities, but even contriving to invent further 
calumnies against him. "Le souvenir de cette injure, & de ce-dommage, se 
presentoit A tout moment, pour crier vengeance aux oreilles de l'Ecrivain", 54 
to such an extent that Timaeus suppressed all and any laudable qualities 
which Agathocles may have possessed. It was inexcusable satire, and it is 
perhaps a ref lexion upon Bayle's motives for remaining so obviously 
silent on Louis XIV, that he should have concluded his remarks with the 
following comment: "Les personnes lea plus moderees, & lea plus modestes, 
auroient sujet de se defier de leur vertu en ecrivant lea actions d'un 
persecuteur." 55  
The critic, in pursuing the suppression of facts in history, 
is confronted with many difficulties, not least of which is the question 
of obscenities. Bayle himself had been accused of obscenity in the 
Dictionnaire, particularly in a number of articles relating to the Bible 
and certain religious sects. In his defence, 56 he claimed that while 
lewd or offensive words or facts discovered in common speech or theatrical 
performances should be condemned, they were permissable in history, for 
53 TIMEE, note L. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 "Eclaircissement que s'il y a des Obscenitez dans ce Livre, elles 
sont de celles qu'on ne peut censurer avec raison", Dictionnaire, IV, pp.637-54. 
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the historian was obliged to faithfully relate everything that pertained 
to his subject, and would be severely hindered if he were obliged to 
suppress certain impure facts. Inevitably "il eat impossible d'ficrire 
l'Histoire, sans raporter des actions infames & abominables. 157 Further-
more "ii eat du devoir d'un Historien, de faire conoitre le caractere 
de ses Acteurs par les traits les plus marquez, qui temoignent l'etendue 
de leurs vertus ou de leur vices ... "58 This did not mean, he asserted, 
that historians possessed an unlimited licence to publish obscenities. 
When discussing figures of ancient history, they have a right, indeed a 
duty, to recount whatever relevant facts they should find in books, 
whether these deserve "... d'atre louees, soit qu'elles meritent l'horreur 
& l'execration des Lecteurs. -.59  This is a particularly important point 
in order to preserve the accuracy of quotation. With the life of a 
modern, however, Bayle placed limitations upon the historian's licence. 
If an account of some infamous or abominable action is to be discovered 
in the work of only one author, an historian can be excused from refer-
ring to it, if he considers that its publication might present "certains 
inconveniens". 60 Where a fact is mentioned by numerous authors, though, 
it is a useless scruple to suppress it, "... car lea Lecteurs trouveront 
facilement par d'autres voles ce que vous voulex leur cacher."61  It is 
difficult to understand why Bayle restricted the historian's licence 
regarding obscenities with this vague rule of discretion, when he was 
57 BLONDEL, Francois ii, note A. 
58 DOMITIA, note A. 
59 HIPPARCHIA, note D. 
60 Ibid. 
61 ABDAS, in corp. 
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generally so outspoken in condemning the suppression of facts: 
seroit 5 souhaiter, que le Public fat plus 
severe qu'il ne rest, contre les Historiens qui supriment 
certaines choses. Ii y en a si peu, qui ne le fassent, qu'il 
seroit desormais tems d'y remedier, si on le pouvoit." 62 
Bayle's critical method also denounced those historians who 
not only suppressed, but distorted, exaggerated and even invented facts. 
His principal target here was undoubtedly those seventeenth century 
humanist historians who strove for artistic and dramatic effect in their 
writings at the expense of historical accuracy. While the mechanisms of 
religious prejudice were not always responsible for this practice, hist-
orical truth was frequently obscured by the distortions and embellishments 
to be discovered in the accounts of these historians. Moreri, Mezerai, 
Saint-Real, Daniel, Vertot were all guilty of inventing and polishing 
facts and transforming conjectures into affirmations of truth. 63 Some of 
these historians, Bayle maintained, were excessively inventive and 
ingenious: 
"Je pane de certains His toriens qui ressemblent A 
Mr. Vanillas. us aiment a dire ce qui ne se trouve point dans lea 
Histoires ordinaires: us aspirent A la louange d'avoir deterre 
des Anecdotes, & lea Qualitez occultes des premiers Ministres, 
avec le secret des Intrigues, & des Nagociations que personne 
n'avoit su."64 
Poor Vanillas! With the exception of Moreri, no other historian's faults 
were pursued more relentlessly through the pages of the Dictionnaire, and 
no category of faults was condemned more assertively: 
62 ABDAS, in corp. 
63 See FBASIS, note A. 
64 "Dissertation sur lea libelles diffamatoires", Dictionsaire, IV, 
p.581, note A. 
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"Ce n'est pas assez que de comparer ces indignes Ecrivains 
A des Harpyes, qui salissent tout ce qu'elles touchent: on peut 
dire ce sont des bourreaux qui tordent le cou, lea bras, & lez 
jambes aux Faits Historiques, & mOme qui lea leur coupent qualque., 
fois, & leur en apliquent de postiches; & cela presque au =meat 
meme qu'un evenement est sorti du sein de sea causes, & que 
lea exploits d'une Bataille ne font que de naitre,  
If the critical method was useful in revealing the effects 
of religious prejudice at work in historical writing, its principles 
of textual criticism were also useful in exposing the deliberate 
alterations which were made to documents and manuscripts. The principal 
offenders in this respect, Bayle believed, were the ancient historians: 
"Je croi que tous lea anciens Historiens ont pris la mime 
licence, I l'figard des vieux Mgmoires qu'ils consultoient. Ils y 
oat cousu des suplemens; &, n'y trouvant pas lea faits dfivelopez 
embellis I leur fantaisie, us lea ont etendus, & habillfis comme ii 
leur a plu: & aujourd'hui, nous prenons cela pour Histoire."66 
This revelation carried considerable significance for historians, since 
documents and manuscripts were the principle part of the historian's 
basic equipment. The discovery of one false document, one altered 
manuscript, cast a shadow of doubt over the authenticity of all hist-
orical sources. While so many manuscripts remained suspect, Bayle could 
only lament "Pauvre Ecrits posthumes, & vous Manuscrits venus des pais 
lointains, comment peut-on se fier en vous? Qui nous pourra assurer 
qu'on n'y 8te rien, qu'on n'y ajoOte rien ...!" 67 How can we be 
sure? It was truly a situation calling for "la doute methodique". 
This doubt which the critical method cast over documentary 
sources had an important implication for Bayle's appeal for toleration. 
65 Ibid., in corp., p.584. 
66 ABIMELECH, note C. 
67 RAYNAUD, note 8. 
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He recognized that the respective claims to orthodoxy of the Roman 
Catholic and Protestant Churches relied heavily on the historical 
manuscripts of the Scriptures and the writings of the early Church 
Fathers. But what if these had also been falsified as they were passed 
down through the centuries? How absurd it was to persecute or even to 
suffer persecution for the sake of a doctrine based upon doubtful 
sources: 
"Nos predecesseurs n'ont pas moins-songe A nous seduire, 
que l i on songe presentement A tromper la posterite. Et si 
pendant qu'un Auteur est plein de vie on ose falsifier ses 
Ouvrages, qui nous repondra que les Manuscrits des Peres aient 
été respectez? Qui nous repondra qu'il n'y alt des gens qui 
souffrent persecution pour soutenir l'artifice d'un Corrupteur 
de Bibliotheques?" 68 
These then are the fundamental principles of Bayle's critical 
method, but a few further points remain to be made. To begin with, these 
principles of criticism presented an important and apparently unsolvable 
dilemma for the historian. On the one hand, the only testimony which 
merited any historical authority was that given by a very direct eye-
witness and trau ,Aerred almost immediately to writing. On the other hand, 
Bayle pointed out, partiality was never more inevitable than in a witness 
who is personally involved in an event. 69 In other words, the 
eradication of an "involuntary" source of falsification of facts immediately 
gives rise to a "voluntary" one. In such a contradictory situation, how is 
truth to be ascertained? Alfred Cobban's description of the Dictionnaire  
68 PELLISSON, note F. 
69 Labrousse, "La methode critique chez Pierre Bayle et l'histoire", p.462. 
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as "a roust reservoir of corrosive erudition" 70  would seem in this 
light to be thoroughly justified. Bayle would seem to assume the 
character of a sceptical historian or historical pyrrhonist bent on 
destroying every vestige of certainty in history. Such an assessment, 
however, neglects two important factors. First, it is evident from 
the principles of his method that Bayle's primary concern was for hist-
orical criticism to eradicate all sources of falsification arising from 
the passion and prejudice of historians. Secondly, while the critical 
method is corrosive up to a point, Bayle clearly admitted the possibility 
of establishing a certain area of historical truth. For example, the 
historian could be persuaded about the truth of a story if all opposing 
parties agree on it, for no one would repeat the story if it disturbed 
the interests of his party. Also the critic is able to obtain reliable 
facts even from accounts which are so obviously coloured by prejudice, 
since everything that contradicts these accounts has a good chance of 
being true. Then again, the laws of history allow that: 
... on regoit pour bon ce qui se prouve par le t6moign-
age des Auteurs graves, & Von rejette come une Fable tout ce 
qeun Moderne daite concernant l'Antiquit6  
Finally, the two basic principles "impossibile est tot homines tot faeculis 
convenire ad mentiendum" and "hoc dicunt tot homines tot faeculis" 72 allow 
the admittance of a considerable body of facts to the rank of historical 
70 Cobban, In Search of Humanity, p.65. 
71 GUEVARA, note D. 
72 BEAULIEU, note F. These premises may be summed up in the syllogism 
"It is impossible that all men at all times should agree upon a 
falsehood". 
- 178 - 
certitude. In this light we can regard Bayle exactly as he was, an 
ardent critic whose primary concern was the condemnation of passion 
and prejudice and the removal from history of all taint of religious bias, 
literary inventiveness and impassioned controversy. 
A second point to be considered is the accusation frequently 
laid against Bayle that he was "minutissimarum rerum minutissimus 
sciscitator" 73 [a minute examiner of minute affairs], a pedant who lacked 
discrimination when dealing with historical facts. In the first instance 
let us hear Bayle's awn defence: 
"On me reprochera de m'attacher trop 1 des minuties: je 
souhaite que l'on sache que je le fais, non pour croire que 
ces choses sont importantes en elles-mames, mais afin d'insf.nuer 
par des fixamples sensibles qu'il faut s'armer de dfifiance contre 
ce qu'on lit, & emploier son genie au discernement des faits. 
Cette application fitend & multiplie lea forces de l'ame."74 
While it is true to claim, as many scholars do, that Bayle failed to 
distinguish between the significant and the insignificant fact, we 
should be cautious of condemning him for failing to do something that 
did not come within the scope of his work. We should remember that 
Bayle was not primarily concerned with formulating a philosophy of 
history, but rather was intent on pursuing the spectre of intolerance 
wherever it should appear. Its appearance in seventeenth century hist- 
orical writing was his excuse for expounding the principles of criticism, 
and his purpose was merely to teach his readers to discern errors, handle 
73 "Projet", Dictionnaire, IV, p.611. 
74 CAPPADOCE, note K. 
- 179 - 
historical sources with caution and be continually on guard against the 
iniquities of passion and prejudice. The problem of factual discrimin-
ation between the significant and the insignificant fact carried no 
particular importance for Bayle's defence of toleration, and we can 
presume that it lay well beyond the scope of his interests. It is 
worth noting that this lack of factual discrimination was a perennial 
problem for the critical historians of the seventeenth century. 
Finally, if any doubt remains that Bayle's use of the critical 
method was inspired by his defence of toleration, we need only to consider 
the priority of talents which he considered necessary for the critical 
historian: 
"L'Histoire generalement parlant est ou la plus dificile 
de toutes les compositions qu'un Auteur puisse entreprendre, ou 
l'une des plus dificiles. Elle demande un home qui ait un grand . 
jugement; un style noble, clair,& serre; une conscience droite, 
une probite achevfie, beaucoup d'excellens materiaux, & l'art de lee 
bien ranger, & sur toutes dhoses la force de resister aux instincts 
du ale de Religion qui sollicitent A decrier ce qu'onjuge faux, 
& A orner ce qu'on juge veritab1e."75 
The stress is obviously placed upon resistance to religious prejudice, 
which Bayle had elsewhere condemned as the principal source of 
intolerance and persecution. Any historian who wishes to faithfully 
discharge his function must shed all desire for satire and flattery, 
and assume as far as possible "... le plus (esprit) qu'il est possible 
dans l'etat d'un Stolcien qui n'est agite d'aucune passion. ,76 His 
sole concern must be for the interests of historical truth. 
75 MOND, note D. 
76 USSON, note F. 
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history as a literary genre. 79 Even the principles of his method were 
culled from the writings of other historians. What we too frequently 
tend to overlook is the fact that Bayle ss critical method formed an 
important part of his attack on religious intolerance, which was a more 
crucial function than the contribution whichit made tothe philosophy 
of history. 
79 Ibid. 
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CONCLUSION  
Few thinkers in the history of European thought have been 
so profoundly misinterpreted by subsequent generations as Pierre 
Bayle. As Paul Dibon tells us, we must acknowledge that the myth 
of Bayle the sceptic, Bayle the "philosophe", Bayle "dfija voltaiiien" 
Is a legacy of the Enlightenment. As the "philosophes" turned the 
pages of his Dictionnaire, they freely plundered ideas which convinced 
them that Bayle had anticipated precisely what they were trying to 
say themselves. Their utopian visions, their anxiety to remould 
society alerted them to arguments which favoured scepticism or ideas 
useful to their assault on the authority of both Church and State. 
They regarded the Dictionnaire as a collection of largely unrelated 
facts and ideas, without unity and without a common purpose. Its 
articles could be pillaged without regard to their context in the 
work as a whole. 
Their mistake, however, was to presume that the Dictionnaire  
lacked any overall unity. Its encyclopaedic form certainly encouraged 
this idea, but it did have a unifying purpose which clearly dissociated 
Bayle from all the utopian reformism subsequently preached by the 
"philosophes". Bayle was no utopian reformer. If anything, he was 
a propagandist preaching a simple moral: struggle against the human 
frailties of passion and prejudice and accept the principle of 
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religious toleration. Far from wishing to remould society, Bayle 
simply wished to alert Europe to the dangers of a new religious 
holocaust. 
He was a moderate rather than a radical reformer. He con-
servatively upheld the authority of Louis XIV's monarchical abso-
lution because he cared more for political stability than for poli-
tical reform. He stubbornly attacked the prophetic visions of his 
fellow Huguenot Pierre Jurieu because they threatened to upset the 
political stability of Europe which was the Only sound basis for 
religious toleration. When he attacked the authority of the 
Catholic Church, he was not advocating its disestablishMent or 
destruction. He attacked only its claim to infallible orthodoxy 
from which it claimed the right to persecute Protestants. 
If the "philosophes" had recognized the importance of Bayles 
defence of toleration to the Dictioniiiire, they might have been more 
cautious of violating its unity by plundering the footnotes of indi-
vidual articles. They might also have recognized that he drew as 
much upon history as he did upon philosophy in constructing his 
defence of toleration. As I have attempted to show in this thesis, 
Bayle's defence of toleration not only relied upon the assumptions of 
his traditional seventeenth century humanist idea of history, it also 
led him to draw new conclusion and to make significant departures 
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from the humanist tradition. When measured against the purpose 
of his defence of toleration, the myths and misinterpretations 
concerning Bayle which were based upon an eighteenth century 
reading of the Dictionnaire begin to evaporate, and the full 
significance Of his idea of history begins to emerge. 
At the foundation of his idea of history lay his firm 
but pessimistic conviction that man was essentially wicked and un-
happy and incapable of any form of moral progress. It was this 
belief which basically confined his idea of history within the 
traditional limits of seventeenth century historical thought. He 
viewed history simply as a repetition of cycles in which mankind 
experienced neither moral nor material progress. The eighteenth. 
century eventually evolved a belief in progress only when it 
finally overcame its belief in the doctrine of original sin. For 
Bayle, however, history confirmed what his Calvinist faith had 
already taught him to believe: that man was born in sin and with-
out God's grace would always incline towards sin. 
Although it was his belief in the doctrine of original sin 
which determined his pessimistic view of history, his lack of faith 
in historical progress is also reflected in his attitude to knowledge, 
particularly to the scientific advances of his own century. When 
Voltaire observed of him that "ii ne savait presque rien en physique", 
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wisdom of respecting the libertyof each man's conscience. If written 
objectively and without prejudice, history would always point up the 
same moral lessons, because its basic pattern was unchanging. 
When placed alongside his denial of man's ability to progress 
morally, this belief in the moral purpose of history would seem to 
introduce an incongruity into Bayle's theory of history. What was 
the point of his defence of toleration if it was not to impress men 
of the need to control their passions and prejudices? What was the 
value of presenting arguments in defence of toleration if he were 
convinced that man could not benefit from the moral lessons which they 
represented? The answer to this apparent inconsistency, as we have 
seen, is to be found in Bayle's analysis of the origin of evil which 
is perhaps one of the most original aspects of his thought in the 
Dictionnaire.  
The explanation which Bayle provided for the origin of evil 
made no departure from the pre-1685 orthodox Calvinist doctrine. 
When he followed through the reasoning behind the Manichean hypothesis, 
he was not espousing it as his own belief. It is true that he believed 
this hypothesis to be rationally invincible, but he used this fact to 
emphasize the futility of attempting to penetrate the mysteries of 
religion through the powers of reason. No matter what explanation 
men presented for the origin of evil, the result was either rationally 
untenable or led directly to scepticism in religion. His awn answer 
was that we must accept on faith and without question that God conff.rmed 
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the evil in man's nature with the original sin, although man was 
responsible for each subsequent act of evil because of the misuse 
of his free-will. 
It was this emphasis on free-will which provided the just-
ification for Bayle's defence of toleration. Although it would 
always be in man's nature to be pre-disposed towards evil, individual 
men were capable of resisting temptation by the correct exercise of 
their free-will. Just as God implanted the instinct for evil in 
man's nature, so too He had given him an instinctive awareness of 
natural morality. Therefore although history was capable of in-
structing individual men in the wisdom of resisting their passions 
and vices and of being tolerant, the propensity for evil would always 
predominate in the nature of mankind as a whole. 
Bayle's explanation of the origin of evil is also consistent 
with this theory of causation in history. He believed that both 
Providence and man played an equal role in causation. It was not an 
original theory for it went back at least as far as the writings of 
Nicdlo Machiavelli two hundred years before, and was quite common in 
seventeenth century explanation of causation. This only serves to 
emphasize, once again, Bayle's dependence upon the traditions of his 
own century. Providence, he believed, exercised a general control 
over history by controlling the number of influential men in any one 
age, by regulating the number of revolutions and by manipulating the 
forces of nature to maintain a balance in history. Man, on the other 
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hand, played a specific role in causation by exercising his free-
will to determine his particular actions. In common with the 
other historians of the seventeenth century Bayle was preoccupied 
solely with the activities of the "great" men of history, the kings, 
princes, prelates, politicians and theorists. Unlike Voltaire, he 
had no awareness of or interest in social history, and while he gave 
some emphasis to chance or fortune in causation, he gave no place to 
any of the vast impersonal social or economic forces which so charac-
terize the causal explanations of twentieth century historiography. 
This pre-occupation with the role of the individual in 
history did lead Bayle to develop some remarkable insights into the 
whole realm of psychological motivation. In his efforts to under-
stand the reason for man's intolerance to man, he concluded that 
religious prejudice was more often the effect of undisciplined passions 
and emotions than of reasoned beliefs. He labelled these irrational 
factors with the term "temperament" and frequently traced their effects 
with remarkable sensitivity. 
While so much of Bayle's historical outlook was restricted 
by his seventeenth century preconceptions, there were two areas in 
which his thinking made significant departures from previous traditions. 
The first concerns his application of the critical method to historical 
scholarship. The principles of the method were not original, being 
culled from the work of many of his contemporaries, but it was largely 
through the Dictionnaire that they became so popular in the eighteenth 
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century. The method was designed to enable historians to attain the 
highest degree of objectivity possible so that history could be freed 
from all taint of prejudice. The important moral lessons concerning 
toleration required absolute historical truth, and truth, Bayle be- 
lieved, was the soul of history. But what was historical truth? 
It was through his answer to this question that Bayle produced 
his second major departure from the traditions of seventeenth century 
historiography: the complete secularization of history upon which he 
based his ethical criticism of the Bible. Other thinkers had attemp-
ted to sever the umbilical cord which bound history to theology but 
the inviolability of the Bible as an historical document was always 
the problem in such an operation. Both Bodin and Lenain de Tillemont 
tried but without any appreciable success. Bayle sought his answer 
to the problem not by dividing history into human, natural and divine 
sections, but by redefining the nature of the term "truth". He 
advanced a "triple" definition truth, one cord composed of three 
strands: moral, physical and metaphysical. Absolute moral truth, 
which he associated with theology, required only the proof of faith; 
absolute metaphysical truth, which he associated with philosophy, 
required the unchallengeable proof of reason, while physical truth, 
which he associated with history required only the apparent existence 
of facts to be proved. An historian, therefore, who allowed his 
religious beliefs to influence his view of history would be presenting 
religious truth at the expense of historical truth, and the moral value 
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of his historical work would be invalidated. Historical truth was 
unitary, identifiable and productive of absolute certainty while 
religious truth was variable, incapable of universal certainty and 
dependant upon the faith of each individual. 
When applied to biblical facts, this definition allowed Bayle 
to justify an ethical criticism of the Bible. The revealed content 
of the Bible which constituted those facts for which there was an 
explicit qualification by the Holy Ghost, was inviolable and must be 
accepted as true without question. This included such things as the 
miracles of Christ and Moses, the story of Jonah and the whale, and 
the creation and fall of man. Facts, however, for which there was 
no explicit qualification must be submitted to the rigorous tests of 
historical criticism and be proved by the same criteria which applied 
to all historical facts. By this means Bayle freed historians from 
the inhibition of regarding all biblical facts as inviolable and 
effectively removed the last remaining obstacle to the evolution of 
a completely secular approach to history. 
Clearly then, Bayle was far closer to the "erudites" of 
his own century than he was to the "philosophes" of the eighteenth 
century, and he was far more an historian then has generally-been . 
recognized. He was never an entirely original thinker,'nor were his 
arguments always as lucid as one might wish. His historical thinking 
was obviously limited by our standards, even by the standardw.of the 
Enlightenment. Nevertheless, when read in the light of his defence 
of toleration, the Dictionnaire historique et critique reveals Bayle 
to have been, not so much a sceptical philosopher, but a propagandist 
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historian who in some sense did bridge the gap between seventeenth 
and eighteenth century historiography. 
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APPENDIX A  
PUBLISHING HISTORY OF THE DICTIONNAIRE  
Since the only reasonably complete publishing history of the 
Dictionnaire is to be found in volume 16 of Beuchot's edition of 1820, 
I have considered it worthwhile to include here, as an appendix, a 
complete list of all editions in French and English up to 1830. 
French Editions  
1. Projet et fragments d'un dictionnaire critique. Rotterdam, 
R. Leers, i692. 80 , 400p. 
2. Dictionnaire historique et critique. Premiere edition, 2 vols. 
in 4 parts. 	Rotterdam, R. Leers, 1697 [?1696]. 	fol. [On the 
question of the date of this edition see chap.I, p.8, n.15). 
3. Dictionnaire historique et critique, revue, corrigee et augmentee. 
Dehmieme edition, 3 vols. Rotterdam, N.B., 1702. 
4. Dictionnaire historique et critique, par M.B. A laquelle on a  
ajoute la vie de l'auteur & mis sea additions & corrections A  
leur place. Troisieme edition, 3 vols. Rotterdam [Geneve) 
1715. fol. 	[This is a pirated version of the 1702 edition 
with some additions). 
5. Dictionnaire historique et critique, par M.B. Troisene edition, 
[4th. ed.] revue par l'auteur [and edited by P. Marchand). 	4 vols. 
Rotterdam, M. B8hm, 1720. fol. [Less complete and accurate than 
later editions). 
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13. Dictionnaire historique at critique. Douzieme edition. 
Paris, C. -V. Duriez, 1830. 	8° . 
14. Nouveau dictionnaire historique et critique, pour servir de  
supplement au Dictionnaire historique et critique de M. Pierre  
Bayle. par Jacques Georges de Chauffepie. 4 vols. Amsterdam, 
La Haye et Leyden, 	Z. Chatelin, 1750-56. fol. 
15. Extraits du Dictionnaire historique et critique de B. 	[by 
Frederick II]. 	2 vols. 	Berlin, 1765. 	8° . 
16. Extraits du Dictionnaire historique et critique.  Nouvelle edition, 
augmentee. 	2 vols. Amsterdam, 1780. 	8° . 
English Editions  
There were several complete English translations of the 
Dictionnaire during the eighteenth century, but none of these was 
entirely reliable. 
1. An Historical and Critical Dictionary. 4 vols. London, 
B. Harper, etc., 1710. 	fol. 	[Translation of the 1702 French 
edition]. 
2. Historical and Critical Dictionary. 5 vols. London, J.J. & 
P. Knapton, etc., 1734-38. 	fol. 	LA translation collated from 
the various French editions up to 1730 and undertaken by a 
group of Huguenot refugees in England. 	Readily available, but 
not a reliably accurate translation]. 
3. General Dictionary, Historical and Critical:  in which a new and 
accurate translation of that of Mr. Bayle is included by 
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J. P. Bernard, Thomas Birch and John Lockman. 10 vols. London, 
1734-41. 	fol. 
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Adam, (First man): 
Agesilas II: 
Alciat, (Jean Paul): 








Arnauld, (Antoine le grand): 
Arnisaeus: 






Blondel, (Francois ii): 
Bodin: 




















David, (Original article): 
David, (Revised article): 
Domitia: 
Drusus, Marc Livius): 
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Edouard IV: 	Knox: 
Elie: Kuchlin, (jean): 
Elisabeth: 
Elisie: 	 Lamech: 
Emma: Launoi, (Jean de): 
Epicture: Louis XI: 






Farel: Mahomet II: 
Francois let: 	Maldonat, (Jean Jesuite): 
Manicheens: 
Gardie: Marcionites: 
Geldenhaur: 	Marillac, (Charles de): 
Gregoire let: Marillac, (Louis de): 
Gregoire VII: Milton: 
Grotius, (Hugo): 	Nude: 
Guevara: 
Guise, (Francois de): 	Naogeorgus: 
Guise, (Louis de): Naples, (Alphonse Ier de): 
Naples, (Jeanne I de): 
Henri II: 	Navarre, (Marguerite de,fille 
Hipparchia: d'Henri II): 
Hobbes: Nestorius: 
Hospital, (Michael de 1'): 	Nicolle: 
Niphus, (Augustin): 
Japon: 
Jonas, (le prophate): 	Origane: 
Judith: 
Junius, (Francois i): 
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